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TSEM, Tower Semiconductor Ltd.

Semiconductors capital-intensive Capital build-out

A semiconductor business, riding a brutal capacity cycle on the edge of Moore's Law.

Over time, the market fluctuates, cycling through periods of weak demand, excess capacity, excess inventory, and price pressure, and periods of strong demand, full capacity utilization, and product shortages that command higher selling prices.

Another key element of our strategy is to target multiple large, growing, and diversified end markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share

TSEM · Tower Semiconductor Ltd.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.6B

+9.1% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.6B 5-yr avg $1.5B

Gross margin 23% 5-yr avg 24%

Operating margin 12.4% 5-yr avg 18.8%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 12%

Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 14%

Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 28% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 23% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 7.0% to 38% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Capital spending runs about 21% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 13%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMDec 2025
											Income statement
$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.6B	RevenueRevenue
24%	26%	22%	19%	18%	22%	28%	—	24%	23%	23%	Gross marginGross mgn
$175M	$220M	$155M	$87M	$91M	$167M	$312M	$547M	$191M	$194M	$194M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.0%	15.8%	11.9%	7.0%	7.2%	11.0%	18.6%	38.5%	13.3%	12.4%	12.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$209M	$302M	$133M	$88M	$83M	$154M	$266M	$520M	$207M	$219M	$219M	Net incomeNet inc.
1%	—	4%	3%	6%	1%	9%	11%	5%	9%	9%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$327M	$356M	$313M	$291M	$277M	$421M	$530M	$677M	$449M	$395M	$395M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$198M	$208M	$214M	$214M	$241M	$271M	$293M	$258M	$266M	$303M	$303M	DepreciationDeprec.
($79M)	($154M)	($35M)	($11M)	($47M)	($3M)	($29M)	($101M)	($25M)	($126M)	($126M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$217M	$188M	$210M	$191M	$314M	$314M	$366M	$445M	$436M	$444M	$444M	CapexCapex
17.4%	13.5%	16.1%	15.5%	24.8%	20.8%	21.8%	31.2%	30.4%	28.4%	28.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$110M	$168M	$103M	$100M	$36M	$107M	$237M	$419M	$182M	$92M	$92M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.8%	12.1%	7.9%	8.1%	2.8%	7.1%	14.1%	29.4%	12.7%	5.9%	5.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$110M	$168M	$103M	$100M	($37M)	$107M	$163M	$232M	$13M	($49M)	($49M)	Free cash flowFCF
8.8%	12.1%	7.9%	8.1%	−2.9%	7.1%	9.7%	16.3%	0.9%	−3.1%	−3.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
53%	38%	17%	6%	5%	10%	16%	20%	7%	6%	6%	ROICROIC
31%	29%	11%	7%	6%	9%	14%	21%	8%	7%	7%	Return on equityROE
31%	29%	11%	7%	6%	9%	14%	21%	8%	7%	7%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$355M	$446M	$505M	$571M	$522M	$575M	$836M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$141M	$150M	$153M	$127M	$162M	$142M	$153M	$154M	$212M	$223M	$223M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$138M	$143M	$171M	$192M	$199M	$235M	$302M	$283M	$268M	$257M	$257M	InventoryInvent.
$99M	$115M	$104M	$119M	$97M	$79M	$151M	$139M	$131M	$124M	$124M	Accounts payablePayables
$179M	$178M	$220M	$200M	$264M	$298M	$304M	$298M	$350M	$356M	$356M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$698M	$874M	$988M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.7B	Current assetsCur. assets
$247M	$302M	$204M	$253M	$273M	$276M	$387M	$277M	$285M	$264M	$264M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.8×	2.9×	4.8×	4.3×	4.0×	4.3×	3.9×	6.2×	6.2×	6.5×	6.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	$7M	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$3.3B	Total assetsAssets
—	—	$11M	$312M	$390M	$315M	$272M	$214M	$181M	$162M	$175M	Total debtDebt
—	—	($494M)	($259M)	($132M)	($260M)	($564M)	($838M)	($1.0B)	($990M)	($977M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
13.3×	17.4×	14.6×	12.7×	13.5×	22.8×	54.8×	123.1×	47.5×	53.1×	53.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$683M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.4B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$2.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
101M	106M	103M	107M	108M	110M	111M	111M	112M	114M	113M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$12.34	$13.09	$12.72	$11.49	$11.67	$13.74	$15.15	$12.79	$12.78	$13.79	$13.92	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.06	$2.85	$1.30	$0.82	$0.77	$1.40	$2.41	$4.67	$1.84	$1.93	$1.94	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.09	$1.59	$1.00	$0.93	$0.33	$0.98	$2.14	$3.76	$1.62	$0.81	$0.82	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.09	$1.59	$1.00	$0.93	$-0.34	$0.98	$1.48	$2.09	$0.11	$-0.43	$-0.43	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.15	$1.77	$2.05	$1.78	$2.89	$2.86	$3.31	$4.00	$3.88	$3.91	$3.95	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.74	$9.72	$12.12	$12.61	$13.44	$14.77	$17.08	$21.87	$23.62	$25.70	$25.94	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.2%/yr	+3.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−3.2%/yr	+19.6%/yr
EPS	−0.8%/yr	+20.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	+6.9%/yr	+6.2%/yr
Book value / share	+16.0%/yr	+13.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

114Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

6%low FY2020

Gross margin

23%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$92Mowner earningsvs.$219Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $92M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $303M it takes just to hold its position. It put $141M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($49M).

Reported net income$219M

Owner earnings$92M · 6% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$219M	$207M	$520M	$266M	$154M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$303M	+$266M	+$258M	+$293M	+$271M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$126M	−$25M	−$101M	−$29M	−$3M
Cash from operations	$395M	$449M	$677M	$530M	$421M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$303M	−$266M	−$258M	−$293M	−$314M
Owner earnings	$92M	$182M	$419M	$237M	$107M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$141M	−$170M	−$186M	−$74M	—
Free cash flow	($49M)	$13M	$232M	$163M	$107M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	6%	13%	29%	14%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $303M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $141M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 53.1×

Comfortable

Operating income $194M ÷ interest expense $4M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$977M

Net cash

Cash $235M + ST investments $917M − debt $175M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $977M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 92d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 52 + DIO 78 − DPO 38 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range 5%–53%; 6% latest = NOPAT $177M ÷ invested capital $2.9B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 3%–29%; latest $92M = operating cash $395M − maintenance capex $303M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $141M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($49M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.81×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $395M ÷ net income $219M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 1.47×

Expanding

Capex $444M ÷ depreciation $303M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 6.48×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $175M vs $1.4B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +47%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.80/share (latest year $1.94), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 14% → 21% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 14% early to 21% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth −0%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 0% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 7.0% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +1.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.7B

Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
Receivables$223M
Inventory$257M
Other current assets$78M

Current liabilities$264M

Debt due within a year$41M
Accounts payable$124M
Other current liabilities$99M

Current ratio6.48×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio5.51×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio4.37×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$41M due · $1.2B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$2.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$1.3BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$178M$3M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$26Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$3.1B · 77%
Retained (debt / cash)$910M · 23%

Net change in share count11.1%
The diluted count rose from 101M to 113M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained5%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $104M, so each retained $1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Tower Semiconductor Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.1%
Diluted shares grew 11.1% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?22% → 31% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $279M to $480M while revenue grew 25%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (22% of revenue then, 31% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
AMKRAmkor Technology	$6.7B	17%	7.5%	10%	6%
FSLRFirst Solar	$5.2B	23%	8.9%	5%	4%
LITELumentum Holdings Inc.	$1.6B	32%	3.0%	3%	9%
TSEMTower Semiconductor Ltd.	$1.6B	23%	12.9%	13%	8%
PLABPhotronics	$849M	25%	13.3%	11%	13%
FORMFormFactor	$785M	40%	8.4%	7%	12%
AAOIApplied Optoelectronics Inc.	$456M	26%	-19.9%	-13%	-13%
SITMSiTime	$327M	53%	-8.3%	-8%	8%
Group median	—	25%	8.0%	6%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Tower Semiconductor Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Tower Semiconductor Ltd. has delivered.

Tower Semiconductor Ltd.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Tower Semiconductor Ltd. earns about $132M on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($132M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($92M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−0%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($49M) on 113M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $977M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($444M) runs well above depreciation ($303M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $92M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

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Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Tower Semiconductor Ltd. (TSEM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TSEM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TSAT its page in the Manual TSM →

Industry order: ← TOYO the Semiconductors chapter TSM →