Owner Scorecard


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TRVG, trivago N.V.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Revenue in runoff

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Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in EUR · 1 ADS = 5 ordinary shares
TRVG · trivago N.V.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
€549M
+19.1% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue €549M 5-yr avg €478M
Gross margin 99% 5-yr avg 97%
Operating margin 0.3% 5-yr avg −11.7%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg −17%
Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Revenue in runoff. Revenue has shrunk about 3% a year across the record while operations still generate cash.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −5.9% through the cycle on a 98% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 6 regions, the largest All other countries at 42%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • All other countries42%€229M
  • United States24%€134M
  • United Kingdom12%€65M
  • Japan9%€51M
  • Germany7%€38M
  • Canada6%€34M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
€754M€1.0B€915M€839M€249M€361M€535M€485M€461M€549M€549MRevenueRevenue
99%99%99%99%96%97%98%98%98%97%99%Gross marginGross mgn
(€44M)(€20M)(€19M)€38M(€253M)€10M(€120M)(€157M)(€32M)€2M€2MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−5.9%−2.0%−2.1%4.5%−101.5%2.8%−22.5%−32.3%−7.0%0.3%0.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
(€51M)(€13M)(€21M)€17M(€245M)€11M(€127M)(€164M)(€24M)€11M€11MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
€31M(€9M)(€5M)€74M€8M€33M€66M€28M€20M€8M€8MOperating cash flowOp. cash
€5M€8M€11M€10M€10M€8M€6M€4M€4M€4M€4MDepreciationDeprec.
€78M(€3M)€6M€47M€243M€14M€187M€188M€40M(€8M)(€7M)Working capital & otherWC & other
€8M€17M€25M€8M€6M€4M€4M€4M€3M€5M€5MCapexCapex
1.1%1.7%2.7%1.0%2.2%1.0%0.7%0.7%0.6%0.8%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
€23M(€26M)(€29M)€66M€2M€29M€62M€24M€17M€3M€3MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.1%−2.5%−3.2%7.9%1.0%8.0%11.6%5.0%3.8%0.6%0.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
€23M(€26M)(€29M)€66M€2M€29M€62M€24M€17M€3M€3MFree cash flowFCF
3.1%−2.5%−3.2%7.9%1.0%8.0%11.6%5.0%3.8%0.6%0.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
€0€0€20M€0€0BuybacksBuybacks
-8%-2%-2%2%-30%1%-17%-58%-13%1%7%ROICROIC
-8%-2%-3%2%-37%2%-23%-76%-12%5%5%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
€227M€190M€0€10M€19M€0€45M€25M€0€12M€202MCash & investmentsCash+inv
€37M€43M€55M€38M€12M€24M€26M€26MReceivablesReceiv.
€40M€51M€34M€33M€7M€14M€20M€18M€25M€34M€34MAccounts payablePayables
(€3M)(€8M)€21M€4M€5M€10M€6M(€8M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
€293M€293M€265M€310M€261M€310M€353M€188M€190M€214M€214MCurrent assetsCur. assets
€61M€78M€61M€63M€35M€42M€50M€36M€50M€97M€97MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.8×3.7×4.4×4.9×7.5×7.3×7.1×5.2×3.8×2.2×2.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
€491M€490M€491M€491M€283M€287M€182M€0€0€14M€14MGoodwillGoodwill
€1.0B€1.1B€1.1B€1.1B€831M€835M€692M€325M€301M€358M€358MTotal assetsAssets
(€227M)(€190M)(€202M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-324.4×-462.9×-10.4×1156.1×-935.7×25.8×-2358.1×-13048.9×-1891.2×37.3×127.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
€654M€854M€854M€895M€665M€694M€562M€215M€198M€213M€213MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
238M275M351M357M353M367M358M345M350M358M358MShares out (diluted)Shares
€3.17€3.77€2.61€2.35€0.70€0.98€1.50€1.41€1.32€1.54€1.54Revenue / shareRev/sh
€-0.22€-0.05€-0.06€0.05€-0.69€0.03€-0.36€-0.48€-0.07€0.03€0.03EPS (diluted)EPS
€0.10€-0.09€-0.08€0.19€0.01€0.08€0.17€0.07€0.05€0.01€0.01Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
€0.10€-0.09€-0.08€0.19€0.01€0.08€0.17€0.07€0.05€0.01€0.01Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
€0.03€0.06€0.07€0.02€0.02€0.01€0.01€0.01€0.01€0.01€0.01Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
€2.75€3.11€2.43€2.51€1.88€1.89€1.57€0.62€0.57€0.60€0.60Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−7.7%/yr+16.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share−23.3%/yr+6.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−10.5%/yr−4.1%/yr
Book value / share−15.6%/yr−20.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
358Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
1%low FY2023
Gross margin
97%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

€3Mowner earningsvs.€11Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported €11M of profit but €3M of owner earnings: €8M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income€11M
Owner earnings€3M · 1% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income€11M(€24M)(€164M)(€127M)€11M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+€4M+€4M+€4M+€6M+€8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−€8M+€40M+€188M+€187M+€14M
Cash from operations€8M€20M€28M€66M€33M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−€5M−€3M−€4M−€4M−€4M
Owner earnings€3M€17M€24M€62M€29M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%4%5%12%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income €2M ÷ interest expense €12K
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash €190M + ST investments €12M − debt €0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by €202M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 17 + DIO 0 − DPO 2101 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -7%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest €3M = operating cash €8M − maintenance capex €5M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 3%)
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops €8M ÷ net income €11M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks €184M ÷ Owner Earnings €3M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against €3M of Owner Earnings, €184M (5728%) went back to shareholders, €184M dividends, €0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.09×
    Maintaining
    Capex €5M ÷ depreciation €4M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €549M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.22×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €-0.16/share (latest year €0.03), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €0.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −3% → −13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

    What this means

    The recent-years average (−13%) sits below the early years (−3%), but the latest year (0%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −6% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Worst year 2020 · −101.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Additionally, emerging technologies like AI powered chatbots - such as ChatGPT (OpenAI), Gemini (Google), Grok (xAI), Claude (Anthropic), and Perplexity - are redefining user engagement and advertising strategies within the travel industry, presenting new competitive challenges and opportunities.…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets€214M
  • Cash & short-term investments€202M
  • Receivables€26M
Current liabilities€97M
  • Accounts payable€34M
  • Other current liabilities€62M
Current ratio2.22×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.22×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital€118Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value€125Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases€2M€2M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue€4Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated €255M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested€82M · 32%
  • Dividends€184M · 72%
  • Buybacks€20M · 8%
  • Returned to owners€204M

    118% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €184M as dividends and €20M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−€31M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran €31M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down €25M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran €20M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count50.4%

    The diluted count rose from 238M to 358M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record€0.53/sh

    Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles€88M25% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity6%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring€0over 10 years buying other businesses, against €82M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why trivago N.V. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?50.4%

    Diluted shares grew 50.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent €20M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UPWKUpwork Inc.$788M73%-5.3%-7%3%
LZLegalZoom.com Inc.$756M66%3.3%15%
CARSCars.com Inc. Common Stock$723M90%8.1%5%21%
HNGEHinge Health Inc.$588M77%-44.6%12%
IBEXIBEX Limited$558M7.7%31%4%
TRVGtrivago N.V.€549M98%-4.0%-5%3%
LIFLife360 Inc.$489M76%-15.2%-28%-4%
YEXTYext Inc.$447M75%-24.8%-85%1%
Group median76%-4.7%-6%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing five Class”; trivago N.V. reports in EUR, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at EUR 1 = $1.145 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in EUR.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what trivago N.V. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, trivago N.V. earns about $22M on its 3.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−31%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2019−40%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $4M on 72M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $231M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "trivago N.V. (TRVG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TRVG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TRSG its page in the Manual TRX →

Industry order: ← TOST the IT Services & Consulting chapter UPWK →