Owner Scorecard


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LIF, Life360 Inc.

Life360 is a leading technology platform connecting millions of people throughout the world to the people, pets and things they care about most.

We have created a new category at the intersection of family, technology, and safety to help keep families connected and safe.

Our suite of product and service offerings, including the Life360 and Tile mobile applications, and related third-party services, is system and platform-agnostic, allowing our products and services to work seamlessly for our members, regardless of the different devices they use.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
LIF · Life360 Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$489M
+31.8% YoY · 43% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $529M 5-yr avg $301M
Gross margin 77% 5-yr avg 74%
Operating margin 1.6% 5-yr avg −15.6%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg −29%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg −1%
Free cash flow margin 17% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Cost of subscription revenue (75%) and Hardware (11%), with 2 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −21% through the cycle on a 75% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 11% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −28%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Cost of subscription revenue is 75% of revenue, with Hardware the other meaningful line at 11%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Cost of subscription revenue75%$369M
  • Hardware11%$52M
  • Partnership7%$36M
  • Data7%$33M
By geographyNorth America87%EMEA7%Other international regions6%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$81M$113M$228M$305M$371M$489M$529MRevenueRevenue
81%80%65%73%75%78%77%Gross marginGross mgn
15%21%21%17%16%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
49%45%45%33%30%26%26%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($17M)($32M)($94M)($30M)($8M)$19M$9MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−20.6%−28.6%−41.4%−9.8%−2.1%3.8%1.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
($16M)($34M)($92M)($28M)($5M)$151M$149MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($7M)($12M)($57M)$8M$33M$89M$94MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$657K$876K$9M$9M$10M$13M$16MDepreciationDeprec.
$336K$9M($9M)($12M)($15M)($131M)($133M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$653K$81K$0$506K$1M$2M$2MCapexCapex
0.8%0.1%0.0%0.2%0.3%0.4%0.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($8M)($12M)($57M)$7M$31M$87M$92MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−9.8%−10.9%−25.0%2.3%8.5%17.7%17.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($8M)($12M)($57M)$7M$31M$87M$92MFree cash flowFCF
−9.8%−10.9%−25.0%2.3%8.5%17.7%17.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$3M$111M$0$0$3M$56MAcquisitionsAcquis.
-169%-93%-42%-13%-3%5%2%ROICROIC
-25%-13%-37%-11%-1%28%25%Return on equityROE
−25%−13%−37%−11%−1%28%25%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$56M$231M$75M$69M$159M$494M$351MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$12M$33M$42M$58M$81M$95MReceivablesReceiv.
$2M$11M$4M$8M$10M$15MInventoryInvent.
$3M$14M$6M$5M$8M$22MAccounts payablePayables
$11M$30M$40M$61M$82M$88MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$257M$143M$131M$241M$606M$590MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$41M$88M$71M$77M$97M$110MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
6.2×1.6×1.9×3.1×6.3×5.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$31M$134M$134M$134M$135M$174MGoodwillGoodwill
$302M$340M$322M$442M$960M$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$8M$8M$5M$0$310M$311MTotal debtDebt
($223M)($68M)($64M)($159M)($184M)($40M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$64M$250M$245M$247M$359M$548M$598MShareholders’ equityEquity
10.0%10.4%15.2%12.6%11.4%11.3%11.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
49.3M51.7M62.8M66.7M72.1M85.2M85.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$1.63$2.18$3.63$4.56$5.15$5.75$6.17Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.33$-0.65$-1.46$-0.42$-0.06$1.77$1.74EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.16$-0.24$-0.91$0.11$0.44$1.02$1.08Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.16$-0.24$-0.91$0.11$0.44$1.02$1.08Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.01$0.02$0.02$0.02Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.30$4.84$3.89$3.70$4.97$6.44$6.98Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+28.6%/yr+28.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.7%/yr+9.7%/yr
Book value / share+37.7%/yr+37.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
85Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
5%low FY2020
Gross margin
78%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$87Mowner earningsvs.$151Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $151M of profit but $87M of owner earnings: $64M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$151M
Owner earnings$87M · 18% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$151M($5M)($28M)($92M)($34M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$13M+$10M+$9M+$9M+$876K
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$55M+$42M+$39M+$35M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$131M−$15M−$12M−$9M+$9M
Cash from operations$89M$33M$8M($57M)($12M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$2M−$1M−$506K−$81K
Owner earnings$87M$31M$7M($57M)($12M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue18%8%2%-25%-11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $55M), owner earnings is nearer $31M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have identified a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting in the past.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $494M − debt $310M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $184M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 60 + DIO 33 − DPO 28 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -169%–5%; 5% latest = NOPAT $19M ÷ invested capital $364M
    Industry peers: median 1%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High, recently turned positive
    latest $87M = operating cash $89M − maintenance capex $2M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (6-yr median -10%)
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a -10% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $55M of SBC) leaves $31M.

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops $89M ÷ net income $151M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.13×
    Harvesting
    Capex $2M ÷ depreciation $13M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $489M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.26×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $310M vs $509M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.49/share (latest year $1.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.77/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −30% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −30% early to −3% lately, median −21% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 28%
    What this means

    Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.

  • Worst year 2022 · −41.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +11.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If we are unable to adequately protect or enforce intellectual property rights related to AI-enabled technologies, or if we are subject to increased intellectual property claims arising from the use of such technologies, our competitive position, business, financial condition, and results of operations could be adverse…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$590M
  • Cash & short-term investments$351M
  • Receivables$95M
  • Inventory$15M
  • Other current assets$129M
Current liabilities$110M
  • Accounts payable$22M
  • Other current liabilities$88M
Current ratio5.37×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio5.23×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$480Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+38.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.8× → 5.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$342Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$147MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5M$263K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$52Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2020–2025

Over the record, the business generated $52M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$4M · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$48M · 92%
  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $295M.

  • Net change in share count73.6%

    The diluted count rose from 49M to 86M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022$3.9M$504k($57M)
2022$3.9M$504k($57M)
2023$1.9M$3.5M$7M
2023$1.9M$3.5M$7M
2024Chris Hulls$4.4M$11.0M$31M
2025$8.7M$14.6M$87M
2025$12.3M$16.6M$87M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership6.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$55M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 11% of revenue, equal to 295% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GDRXGoodRx Holdings Inc.$797M5.1%2%20%
UPWKUpwork Inc.$788M73%-5.3%-7%3%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock$723M90%8.1%5%21%
HNGEHinge Health Inc.$588M77%-44.6%12%
IBEXIBEX Limited$558M7.7%31%4%
LIFLife360 Inc.$489M76%-15.2%-28%-4%
YEXTYext Inc.$447M75%-24.8%-85%1%
TCXTucows Inc.$390M27%-0.2%0%10%
Group median76%-2.7%0%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Life360 Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+252%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $92M on 81M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net cash $40M. The if-converted diluted count is 86M, 6% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Life360 Inc. (LIF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LIF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LHX its page in the Manual LIFE →

Industry order: ← ISSC the IT Services & Consulting chapter LZ →