Share count
194Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← TJX Manual TKR → ← STRZ Entertainment & Studios WMG →
TKO, TKO Group Holdings Inc.
Entertainment & Studios diversified
TKO was formed through the combination of Zuffa Parent, LLC which owns and operates the Ultimate Fighting Championship, a preeminent combat sports brand, and World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc.
Monetizes its brands through four principal activities: (i) Media rights, production and content, (ii) Live events and hospitality, (iii) Partnerships and marketing, and (iv) Consumer products licensing.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$4.7B
−3.1% YoY · 46% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.1B 5-yr avg $3.0B
Revenue $1.6B +25.9% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 21.2% yr-ago 18.7%
Net income $250M yr-ago $166M
Net margin 15.6% yr-ago 13.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by WWE (36%) and UFC (32%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 18% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.6% to 48% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest WWE at 36%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- WWE36%$1.7B
- UFC32%$1.5B
- IMG29%$1.4B
- Corporate and Other4%$199M
- Eliminations-1%($43M)
By geographyNorth America74%EMEA19%Asia Pacific5%Latin America2%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $1.0B | $1.1B | $3.2B | $4.9B | $4.7B | $5.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 23% | 18% | 32% | 36% | 32% | 30% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $391M | $544M | $376M | $31M | $835M | $936M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 37.9% | 47.7% | 11.7% | 0.6% | 17.6% | 18.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $274M | $389M | ($35M) | $9M | $195M | $226M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 5% | 4% | — | — | 27% | 28% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $441M | $502M | $266M | $586M | $1.3B | $1.8B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $63M | $60M | $224M | $458M | $485M | $528M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $41M | $29M | $13M | $15M | $488M | $936M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | $100M | $165M | $867M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 22% | 68% | -1% | 0% | 5% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $875M | $181M | $236M | $620M | $831M | $789M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $45M | $135M | $423M | $558M | $760M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $17M | $42M | $246M | $195M | $211M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $29M | $93M | $177M | $363M | $550M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $268M | $492M | $1.5B | $2.3B | $2.9B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $230M | $472M | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.3× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $2.6B | $8.4B | $8.4B | $8.4B | $8.4B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $3.6B | $12.7B | $15.1B | $15.5B | $16.0B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $2.8B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.8B | $4.6B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.1B | $2.9B | $3.9B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.8× | 3.9× | 1.6× | 0.1× | 4.1× | 4.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.2B | $569M | $4.1B | $4.1B | $3.7B | $3.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 6.2% | 2.1% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 2.5% | 2.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| — | — | 166M | 172M | 194M | 195M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | — | $19.47 | $28.42 | $24.41 | $26.01 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | — | $-0.21 | $0.05 | $1.01 | $1.16 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | $24.81 | $23.80 | $19.26 | $17.35 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.0%/yr (2-yr) | +12.0%/yr (2-yr) |
| Book value / share | −11.9%/yr (2-yr) | −11.9%/yr (2-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2021FY2025
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $835M ÷ interest expense $203M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.9B · 3.5× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $831M − debt $3.8B
What this means
Netting $831M of cash and short-term investments against $3.8B of debt leaves $2.9B owed, about 3.5× a year's operating profit (4.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $195M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $4.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.26×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.8B vs $482M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (5-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 1 of 5 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.73/share (latest year $2.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $48.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 43% → 9% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 43% early to 9% lately, median 18% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2024 · 0.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$2.9B
- Cash & short-term investments$789M
- Receivables$760M
- Other current assets$1.4B
Current liabilities$2.2B
- Debt due within a year$46M
- Accounts payable$211M
- Other current liabilities$1.9B
Current ratio1.34×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.34×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.36×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$743Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$46M due · $789M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+25.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($8.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.7B$57M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$555Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$11.8B76% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$9Mover 5 years buying other businesses
$8M written down across 1 year (2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 86% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Ariel Emanuel | $64.9M | $57.0M | ($35M) |
| 2024 | Ariel Emanuel | $18.1M | $41.0M | $9M |
| 2025 | Ariel Emanuel | $67.4M | $102.0M | $195M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$118M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why TKO Group Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?9.1% vs 42.8%
The operating margin averaged 42.8% early in the record and 9.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Entertainment & Studios
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LYVLive Nation | $25.2B | — | 2.7% | 8% | 4% |
| WMGWarner Music | $6.7B | 47% | 9.2% | 13% | 9% |
| DKNGDraftKings Inc. | $6.1B | 38% | -44.5% | -79% | -15% |
| TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc. | $4.7B | — | 17.6% | — | — |
| STUBStubHub Holdings Inc. | $1.7B | — | 7.8% | -73% | 15% |
| ACELAccel Entertainment Inc. | $1.3B | — | 7.7% | 14% | 7% |
| RSIRush Street Interactive Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | -19.3% | — | -1% |
| LLYVALiberty Live Holdings, Inc. | $382M | 19% | -13.5% | -1% | — |
| Group median | — | — | 5.2% | — | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFTKO Group Holdings Inc. is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered57%/yr’21→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TKO Group Holdings Inc. (TKO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TKO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TJX its page in the Manual TKR →
Industry order: ← STRZ the Entertainment & Studios chapter WMG →