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TCX, Tucows Inc.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Distress / turnaroundCyclical

A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TCX · Tucows Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$390M

+7.7% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $392M 5-yr avg $343M

Gross margin 24% 5-yr avg 23%

Operating margin −6.6% 5-yr avg −11.0%

ROIC −30% 5-yr avg −21%

Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 0%

Free cash flow margin −2% 5-yr avg −21%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 13% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −2.6%) on a 26% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 13% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$190M	$329M	$346M	$337M	$311M	$304M	$321M	$339M	$362M	$390M	$392M	RevenueRevenue
37%	30%	33%	30%	27%	26%	24%	20%	23%	24%	24%	Gross marginGross mgn
6%	4%	5%	5%	7%	7%	10%	10%	10%	11%	11%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	5%	4%	6%	5%	5%	5%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$25M	$27M	$29M	$29M	$7M	($8M)	($32M)	($64M)	($65M)	($23M)	($26M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
13.2%	8.2%	8.5%	8.7%	2.2%	−2.6%	−9.9%	−18.8%	−17.9%	−6.0%	−6.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$16M	$22M	$17M	$15M	$6M	$3M	($28M)	($96M)	($110M)	($76M)	($79M)	Net incomeNet inc.
36%	7%	34%	37%	46%	54%	—	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$23M	$32M	$37M	$40M	$36M	$30M	$20M	($5M)	($20M)	($6M)	$9M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$504K	$585K	$424K	$486K	$488K	$534K	$598K	$10M	$4M	$4M	$4M	DepreciationDeprec.
$5M	$8M	$17M	$22M	$26M	$21M	$39M	$73M	$79M	$59M	$77M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$8M	$13M	$28M	$44M	$44M	$73M	$137M	$92M	$56M	$17M	$17M	CapexCapex
4.2%	3.9%	8.1%	13.1%	14.3%	24.0%	42.6%	27.1%	15.6%	4.4%	4.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$22M	$31M	$37M	$40M	$36M	$29M	$19M	($15M)	($24M)	($9M)	$5M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.6%	9.5%	10.6%	11.8%	11.4%	9.6%	6.0%	−4.3%	−6.6%	−2.4%	1.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$15M	$19M	$9M	($4M)	($8M)	($44M)	($117M)	($97M)	($76M)	($23M)	($8M)	Free cash flowFCF
7.7%	5.8%	2.7%	−1.1%	−2.7%	−14.3%	−36.4%	−28.5%	−21.0%	−5.9%	−2.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$7M	—	$0	$5M	$3M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
48%	21%	15%	10%	2%	-1%	-8%	-36%	-38%	-23%	-30%	ROICROIC
42%	37%	21%	16%	6%	3%	-29%	-974%	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
42%	37%	21%	16%	6%	3%	−29%	−974%	—	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$15M	$18M	$13M	$20M	$8M	$9M	$23M	$93M	$57M	$47M	$44M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$11M	$12M	$11M	$15M	$16M	$15M	$18M	$22M	$21M	$24M	$28M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1M	$3M	$4M	$3M	$2M	$3M	$7M	$7M	$4M	$4M	$3M	InventoryInvent.
$5M	$7M	$8M	$7M	$6M	$10M	$17M	$13M	$9M	$10M	$10M	Accounts payablePayables
$7M	$8M	$6M	$11M	$11M	$8M	$9M	$16M	$16M	$18M	$21M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$83M	$154M	$132M	$146M	$141M	$147M	$170M	$243M	$205M	$203M	$200M	Current assetsCur. assets
$84M	$179M	$165M	$157M	$163M	$174M	$188M	$201M	$200M	$330M	$337M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	0.9×	0.8×	0.9×	0.9×	0.8×	0.9×	1.2×	1.0×	0.6×	0.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$21M	$90M	$90M	$110M	$116M	$130M	$130M	$130M	$130M	$130M	$130M	GoodwillGoodwill
$154M	$351M	$340M	$426M	$452M	$540M	$665M	$798M	$759M	$731M	$729M	Total assetsAssets
$11M	$78M	$65M	$114M	$122M	$191M	$240M	$223M	$288M	$292M	$293M	Total debtDebt
($4M)	$60M	$53M	$94M	$114M	$182M	$216M	$130M	$231M	$245M	$248M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	-1.7×	-2.2×	-1.4×	-1.2×	-0.4×	-0.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$38M	$60M	$80M	$94M	$105M	$115M	$97M	$10M	($95M)	($164M)	($181M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	0.9%	1.2%	1.5%	2.4%	2.4%	1.9%	1.8%	1.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
10.7M	10.8M	10.8M	10.8M	10.7M	10.8M	10.8M	10.9M	11.0M	11.1M	11.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$17.72	$30.52	$32.06	$31.30	$29.11	$28.13	$29.82	$31.23	$33.03	$35.27	$35.27	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.50	$2.07	$1.59	$1.43	$0.54	$0.31	$-2.56	$-8.85	$-10.02	$-6.85	$-7.08	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.05	$2.90	$3.41	$3.70	$3.33	$2.69	$1.79	$-1.35	$-2.19	$-0.84	$0.47	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.36	$1.76	$0.86	$-0.34	$-0.78	$-4.02	$-10.85	$-8.91	$-6.95	$-2.07	$-0.74	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.74	$1.20	$2.59	$4.09	$4.16	$6.76	$12.69	$8.47	$5.15	$1.55	$1.55	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.53	$5.58	$7.39	$8.74	$9.79	$10.64	$8.98	$0.91	$-8.69	$-14.84	$-16.30	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.0%/yr	+3.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+8.6%/yr	−17.9%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

11Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−23%low FY2024

Gross margin

24%low FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

11.2×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($9M)owner earningsvs.($76M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2022

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($9M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $4M it takes just to hold its position. It put $14M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($23M).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($76M)	($110M)	($96M)	($28M)	$3M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$4M	+$4M	+$10M	+$598K	+$534K
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$7M	+$7M	+$8M	+$8M	+$5M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$59M	+$79M	+$73M	+$39M	+$21M
Cash from operations	($6M)	($20M)	($5M)	$20M	$30M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$4M	−$4M	−$10M	−$598K	−$534K
Owner earnings	($9M)	($24M)	($15M)	$19M	$29M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$14M	−$52M	−$82M	−$136M	−$73M
Free cash flow	($23M)	($76M)	($97M)	($117M)	($44M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-2%	-7%	-4%	6%	10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $4M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $14M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $7M), owner earnings is nearer ($16M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.4×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($23M) ÷ interest expense $57M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $245M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $47M − debt $292M

What this means
Netting $47M of cash and short-term investments against $292M of debt leaves $245M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 15d

Tight

DSO 23 + DIO 5 − DPO 12 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -1%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -38%–48%; -23% latest = NOPAT ($19M) ÷ invested capital $81M

Industry peers: median -11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -23% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -7%–12%; latest ($9M) = operating cash ($6M) − maintenance capex $4M

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. It chose to put $14M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($23M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $7M of SBC) leaves ($16M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($6M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($76M) · cash from operations ($6M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 4.85×

Expanding

Capex $17M ÷ depreciation $4M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $390M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.61×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $292M vs ($127M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −608%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-8.43/share (latest year $-6.80), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-14.73/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → −14% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to −14% lately, median −3% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2023 · −18.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Additionally, emerging e-commerce platforms and AI-generated website builders could disrupt the traditional domain ecosystem, requiring us to adapt or risk losing market share.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$200M

Cash & short-term investments$44M
Receivables$28M
Inventory$3M
Other current assets$125M

Current liabilities$337M

Accounts payable$10M
Other current liabilities$328M

Current ratio0.59×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.58×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.13×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($137M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($331M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$262M$71M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$158Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $187M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$513M · 274%
Buybacks$15M · 8%

Returned to owners$15M
9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $15M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$341M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $341M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $11M to $293M.
Average price paid for buybacks$32.15
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $15M, about $32.15 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $23.28 (2016) to $48.97 (2019); its heaviest year, 2016, paid $23.28 ($7M).
Net change in share count3.8%
The diluted count rose from 11M to 11M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$150M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$76Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $513M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$781k	$853k	$29M
2022	$1.3M	$967k	$19M
2023	$1.1M	$2.1M	($15M)
2024	$976k	$507k	($24M)
2025	$785k	$887k	($9M)
2025	$3.1M	$3.1M	($9M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$7M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tucows Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−4.4% vs 10.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.6% early in the record and −4.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.8%
Diluted shares grew 3.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $15M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$11M → $293M
Debt rose from $11M to $293M while owner earnings went from about $30M to ($16M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $37M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LZLegalZoom.com Inc.	$756M	66%	3.3%	—	15%
HNGEHinge Health Inc.	$588M	77%	-44.6%	—	12%
IBEXIBEX Limited	$558M	—	7.7%	31%	4%
LIFLife360 Inc.	$489M	76%	-15.2%	-28%	-4%
YEXTYext Inc.	$447M	75%	-24.8%	-85%	1%
TCXTucows Inc.	$390M	27%	-0.2%	0%	10%
OOMAOoma Inc.	$274M	61%	-2.7%	-11%	1%
INODInnodata Inc.	$252M	—	-0.8%	-1%	3%
Group median	—	70%	-1.7%	-6%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tucows Inc. has delivered.

Tucows Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Tucows Inc. earns about $37M on its 9.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($37M) Net of stock comp (−$7M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($5M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($8M) on 11M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $248M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($17M) runs well above depreciation ($4M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $5M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TCX against another business →

The owners of TCX: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Tucows Inc. (TCX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TCX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TCMD its page in the Manual TDAY →

Industry order: ← TBRG the IT Services & Consulting chapter TOST →