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TJGC, TJGC Group Limited
Revenue is led by Offline advertising and web banner (59%) and Online advertising (35%), with 2 more lines behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A diversified business; where the profit really comes from, and whether it is earned or bought, is what the segment detail settles.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Net current asset value. Current assets alone exceed every liability combined, and the surplus is most of the balance sheet: the shape Graham called a net-net.
- What moves the needle
- Where the revenue and the profit actually come from, and whether the returns are earned by a real advantage or bought with capital. The segment detail in the 10-K is where this one is settled. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Offline advertising and web banner at 59%.
- Offline advertising and web banner59%HK$18M
- Online advertising35%HK$11M
- Other services5%HK$1M
- Provisioning of strategic planning services1%HK$369K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -89.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income (HK$26M) ÷ interest expense HK$295K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash HK$0 − debt HK$8M
What this means
Netting HK$0 of cash and short-term investments against HK$8M of debt leaves HK$8M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 31 + DIO 0 − DPO 20 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below averageNOPAT (HK$21M) ÷ invested capital HK$38M (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median -16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Are earnings backed by cash? (HK$35M)Loss, and burning cashNet income (HK$27M) · cash from operations (HK$35M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 2 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · HK$30M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 7.08×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · HK$8M vs HK$28M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are HK$-0.81/share (latest year HK$-1.75), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is HK$1.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
Despite the structural exposure, the latest 10-K does not name AI as a competitive risk, which is itself worth a question.
The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- ReceivablesHK$3M
- Other current assetsHK$31M
- Accounts payableHK$1M
- Other current liabilitiesHK$3M
From the company's latest filing.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈HK$3M · 11% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“For the year ended March 31, 2025, one customer accounted for 10.6 % of the Company's total revenue.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Advertising & Marketing
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARLOArlo Technologies Inc. | $529M | 25% | -9.4% | -46% | -6% |
| NVEENV5 Global | $491M | — | 11.5% | 7% | 9% |
| LQDTLiquidity Services Inc. | $477M | — | 6.4% | 37% | 12% |
| PHRPhreesia Inc. | $468M | — | -17.3% | -36% | -7% |
| SEZLSezzle Inc. | $236M | — | -5.4% | -141% | 14% |
| ASPSAltisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. | $171M | 26% | 2.4% | 5% | -3% |
| CASSCass Information Systems Inc | $108M | — | 35.6% | — | 29% |
| TJGCTJGC Group Limited | HK$30M | 22% | -86.5% | -55% | — |
| Group median | — | 25% | -1.5% | -36% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. TJGC Group Limited reports in HKD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that HKD, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in HKD. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← TIMB its page in the Manual TK →
Industry order: ← STGW the Advertising & Marketing chapter WPP →