Share count
18Mpeak FY2023
← All companies ← TNK Manual TOUR → ← TNK Marine Shipping TRMD →
TORO, Toro Corp.
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$21M
−5.9% YoY · −8% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $21M 5-yr avg $22M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 317% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 44% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −2.5%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 317% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 1 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $29M | $16M | $22M | $22M | $21M | $21M | RevenueRevenue |
| ($734K) | $7M | $8M | ($6M) | ($5M) | ($5M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −2.5% | 44.3% | 36.8% | −24.8% | −22.1% | −22.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($1M) | $50M | $141M | $25M | $6M | $6M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| ($4M) | $42M | $56M | $11M | ($6M) | $22M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $4M | $1M | $3M | $5M | $5M | $5M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($7M) | ($10M) | ($88M) | ($19M) | ($17M) | $11M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $111M | $296K | $72M | $119K | $67M | $67M | CapexCapex |
| 380.3% | 1.9% | 323.8% | 0.5% | 316.7% | 316.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($116M) | $41M | ($16M) | $11M | ($73M) | ($45M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −395.4% | 263.7% | −72.1% | 47.6% | −346.8% | −214.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($116M) | $41M | ($16M) | $11M | ($73M) | ($45M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −395.4% | 263.7% | −72.1% | 47.6% | −346.8% | −214.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $1M | $4M | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -1% | 6% | 27% | -3% | -6% | -6% | ROICROIC |
| -1% | 36% | 80% | 13% | 4% | 4% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | 36% | 80% | 13% | 4% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $5M | $42M | $152M | $37M | $87M | $87M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $4M | $11M | $1M | $416K | $70K | $70K | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3M | $894K | $173K | $195K | $200K | $200K | InventoryInvent. |
| $506K | $2M | $2M | $771K | $1M | $1M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $7M | $10M | ($173K) | ($160K) | ($857K) | ($857K) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $13M | $55M | $165M | $55M | $96M | $96M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $7M | $7M | $8M | $5M | $42M | $42M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.8× | 8.4× | 21.0× | 11.8× | 2.3× | 2.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $124M | $157M | $308M | $326M | $331M | $331M | Total assetsAssets |
| $16M | $13M | $5M | $0 | — | $0 | Total debtDebt |
| $11M | ($29M) | ($147M) | ($37M) | — | ($87M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -1.5× | 7.7× | 8.5× | -24.1× | -68.3× | -4.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $104M | $140M | $177M | $199M | $164M | $164M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 9.5M | 42.7M | 48.7M | 17.4M | 17.9M | 21.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.09 | $0.37 | $0.46 | $1.29 | $1.18 | $0.98 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.15 | $1.17 | $2.89 | $1.45 | $0.33 | $0.28 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-12.23 | $0.97 | $-0.33 | $0.61 | $-4.09 | $-2.10 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-12.23 | $0.97 | $-0.33 | $0.61 | $-4.09 | $-2.10 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $11.76 | $0.01 | $1.48 | $0.01 | $3.73 | $3.11 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $11.00 | $3.29 | $3.63 | $11.44 | $9.15 | $7.62 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×4.51 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/2.8 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −21.4%/yr | −21.4%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −24.9%/yr | −24.9%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −4.5%/yr | −4.5%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−6%low FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($73M)owner earningsvs.$6Mnet incomelow FY2021
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2022FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $6M of profit but ($73M) of owner earnings: $79M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $6M | $25M | $141M | $50M | ($1M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$5M | +$5M | +$3M | +$1M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$17M | −$19M | −$88M | −$10M | −$7M |
| Cash from operations | ($6M) | $11M | $56M | $42M | ($4M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$67M | −$119K | −$72M | −$296K | −$111M |
| Owner earnings | ($73M) | $11M | ($16M) | $41M | ($116M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -347% | 48% | -72% | 264% | -395% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -4.8×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($5M) ÷ interest expense $964K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $87M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $87M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -6%–27%; -6% latest = NOPAT ($5M) ÷ invested capital $76MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle5-yr median margin, range -395%–264%; latest ($45M) = operating cash $22M − maintenance capex $67MIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -214% of revenue this year, a -72% median across 5 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $22M ÷ net income $6M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 13.53×ExpandingCapex $67M ÷ depreciation $5M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $21M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.30×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $0 vs $54M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (5-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.67/share (latest year $0.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $7.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 21% → −23% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 21% early to −23% lately, median −3% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2024 · −24.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The complexity and rapid evolution of AI technologies further amplify these risks, potentially exposing the organization to regulatory penalties, reputational damage, or operational disruptions.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$96M
- Cash & short-term investments$87M
- Receivables$70K
- Inventory$200K
- Other current assets$9M
Current liabilities$42M
- Accounts payable$1M
- Other current liabilities$41M
Current ratio2.30×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.29×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.08×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$54Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$164Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Deferred revenue$769Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $98M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$251M · 257%
- Buybacks$5M · 5%
- Returned to owners$5M
$0 as dividends and $5M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$158M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $158M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $5M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count127.0%
The diluted count rose from 9M to 21M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained2%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($216M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $4M, so each retained $1 added about 0.02 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Toro Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?127.0%
Diluted shares grew 127.0% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent $5M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.44×
Across the record the business reported $220M of net income but generated $98M of operating cash, a 0.44-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
And these came back clean
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Marine Shipping
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KEXKirby | $3.4B | — | 7.7% | 4% | 10% |
| MATXMatson | $3.3B | 96% | 11.4% | 11% | 12% |
| TDWTidewater Inc. | $1.4B | — | -12.5% | -6% | 3% |
| INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock | $843M | — | 12.3% | 3% | 33% |
| PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd. | $632M | — | 7.7% | 10% | 10% |
| LPGDorian LPG Ltd. | $482M | — | 35.2% | 7% | 38% |
| GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited | $342M | — | -1.1% | -0% | 31% |
| TOROToro Corp. | $21M | — | -2.5% | -1% | -72% |
| Group median | — | — | 7.7% | 3% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Toro Corp.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Toro Corp. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered−3%/yr’21→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−214%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Toro Corp. (TORO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TORO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TNK its page in the Manual TOUR →
Industry order: ← TNK the Marine Shipping chapter TRMD →