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YEXT, Yext Inc.

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Our platform powers all of our key products, including Listings, Reviews, Pages, Search, Social, Relate, and Scout, each with robust analytics capabilities for businesses to easily track performance across customer experiences.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

YEXT · Yext Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$447M

+6.1% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $445M 5-yr avg $413M

Gross margin 74% 5-yr avg 76%

Operating margin 11.0% 5-yr avg −7.7%

ROIC 57% 5-yr avg −22%

Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −27% through the cycle on a 74% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 13% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −85%, above 15% in 1 of 3 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

North America is 81% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.

Revenue by geography, FY2026

North America81%$362M
International19%$85M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$124M	$170M	$228M	$299M	$355M	$391M	$401M	$404M	$421M	$447M	$445M	RevenueRevenue
70%	74%	75%	74%	76%	75%	74%	78%	77%	74%	74%	Gross marginGross mgn
23%	24%	23%	26%	21%	21%	20%	18%	25%	14%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
16%	15%	16%	17%	16%	17%	18%	18%	18%	20%	20%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($43M)	($67M)	($76M)	($123M)	($94M)	($90M)	($65M)	($6M)	($32M)	$45M	$49M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−34.4%	−39.2%	−33.1%	−41.1%	−26.6%	−23.0%	−16.2%	−1.5%	−7.7%	10.0%	11.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($43M)	($67M)	($75M)	($122M)	($95M)	($93M)	($66M)	($3M)	($28M)	$38M	$40M	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
($14M)	($32M)	$5M	($31M)	$1M	$22M	$18M	$46M	$50M	$56M	$56M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1M	$2M	$4M	$8M	$10M	$16M	$18M	$16M	$11M	$11M	$10M	DepreciationDeprec.
$19M	$10M	$32M	$16M	$14M	$25M	$3M	($12M)	$15M	($41M)	($40M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4M	$4M	$5M	$12M	$65M	$13M	$6M	$3M	$2M	$3M	$2M	CapexCapex
2.8%	2.2%	2.3%	4.0%	18.4%	3.4%	1.5%	0.7%	0.5%	0.6%	0.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($15M)	($34M)	$2M	($38M)	($9M)	$8M	$12M	$43M	$48M	$53M	$53M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−11.8%	−20.2%	0.8%	−12.8%	−2.5%	2.2%	2.9%	10.7%	11.4%	11.9%	11.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($17M)	($36M)	($30K)	($43M)	($64M)	$8M	$12M	$43M	$48M	$53M	$53M	Free cash flowFCF
−13.7%	−21.2%	−0.0%	−14.3%	−18.0%	2.2%	2.9%	10.7%	11.4%	11.9%	11.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$89M	$19M	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$77M	$23M	$18M	$67M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	-112%	—	—	—	—	—	—	-85%	41%	57%	ROICROIC
—	-82%	-89%	-60%	-46%	-44%	-52%	-2%	-18%	24%	162%	Return on equityROE
—	−82%	−89%	−60%	−46%	−44%	−52%	−2%	−18%	24%	162%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$24M	$118M	$92M	$256M	$230M	$261M	$190M	$210M	$123M	$154M	$176M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$28M	$45M	$55M	$81M	$97M	$102M	$110M	$108M	$113M	$121M	$70M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$5M	$4M	$8M	$10M	$13M	$9M	$7M	$7M	$5M	$6M	$5M	Accounts payablePayables
$22M	$40M	$47M	$71M	$84M	$92M	$102M	$101M	$108M	$115M	$65M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$62M	$180M	$230M	$378M	$376M	$410M	$347M	$360M	$286M	$318M	$208M	Current assetsCur. assets
$84M	$118M	$180M	$245M	$260M	$291M	$291M	$268M	$345M	$297M	$264M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	1.5×	1.3×	1.5×	1.4×	1.4×	1.2×	1.3×	0.8×	1.1×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4M	$5M	$5M	$5M	$5M	$5M	$4M	$4M	$97M	$111M	$111M	GoodwillGoodwill
$86M	$203M	$267M	$564M	$596M	$620M	$524M	$509M	$610M	$622M	$499M	Total assetsAssets
$5M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$98M	$148M	Total debtDebt
($19M)	($118M)	—	—	—	—	—	—	($123M)	($56M)	($28M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-284.7×	-185.6×	—	—	—	—	-110.1×	-13.2×	-33.6×	5.9×	4.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($128M)	$81M	$85M	$201M	$207M	$212M	$128M	$147M	$153M	$159M	$24M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
7.9%	13.1%	19.4%	22.7%	20.4%	18.8%	15.7%	11.1%	12.3%	10.9%	10.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
31.1M	78.6M	98.4M	112M	120M	128M	125M	124M	127M	130M	113M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$4.00	$2.16	$2.32	$2.67	$2.96	$3.06	$3.20	$3.26	$3.32	$3.44	$3.94	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.39	$-0.85	$-0.76	$-1.09	$-0.79	$-0.73	$-0.53	$-0.02	$-0.22	$0.29	$0.35	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.47	$-0.44	$0.02	$-0.34	$-0.07	$0.07	$0.09	$0.35	$0.38	$0.41	$0.47	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.55	$-0.46	$-0.00	$-0.38	$-0.53	$0.07	$0.09	$0.35	$0.38	$0.41	$0.47	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.11	$0.05	$0.05	$0.11	$0.54	$0.10	$0.05	$0.02	$0.02	$0.02	$0.02	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-4.11	$1.04	$0.86	$1.80	$1.73	$1.66	$1.02	$1.19	$1.21	$1.23	$0.22	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.53 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−1.7%/yr	+3.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−17.6%/yr	−48.5%/yr
Book value / share	—	−6.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

130Mpeak FY2026

ROIC

41%low FY2018

Gross margin

74%low FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$53Mowner earningsvs.$38Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $38M of profit into $53M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$38M

Owner earnings$53M · 12% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$38M	($28M)	($3M)	($66M)	($93M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$11M	+$11M	+$16M	+$18M	+$16M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$49M	+$52M	+$45M	+$63M	+$73M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$41M	+$15M	−$12M	+$3M	+$25M
Cash from operations	$56M	$50M	$46M	$18M	$22M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$3M	−$2M	−$3M	−$6M	−$13M
Owner earnings	$53M	$48M	$43M	$12M	$8M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	12%	11%	11%	3%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $49M), owner earnings is nearer $5M.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“We previously identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.9×

Comfortable

Operating income $45M ÷ interest expense $8M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$140M

Net cash

Cash $154M + ST investments $84M − debt $98M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $140M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 80d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 99 + DIO 0 − DPO 19 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -85%

Below average through the cycle

3-yr median, range -112%–41%; 41% latest = NOPAT $42M ÷ invested capital $103M

Industry peers: median -3%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 41% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 12%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $53M = operating cash $56M − maintenance capex $3M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $49M of SBC) leaves $5M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.47×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $56M ÷ net income $38M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 127%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $67M ÷ Owner Earnings $53M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $53M of Owner Earnings, $67M (127%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $67M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $49M stock comp, the real buyback was about $19M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.24×

Harvesting

Capex $3M ÷ depreciation $11M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $447M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $98M vs $21M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.02/share (latest year $0.38), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.59/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −36% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −36% early to 0% lately, median −27% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −41.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Accordingly, while AI-powered applications may help provide more tailored or personalized learner experiences, if the content, analyses, answers or recommendations that AI-powered applications assist in producing on our platform are, or are perceived to be, deficient, inaccurate, biased, unethical or otherwise flawed, …”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$208M

Cash & short-term investments$176M
Receivables$70M

Current liabilities$264M

Accounts payable$5M
Other current liabilities$259M

Current ratio0.79×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.79×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.67×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($56M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($167M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($267M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$225M$77M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$201Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $122M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$116M · 96%
Buybacks$186M · 153%

Returned to owners$186M
263% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $186M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$180M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $180M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $5M to $148M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $186M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count263.6%
The diluted count rose from 31M to 113M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$196M32% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity70%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$108Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $116M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Howard Lerman	$6.9M	$1.8M	$8M
2023	Howard Lerman	$117k	−$4.3M	$12M
2023	Michael Walrath	$11.4M	$11.1M	$12M
2024	Michael Walrath	$7.6M	$6.5M	$43M
2025	Michael Walrath	$540k	−$1.8M	$48M
2026	Michael Walrath	$8.7M	$15.6M	$53M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$49M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 11% of revenue, equal to 109% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Yext Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?263.6%
Diluted shares grew 263.6% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $186M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$5M → $148M
Debt rose from $5M to $148M while owner earnings went from about ($16M) to $48M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
UPWKUpwork Inc.	$788M	73%	-5.3%	-7%	3%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock	$723M	90%	8.1%	5%	21%
HNGEHinge Health Inc.	$588M	77%	-44.6%	—	12%
IBEXIBEX Limited	$558M	—	7.7%	31%	4%
LIFLife360 Inc.	$489M	76%	-15.2%	-28%	-4%
YEXTYext Inc.	$447M	75%	-24.8%	-85%	1%
TCXTucows Inc.	$390M	27%	-0.2%	0%	10%
OOMAOoma Inc.	$274M	61%	-2.7%	-11%	1%
Group median	—	75%	-4.0%	-7%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Yext Inc. has delivered.

Yext Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Yext Inc. earns about $7M on its 1.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($7M) Net of stock comp (−$46M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+50%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+59%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $53M on 100M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-19; net cash $28M. The if-converted diluted count is 113M, 13% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh YEXT against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Yext Inc. (YEXT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/YEXT, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← YETI its page in the Manual YORW →

Industry order: ← WKEY the IT Services & Consulting chapter YMT →