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GCT, GigaCloud Technology Inc
GigaCloud Marketplace is one of the fastest growing large parcel B2B marketplaces with over $1,576.8 million, $1,341.4 million and $794.4 million of GMV transacted in our marketplace in 2025, 2024 and 2023, respectively.
We are a pioneer of global end-to-end B2B ecommerce solutions for large parcel merchandise.
Our B2B ecommerce platform, which we refer to as the "GigaCloud Marketplace," integrates everything from product discovery to payments to logistics tools into one easy-to-use platform.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Products (67%) and Last-mile delivery service (19%), with 5 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 11% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 84%, above 15% in 5 of 5 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Products is 67% of revenue, with Last-mile delivery service the other meaningful line at 19%.
- Products67%$862M
- Last-mile delivery service19%$245M
- Warehousing service5%$58M
- Ocean transportation service3%$37M
- Packaging service3%$34M
- Others2%$21M
- Other2%$32M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $414M | $490M | $704M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 6% | 5% | 4% | 6% | 4% | 3% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 0% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $39M | $35M | $110M | $131M | $145M | $159M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 9.5% | 7.1% | 15.6% | 11.3% | 11.2% | 11.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $29M | $24M | $94M | $126M | $137M | $148M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 22% | 23% | 18% | 11% | 15% | 15% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $9M | $50M | $133M | $158M | $191M | $159M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $775K | $1M | $3M | $9M | $8M | $9M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($31M) | $15M | $34M | $7M | $40M | ($1M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $709K | $4M | $16M | $8M | $10M | CapexCapex |
| 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.6% | 1.3% | 0.6% | 0.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $8M | $49M | $131M | $150M | $183M | $150M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.9% | 10.0% | 18.6% | 12.9% | 14.2% | 10.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $7M | $49M | $129M | $143M | $183M | $150M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.6% | 10.0% | 18.3% | 12.3% | 14.2% | 10.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $87M | $0 | $0 | $13M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| 86% | 52% | 84% | 80% | 117% | 75% | ROICROIC |
| 29% | 12% | 32% | 31% | 28% | 29% | Return on equityROE |
| 29% | 12% | 32% | 31% | 28% | 29% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $64M | $144M | $183M | $302M | $416M | $363M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $27M | $59M | $57M | $66M | $84M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $78M | $132M | $172M | $188M | $240M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $32M | $70M | $78M | $105M | $99M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $74M | $121M | $152M | $149M | $225M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $258M | $393M | $548M | $691M | $709M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $103M | $206M | $264M | $342M | $343M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.5× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 2.0× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $0 | $13M | $13M | $13M | $13M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $419M | $847M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $207K | $0 | — | — | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($143M) | ($183M) | — | — | ($363M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 127.4× | 61.7× | 88.8× | 510.2× | 724.9× | 535.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $99M | $195M | $290M | $405M | $486M | $510M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.3% | 1.9% | 0.4% | 1.4% | 0.4% | 0.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| 10.2M | 24.4M | 40.9M | 41.2M | 38.2M | 36.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $40.42 | $20.07 | $17.20 | $28.18 | $33.74 | $37.46 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.85 | $0.98 | $2.30 | $3.05 | $3.59 | $4.03 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.76 | $2.01 | $3.19 | $3.63 | $4.78 | $4.07 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.66 | $2.01 | $3.15 | $3.46 | $4.78 | $4.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.18 | $0.03 | $0.11 | $0.38 | $0.21 | $0.27 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $9.68 | $7.99 | $7.10 | $9.84 | $12.71 | $13.88 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×2.38 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.68 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −4.4%/yr | −4.4%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +58.4%/yr | +58.4%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | +5.9%/yr | +5.9%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +3.7%/yr | +3.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | +7.0%/yr | +7.0%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $137M of profit into $183M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $137M | $126M | $94M | $24M | $29M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$8M | +$9M | +$3M | +$1M | +$775K |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$5M | +$17M | +$3M | +$9M | +$10M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$40M | +$7M | +$34M | +$15M | −$31M |
| Cash from operations | $191M | $158M | $133M | $50M | $9M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$8M | −$9M | −$3M | −$709K | −$775K |
| Owner earnings | $183M | $150M | $131M | $49M | $8M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$7M | −$2M | — | −$1M |
| Free cash flow | $183M | $143M | $129M | $49M | $7M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 13% | 19% | 10% | 2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $5M), owner earnings is nearer $178M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 724.9×ComfortableOperating income $145M ÷ interest expense $200K
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $380M + ST investments $36M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $416M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle5-yr median, range 52%–117%; 117% latest = NOPAT $124M ÷ invested capital $106MIndustry peers: median -8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 117% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median margin, range 2%–19%; latest $183M = operating cash $191M − maintenance capex $8MIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $5M of SBC) leaves $178M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $191M ÷ net income $137M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.94×MaintainingCapex $8M ÷ depreciation $8M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.02×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $348M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (5-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.25/share (latest year $3.74), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 5
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 8% → 11% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 8% early to 11% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +56%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 56% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · 7.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Such additional regulations may impact our ability to develop, use, procure and commercialize our AI software or other AI technologies in the future and require us to expend significant resources to modify our products, services, or operations to ensure compliance or remain competitive.…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$363M
- Receivables$84M
- Inventory$240M
- Other current assets$22M
- Accounts payable$99M
- Other current liabilities$244M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $470M, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $540M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$30M · 6%
- Retained (debt / cash)$510M · 94%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $299M.
- Net change in share count258.8%
The diluted count rose from 10M to 37M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained22%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($411M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $92M, so each retained $1 added about 0.22 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Mr. Larry Lei Wu | $163k | $163k | $49M |
| 2023 | Mr. Larry Lei Wu | $287k | $287k | $131M |
| 2024 | Mr. Larry Lei Wu | $3.5M | $3.5M | $150M |
| 2025 | Mr. Larry Lei Wu | $1.9M | $1.9M | $183M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$5M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why GigaCloud Technology Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?258.8%
Diluted shares grew 258.8% over 2021–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, E-Commerce & Marketplaces
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PTRNPattern Group Inc. Series A | $2.5B | 44% | 3.9% | — | 3% |
| GCTGigaCloud Technology Inc | $1.3B | — | 11.2% | 84% | 13% |
| EZPWEZCORP Inc. Class A Non Voting | $1.3B | 79% | 7.7% | 6% | 7% |
| SFIXStitch Fix Inc. | $1.3B | 44% | -3.0% | -35% | 3% |
| LESLLeslie's | $1.2B | 41% | 13.1% | 38% | 3% |
| RVLVRevolve Group | $1.2B | 53% | 6.6% | 39% | 4% |
| BBBYBed Bath & Beyond Inc. | $1.0B | 23% | -4.3% | -201% | -3% |
| HNSTThe Honest Company Inc. | $371M | 33% | -11.3% | -23% | -4% |
| Group median | — | — | 5.3% | 6% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GigaCloud Technology Inc has delivered.
Through the cycle, GigaCloud Technology Inc earns about $166M on its 12.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $150M on 37M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $363M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($10M) runs well above depreciation ($9M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $152M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← GCO its page in the Manual GD →
Industry order: ← DDL the E-Commerce & Marketplaces chapter GRPN →