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TNK, Teekay Tankers Ltd.
Our primary business is to own and operate crude oil and product tankers, and we employ a chartering strategy that seeks to capture upside opportunities in the tanker spot market while using fixed-rate time charters to reduce downside risks.
Our mix of vessels trading in the spot market or subject to fixed-rate time charters will change from time to time.
The following table provides additional information about our owned LR2 product tankers as of March 1, 2026, six of which are Bahamian-flagged and one of which is Marshall Islands-flagged.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Tankers (87%) and Marine Services and Other (13%).
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 20% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 66% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −36% and 37% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 18%, above 15% in 4 of 8 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 20% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Tankers is 87% of revenue, with Marine Services and Other the other meaningful segment at 13%.
- Tankers87%$824M
- Marine Services and Other13%$128M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $551M | $431M | $776M | $944M | $886M | $542M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $952M | $952M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 82% | 51% | 57% | 66% | 42% | 58% | 68% | 67% | 67% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $97M | $1M | $7M | $124M | $142M | ($194M) | $264M | $547M | $380M | $309M | $309M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 17.6% | 0.3% | 0.9% | 13.1% | 16.0% | −35.8% | 22.4% | 37.1% | 30.9% | 32.5% | 32.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $68M | ($58M) | ($53M) | $41M | $87M | ($242M) | $235M | $520M | $404M | $351M | $351M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 33% | 8% | — | 1% | 2% | 0% | -1% | -1% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $207M | $80M | ($7M) | $118M | $348M | ($107M) | $200M | $631M | $472M | $306M | $306M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $104M | $100M | $119M | $124M | $117M | $106M | $99M | $98M | $94M | $87M | $87M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $35M | $38M | ($73M) | ($48M) | $143M | $29M | ($135M) | $14M | ($25M) | ($132M) | ($132M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $9M | $5M | $6M | $12M | $16M | $21M | $0 | $0 | $71M | $190M | $190M | CapexCapex |
| 1.7% | 1.1% | 0.8% | 1.2% | 1.8% | 4.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 5.7% | 20.0% | 20.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $197M | $76M | ($13M) | $106M | $332M | ($129M) | $200M | $631M | $401M | $219M | $219M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 35.8% | 17.6% | −1.7% | 11.2% | 37.4% | −23.7% | 17.0% | 42.8% | 32.7% | 23.0% | 23.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $197M | $76M | ($13M) | $106M | $332M | ($129M) | $200M | $631M | $401M | $116M | $116M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 35.8% | 17.6% | −1.7% | 11.2% | 37.4% | −23.7% | 17.0% | 42.8% | 32.7% | 12.1% | 12.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $47M | $21M | $8M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $60M | $103M | $69M | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 4% | — | — | 6% | 11% | -14% | 30% | 46% | 31% | 25% | 25% | ROICROIC |
| 7% | -6% | -6% | 4% | 8% | -29% | 22% | 34% | 23% | 17% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| 2% | −8% | −6% | 4% | 8% | −29% | 22% | 30% | 17% | 14% | 17% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $94M | $71M | $55M | $89M | $97M | $71M | $207M | $391M | $534M | $831M | $831M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $34M | $19M | $17M | $96M | $36M | $41M | $117M | $115M | $82M | $83M | $83M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | $23M | $50M | $35M | $49M | $61M | $53M | $46M | $29M | $29M | InventoryInvent. |
| $14M | $8M | $11M | $71M | $31M | $35M | $42M | $34M | $26M | $20M | $20M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $19M | $11M | $29M | $74M | $40M | $55M | $135M | $134M | $103M | $92M | $92M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $258M | $177M | $226M | $421M | $245M | $245M | $460M | $667M | $748M | $1.1B | $1.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $256M | $237M | $198M | $280M | $197M | $157M | $170M | $168M | $132M | $135M | $135M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 0.7× | 1.1× | 1.5× | 1.2× | 1.6× | 2.7× | 4.0× | 5.7× | 8.0× | 8.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $8M | $8M | $8M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $933M | $952M | $735M | $560M | $243M | $320M | $0 | — | — | — | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| $839M | $881M | $680M | $471M | $146M | $250M | ($207M) | — | — | — | ($831M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.2× | 0.0× | 0.1× | 1.9× | 2.7× | -5.5× | 7.4× | 19.7× | 50.9× | 106.7× | 106.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $933M | $1.0B | $947M | $990M | $1.1B | $848M | $1.1B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 24.3M | 23.4M | 33.6M | 33.7M | 33.9M | 33.9M | 34.3M | 34.6M | 34.7M | 34.8M | 83.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $22.62 | $18.42 | $23.14 | $27.98 | $26.13 | $16.02 | $34.36 | $42.63 | $35.42 | $27.37 | $11.39 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.79 | $-2.48 | $-1.57 | $1.23 | $2.57 | $-7.16 | $6.87 | $15.04 | $11.63 | $10.10 | $4.20 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $8.11 | $3.24 | $-0.39 | $3.14 | $9.78 | $-3.80 | $5.82 | $18.26 | $11.57 | $6.31 | $2.62 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $8.11 | $3.24 | $-0.39 | $3.14 | $9.78 | $-3.80 | $5.82 | $18.26 | $11.57 | $3.33 | $1.38 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.93 | $0.88 | $0.24 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $1.72 | $2.96 | $1.98 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.38 | $0.20 | $0.17 | $0.34 | $0.47 | $0.63 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $2.03 | $5.47 | $2.28 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $38.33 | $43.01 | $28.21 | $29.35 | $31.81 | $25.04 | $31.84 | $44.84 | $50.61 | $58.77 | $24.45 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2017 are restated ×1/7 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×1.43 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×2.4 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.1%/yr | +0.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −2.8%/yr | −8.4%/yr |
| EPS | +15.4%/yr | +31.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +0.3%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +34.5%/yr | +63.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +4.9%/yr | +13.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $219M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $87M it takes just to hold its position. It put $104M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $116M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $351M | $404M | $520M | $235M | ($242M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$87M | +$94M | +$98M | +$99M | +$106M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$132M | −$25M | +$14M | −$135M | +$29M |
| Cash from operations | $306M | $472M | $631M | $200M | ($107M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$87M | −$71M | — | — | −$21M |
| Owner earnings | $219M | $401M | $631M | $200M | ($129M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$104M | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $116M | $401M | $631M | $200M | ($129M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 23% | 33% | 43% | 17% | -24% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $87M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $104M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 106.7×ComfortableOperating income $309M ÷ interest expense $3M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $831M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $831M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 32 + DIO 34 − DPO 23 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median, range -14%–46%; 25% latest = NOPAT $309M ÷ invested capital $1.2BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 25% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -24%–43%; latest $219M = operating cash $306M − maintenance capex $87MIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. It chose to put $104M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $116M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops $306M ÷ net income $351M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $219M
What this means
Of $219M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.20×ExpandingCapex $190M ÷ depreciation $87M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $952M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 7.98×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $944M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $12.22/share (latest year $10.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $58.77/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 6% → 33% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 33% lately, median 16% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +10%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · −35.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$831M
- Receivables$83M
- Inventory$29M
- Other current assets$137M
- Accounts payable$20M
- Other current liabilities$115M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a deleverager, a meaningful share of cash went to paying down debt.
- Reinvested$330M · 15%
- Dividends$307M · 14%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.6B · 72%
- Returned to owners$307M
15% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $307M as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $933M and cash and short-term investments rose $736M.
- Net change in share count243.5%
The diluted count rose from 24M to 84M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.98/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 0% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained32%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $331M, so each retained $1 added about 0.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Teekay Tankers Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?243.5%
Diluted shares grew 243.5% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?6% → 9% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $34M to $83M while revenue grew 73%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (6% of revenue then, 9% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Marine Shipping
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NCLHNorwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd. | $9.8B | 38% | 15.7% | 9% | 11% |
| KEXKirby | $3.4B | — | 7.7% | 4% | 10% |
| MATXMatson | $3.3B | 96% | 11.4% | 11% | 12% |
| TDWTidewater Inc. | $1.4B | — | -12.5% | -6% | 3% |
| TNKTeekay Tankers Ltd. | $952M | 66% | 16.8% | 18% | 20% |
| INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock | $843M | — | 12.3% | 3% | 33% |
| PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. | $632M | — | 7.7% | 10% | 10% |
| LPGDorian LPG Ltd. | $482M | — | 35.2% | 7% | 38% |
| Group median | — | 66% | 11.8% | 8% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Teekay Tankers Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Teekay Tankers Ltd. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Teekay Tankers Ltd. earns about $193M on its 20.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $116M on 35M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $831M. The if-converted diluted count is 84M, 140% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($190M) runs well above depreciation ($87M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $219M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← TME its page in the Manual TORO →
Industry order: ← TK the Marine Shipping chapter TORO →