Share count
13Mpeak FY2025
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SEG, Seaport Entertainment Group Inc.
Seaport is a historic neighborhood in Lower Manhattan on the banks of the East River and within walking distance of the Brooklyn Bridge.
JG was formed in 1997 and has grown from 17 locations in 2013 to over 40 high-end restaurant concepts across five continents, 13 countries and 24 markets.
JG's expertise and versatility allow it to serve the culinary needs of its customers, and with an asset-light platform and highly regarded brand recognition, JG is able to enter new markets and provide customers with a range of culinary options, from high-end restaurants to fast casual concepts to high-quality wholesale products.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$130M
+18.3% YoY · 3% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $115M
Cash burn · annual $40M
Runway 2.9 yrs
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Entertainment (45%) and Hospitality (40%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −93% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −18%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Entertainment at 45%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Entertainment45%$59M
- Hospitality40%$52M
- Rental14%$18M
- Other2%$2M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $119M | $115M | $110M | $130M | $127M | RevenueRevenue |
| 14% | 27% | 57% | 33% | 32% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($67M) | ($757M) | ($102M) | ($118M) | ($128M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −56.0% | −658.8% | −92.7% | −90.6% | −100.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($111M) | ($838M) | ($153M) | ($117M) | ($129M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($30M) | ($51M) | ($53M) | ($50M) | ($40M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $47M | $48M | $35M | $32M | $44M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $34M | $739M | $66M | $35M | $45M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| -5% | -110% | -16% | -19% | -30% | ROICROIC |
| -10% | -218% | -27% | -26% | -31% | Return on equityROE |
| −10% | −218% | −27% | −26% | −31% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $16M | $2M | $166M | $78M | $115M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $14M | $5M | $7M | $7M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $3M | $2M | $2M | $2M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $16M | $7M | $9M | $9M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $617M | $744M | $650M | $542M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $158M | $102M | $100M | $39M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $156M | ($63M) | $23M | ($76M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $1.1B | $385M | $561M | $457M | $413M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 5.5M | 5.5M | 9.1M | 12.7M | 12.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $21.56 | $20.80 | $12.10 | $10.25 | $9.99 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-20.15 | $-151.77 | $-16.82 | $-9.18 | $-10.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $198.51 | $69.70 | $61.65 | $35.89 | $32.46 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.65 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −21.9%/yr | −21.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −43.5%/yr | −43.5%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−19%low FY2023
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $78M − debt $100M
What this means
Netting $78M of cash and short-term investments against $100M of debt leaves $23M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -110%–-5%; -19% latest = NOPAT ($93M) ÷ invested capital $479MIndustry peers: median -28%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -19% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($50M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($117M) · cash from operations ($50M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 1 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $130M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-28.85/share (latest year $-9.12), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $35.66/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −357% → −92% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −357% early to −92% lately, median −93% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2023 · −658.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Artificial intelligence and other machine learning techniques could increase competitive, operational, legal and regulatory risks to our business in ways that we cannot predict.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Peers, Casinos & Gaming
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DKNGDraftKings Inc. | $6.1B | 38% | -44.5% | -79% | -15% |
| STUBStubHub Holdings Inc. | $1.7B | — | 7.8% | -73% | 15% |
| ACELAccel Entertainment Inc. | $1.3B | — | 7.7% | 14% | 7% |
| RSIRush Street Interactive Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | -19.3% | — | -1% |
| OSWOneSpaWorld Holdings Limited | $961M | — | 7.2% | 12% | 6% |
| LLYVALiberty Live Holdings, Inc. | $382M | 19% | -13.5% | -1% | — |
| SEGSeaport Entertainment Group Inc. | $130M | — | -91.7% | -18% | — |
| FBYDFalcon's Beyond Global Inc. | $15M | — | -172.0% | -55% | -148% |
| Group median | — | — | -16.4% | -18% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFThe owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered2%/yr’22→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Seaport Entertainment Group Inc. (SEG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SEG, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SEE its page in the Manual SEI →
Industry order: ← RSI the Casinos & Gaming chapter SGHC →