Share count
45Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← SPH Manual SPIR → ← RSVR Entertainment & Studios STRZ →
SPHR, Sphere Entertainment Co.
Sphere Entertainment Co. is a Nevada corporation with its principal executive office at Two Pennsylvania Plaza, New York, NY, 10121.
Sphere is an experiential medium powered by advanced technologies, and MSG Networks operates two regional sports and entertainment networks, as well as a direct-to-consumer ("DTC") and authenticated streaming product.
The entire exterior surface of Sphere, referred to as the Exosphere , is covered with nearly 580,000 square feet of fully programmable LED lighting, creating the largest LED screen in the world and an impactful display for artistic and branded content.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+19.0% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.3B 5-yr avg $842M
Revenue $386M +37.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 1.9% yr-ago −28.0%
Net income ($2M) yr-ago ($82M)
Net margin −0.4% yr-ago −29.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Ticketing and venue license fee revenues (46%) and Media Networks Revenue (36%), with 3 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 62% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 16% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −24%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 32% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Ticketing and venue license fee revenues at 46%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Ticketing and venue license fee revenues46%$561M
- Media Networks Revenue36%$439M
- Food, beverage and merchandise revenues8%$100M
- Sponsorship, Signage, Exosphere Advertising And Suite Licenses8%$96M
- Other2%$22M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $989M | $1.0B | $1.4B | $790M | $608M | $571M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 28% | 30% | 30% | 54% | 112% | — | — | — | 51% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($31M) | ($46M) | $235M | ($188M) | ($166M) | ($273M) | ($341M) | ($230M) | ($144M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −3.2% | −4.3% | 16.4% | −23.8% | −27.3% | −47.8% | −33.3% | −18.8% | −10.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $7M | ($8M) | $182M | ($148M) | ($194M) | $503M | ($201M) | $33M | $120M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 36% | — | — | 17% | — | 42% | 25% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $144M | $101M | $308M | ($59M) | $141M | $154M | ($20M) | $243M | $373M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $112M | $109M | $112M | $122M | $125M | $103M | $256M | $336M | $337M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($2M) | ($35M) | ($47M) | ($103M) | $134M | ($515M) | ($124M) | ($185M) | ($134M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $187M | $184M | $455M | $456M | $757M | — | — | — | $1.0B | CapexCapex |
| 18.9% | 17.5% | 31.7% | 57.7% | 124.4% | — | — | — | 75.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($43M) | ($83M) | ($147M) | ($515M) | ($615M) | — | — | — | ($632M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −4.3% | −7.9% | −10.2% | −65.2% | −101.2% | — | — | — | −47.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($43M) | ($83M) | ($147M) | ($515M) | ($615M) | — | — | — | ($632M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −4.3% | −7.9% | −10.2% | −65.2% | −101.2% | — | — | — | −47.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $6M | — | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $9M | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | $294M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $50M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -2% | -2% | 8% | -6% | -6% | -6% | -8% | -5% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| 0% | -0% | 6% | -7% | -10% | 19% | -8% | 1% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| 0% | −0% | 6% | −7% | −10% | 19% | −8% | 1% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $747M | $132M | $540M | $521M | $629M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $81M | $57M | $185M | $217M | — | — | — | $214M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | $10M | $14M | $0 | $13M | $14M | $18M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $24M | $17M | $27M | $2M | $40M | $34M | $25M | $36M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $57M | $40M | $167M | $228M | ($40M) | ($21M) | ($10M) | $196M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $1.2B | $624M | $761M | $810M | $904M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $474M | $510M | $730M | $961M | $692M | $1.4B | $743M | $743M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.8× | 2.8× | 2.6× | 1.3× | 0.9× | 0.6× | 1.1× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $148M | $166M | $499M | $457M | $457M | $457M | $470M | $345M | $345M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $3.3B | $3.7B | $5.3B | $5.5B | $5.0B | $4.5B | $4.2B | $4.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $55M | $34M | $1.7B | $996M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $830M | $810M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($1.1B) | ($1.2B) | $188M | $248M | $1.1B | $814M | $309M | $181M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -2.6× | -8.2× | 6.4× | -9.2× | -6.1× | — | -4.3× | — | -1.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.6B | $2.4B | $2.2B | $2.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.8% | 3.4% | 4.3% | 8.9% | 12.7% | 11.0% | 4.7% | 4.8% | 3.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | $89M | — | — | — | — | $65M | $65M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 24.0M | 24.0M | 34.9M | 34.3M | 34.3M | 34.9M | 35.3M | 45.3M | 35.9M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $41.22 | $43.72 | $41.10 | $23.06 | $17.75 | $16.35 | $29.00 | $26.89 | $36.91 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.29 | $-0.34 | $5.20 | $-4.33 | $-5.67 | $14.39 | $-5.68 | $0.74 | $3.34 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.79 | $-3.44 | $-4.21 | $-15.03 | $-17.96 | — | — | — | $-17.62 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.79 | $-3.44 | $-4.21 | $-15.03 | $-17.96 | — | — | — | $-17.62 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $7.81 | $7.67 | $13.03 | $13.31 | $22.09 | — | — | — | $28.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $103.88 | $107.20 | $81.73 | $63.31 | $57.31 | $73.97 | $68.43 | $49.30 | $62.65 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −5.9%/yr | −8.1%/yr |
| EPS | +14.4%/yr | −32.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +29.7%/yr (4-yr) | +29.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −10.1%/yr | −9.6%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−5%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($615M)owner earningsvs.($194M)net incomelow FY2022
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2022 the business reported a $194M loss but ($615M) of owner earnings: $421M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($194M) | ($148M) | $182M | ($8M) | $7M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$125M | +$122M | +$112M | +$109M | +$112M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$77M | +$71M | +$61M | +$35M | +$27M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$134M | −$103M | −$47M | −$35M | −$2M |
| Cash from operations | $141M | ($59M) | $308M | $101M | $144M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$757M | −$456M | −$455M | −$184M | −$187M |
| Owner earnings | ($615M) | ($515M) | ($147M) | ($83M) | ($43M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -101% | -65% | -10% | -8% | -4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $77M), owner earnings is nearer ($693M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“As a result of the accounting error, the Company re-evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's internal control over financial reporting and identified a material weakness as of June 30, 2021, September 30, 2021, December 31, 2021 and March 31, 2022.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($230M) ÷ interest expense $80M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $521M − debt $830M
What this means
Netting $521M of cash and short-term investments against $830M of debt leaves $309M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -8%–8%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($134M) ÷ invested capital $2.5BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -101%–-4%; latest ($513M) = operating cash $243M − maintenance capex $757MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -42% of revenue this year, a -10% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $59M of SBC) leaves ($572M).
- Cash-backedCash from ops $243M ÷ net income $33M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.25×ExpandingCapex $757M ÷ depreciation $336M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $830M vs $67M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +86%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.12/share (latest year $0.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $62.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → −33% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −33% lately, median −24% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −20%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2023 · −47.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“The experience uses technologies, including artificial intelligence and visual effects, to bring The Wizard of Oz to Sphere's 160,000 square foot interior display plane and takes advantage of Sphere Immersive Sound's 167,000 programmable speakers to direct sound around the venue.…”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$904M
- Cash & short-term investments$629M
- Receivables$214M
- Inventory$18M
- Other current assets$42M
Current liabilities$743M
- Debt due within a year$58M
- Accounts payable$36M
- Other current liabilities$648M
Current ratio1.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.19×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.85×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$161Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$58M due · $629M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+37.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$938M$128M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$194Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2022
Over the record, the business generated $637M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$2.0B · 320%
- Buybacks$294M · 46%
- Returned to owners$294M
$0 as dividends and $294M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.7B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.7B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $597M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $294M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count49.5%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 36M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$367M9% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity15%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$16Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $2.0B of capital spent building
$154M written down across 2 years (2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Dolan | $8.3M | −$741k | ($148M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Dolan | $19.2M | $9.3M | ($194M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Dolan | $16.3M | $12.1M | $503M |
| 2024 | Mr. Dolan | $27.4M | $29.2M | ($201M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Dolan | $14.3M | $215.6M | $33M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership5.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio379:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$59M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Sphere Entertainment Co. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−83.2% vs −6.1%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −6.1%) and the loss has widened to −83.2% across the last three years, with the latest year at −101.2%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?49.5%
Diluted shares grew 49.5% over 2018–2022, even as the company spent $294M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Entertainment & Studios
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FUNCedar Fair | $3.1B | 91% | 14.2% | -19% | 6% |
| PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc. | $1.7B | — | 18.6% | 16% | 10% |
| PLNTPlanet Fitness | $1.3B | 81% | 28.6% | 16% | 20% |
| SPHRSphere Entertainment Co. | $1.2B | — | -21.3% | -6% | -10% |
| LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation | $1.2B | 30% | 11.4% | 8% | 4% |
| MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp. | $1.0B | — | -3.4% | -3% | 7% |
| MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. | $863M | — | 12.6% | 13% | — |
| BATRAAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series A | $732M | — | -5.6% | -3% | -10% |
| Group median | — | — | 12.0% | 3% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFSphere Entertainment Co. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered−0%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−48%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sphere Entertainment Co. (SPHR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SPHR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← SPH its page in the Manual SPIR →
Industry order: ← RSVR the Entertainment & Studios chapter STRZ →