Share count
30Mpeak FY2023
← All companies ← TOUR Manual TRI → ← TE Semiconductors TSEM →
TOYO, TOYO Co. Ltd
Semiconductors capital-intensive
The acquisition supports TOYO's strategic expansion into the U.S market, complementing its existing manufacturing footprint for solar cells in Vietnam and Ethiopia.
To date, our cell plant in Vietnam has commenced commercial production since the second half of 2023 and achieved its full 2GW annual capacity.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$427M
+141.5% YoY
Vital signs · TTM, with 3-yr average
Revenue $427M 3-yr avg $222M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Third Parties (60%) and Related Parties (40%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 5.0% to 19% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Capital spending runs about 24% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 19%, above 15% in 2 of 3 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Third Parties is 60% of revenue, with Related Parties the other meaningful line at 40%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Third Parties60%$256M
- Related Parties40%$171M
By geographyUSA80%Other Areas20%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $62M | $177M | $427M | $427M | RevenueRevenue |
| 27% | 12% | 23% | 23% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $12M | $9M | $59M | $59M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 19.2% | 5.0% | 13.8% | 13.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $10M | $41M | $37M | $37M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 2% | 29% | 29% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| ($13M) | $47M | $133M | $133M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $3M | $23M | $37M | $23M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($25M) | ($17M) | $59M | $73M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $114M | $43M | $92M | $92M | CapexCapex |
| 182.9% | 24.0% | 21.5% | 21.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($15M) | $23M | $96M | $110M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −24.3% | 13.2% | 22.6% | 25.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($127M) | $4M | $41M | $41M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −203.0% | 2.3% | 9.6% | 9.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| 19% | 13% | 32% | 34% | ROICROIC |
| 17% | 68% | 33% | 33% | Return on equityROE |
| 17% | 68% | 33% | 33% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| $18M | $14M | — | $14M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $7M | $11M | $11M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $40M | $20M | $80M | $80M | InventoryInvent. |
| $37M | $18M | $52M | $52M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $3M | $9M | $39M | $39M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $83M | $55M | $172M | $172M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $169M | $125M | $296M | $296M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.5× | 0.4× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $238M | $240M | $441M | $441M | Total assetsAssets |
| $12M | $21M | $19M | $26M | Total debtDebt |
| ($6M) | $7M | $19M | $13M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.7× | 2.7× | 17.8× | 17.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $57M | $59M | $111M | $111M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||
| 41.0M | 30.8M | 30.3M | 36.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.52 | $5.75 | $14.09 | $11.64 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.24 | $1.32 | $1.22 | $1.01 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.37 | $0.76 | $3.18 | $2.99 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-3.09 | $0.13 | $1.36 | $1.12 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $2.78 | $1.38 | $3.02 | $2.50 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.39 | $1.93 | $3.67 | $3.03 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
32%low FY2024
Gross margin
23%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$96Mowner earningsvs.$37Mnet incomelow FY2023
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $96M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $37M it takes just to hold its position. It put $55M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $41M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $37M | $41M | $10M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$37M | +$23M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$59M | −$17M | −$25M |
| Cash from operations | $133M | $47M | ($13M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$37M | −$23M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | $96M | $23M | ($15M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$55M | −$19M | −$112M |
| Free cash flow | $41M | $4M | ($127M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 23% | 13% | -24% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $37M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $55M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 17.8×ComfortableOperating income $59M ÷ interest expense $3M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $13M · 0.2× operating profitModest net debtCash $14M − debt $26M
What this means
Netting $14M of cash and short-term investments against $26M of debt leaves $13M owed, about 0.2× a year's operating profit (0.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 10 + DIO 88 − DPO 58 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle3-yr median, range 13%–32%; 34% latest = NOPAT $42M ÷ invested capital $124MIndustry peers: median -8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 34% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle3-yr median margin, range -24%–23%; latest $110M = operating cash $133M − maintenance capex $23MIndustry peers: median -2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 3 years. It chose to put $69M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $41M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $133M ÷ net income $37M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.95×ExpandingCapex $92M ÷ depreciation $23M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $427M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.58×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $26M vs ($124M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.77/share (latest year $0.98), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$172M
- Cash & short-term investments$14M
- Receivables$11M
- Inventory$80M
- Other current assets$67M
Current liabilities$296M
- Debt due within a year$5M
- Accounts payable$52M
- Other current liabilities$238M
Current ratio0.58×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.31×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($124M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $14M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$111Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($158M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$29M$3M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$28Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PLABPhotronics | $849M | 25% | 13.3% | 11% | 13% |
| FORMFormFactor | $785M | 40% | 8.4% | 7% | 12% |
| AAOIApplied Optoelectronics Inc. | $456M | 26% | -19.9% | -13% | -13% |
| AIOTPowerFleet Inc. | $444M | 50% | -7.1% | -8% | -2% |
| MVSTMicrovast Holdings Inc. | $428M | 10% | -34.8% | -30% | -9% |
| TOYOTOYO Co. Ltd | $427M | 23% | 13.8% | 19% | 13% |
| SITMSiTime | $327M | 53% | -8.3% | -8% | 8% |
| MXMagnachip Semiconductor Corporation | $179M | 24% | 2.5% | 8% | -5% |
| Group median | — | 25% | -2.3% | -0% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. TOYO Co. Ltd reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TOYO Co. Ltd has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+930%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+314%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $41M on 38M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $13M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($92M) runs well above depreciation ($23M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $110M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TOYO Co. Ltd (TOYO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TOYO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TOUR its page in the Manual TRI →
Industry order: ← TE the Semiconductors chapter TSEM →