Share count
15Mpeak FY2020
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TSAT, TELESAT CORPORATION
Telesat is a leading global satellite operator, providing its customers with mission -critical communications services since the start of the satellite communications industry in the 1960s.
Through a combination of advanced satellites and ground facilities and a highly expert and dedicated staff, our communications solutions support the requirements of sophisticated satellite users throughout the world.
Throughout our lengthy operating history, we have demonstrated a deep commitment to customer service and led the way on many of the industry's most ground -breaking innovations.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
C$418M
−26.8% YoY · −13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue C$418M 5-yr avg C$642M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 34% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 95% and operating margin about 49% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −73% and 81% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −332 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on subscribers, revenue per user, and network capex. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 27% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 5 regions, the largest Canada at 51%.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- Canada51%C$213M
- United States32%C$133M
- Latin America & Caribbean7%C$30M
- Europe, Middle East & Africa7%C$28M
- Asia & Australia3%C$14M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| C$911M | C$820M | C$758M | C$759M | C$704M | C$571M | C$418M | C$418M | RevenueRevenue |
| 96% | 96% | 96% | 93% | 95% | 93% | — | 94% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| C$478M | C$405M | C$409M | C$296M | C$569M | (C$40M) | (C$304M) | (C$304M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 52.5% | 49.3% | 54.0% | 39.0% | 80.8% | −7.1% | −72.7% | −72.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| C$187M | C$245M | C$93M | (C$24M) | C$157M | (C$88M) | (C$155M) | (C$155M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 7% | -2% | 43% | — | 36% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| C$376M | C$372M | C$293M | C$240M | C$170M | C$62M | C$67M | C$67M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| C$243M | C$217M | C$204M | C$189M | C$183M | C$127M | C$105M | C$105M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (C$55M) | (C$90M) | (C$3M) | C$75M | (C$170M) | C$23M | C$117M | C$117M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| C$8M | C$16M | C$32M | C$33M | C$43M | C$65M | C$141M | C$141M | CapexCapex |
| 0.9% | 2.0% | 4.2% | 4.3% | 6.1% | 11.3% | 33.6% | 33.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| C$367M | C$355M | C$262M | C$207M | C$127M | (C$2M) | (C$74M) | (C$74M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 40.3% | 43.3% | 34.5% | 27.2% | 18.1% | −0.4% | −17.7% | −17.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| C$367M | C$355M | C$262M | C$207M | C$127M | (C$2M) | (C$74M) | (C$74M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 40.3% | 43.3% | 34.5% | 27.2% | 18.1% | −0.4% | −17.7% | −17.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| C$20K | C$10K | C$10K | — | — | — | — | C$10K | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | 11% | 8% | — | 17% | -1% | -7% | -7% | ROICROIC |
| 15% | 17% | 22% | -5% | 24% | -12% | -29% | -29% | Return on equityROE |
| 15% | 17% | 22% | — | — | — | — | −29% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| C$1.0B | C$819M | C$1.5B | C$1.7B | C$1.7B | C$553M | C$510M | C$510M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | C$52M | C$123M | C$41M | C$78M | C$159M | C$58M | C$58M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | C$5M | C$17M | C$2M | C$4M | C$1M | C$1M | C$1M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | C$30M | C$55M | C$44M | C$44M | C$158M | C$57M | C$57M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | C$27M | C$85M | (C$284K) | C$39M | C$2M | C$2M | C$2M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | C$894M | C$1.6B | C$1.8B | C$1.8B | C$1.0B | C$832M | C$832M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | C$162M | C$182M | C$171M | C$138M | C$257M | C$3.3B | C$3.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 5.5× | 8.9× | 10.4× | 13.2× | 4.0× | 0.3× | 0.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | C$2.4B | C$2.4B | C$2.4B | C$2.4B | C$2.6B | C$2.2B | C$2.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | C$5.6B | C$6.4B | C$6.5B | C$6.3B | C$6.9B | C$6.6B | C$6.6B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | C$3.2B | C$3.8B | C$3.9B | C$3.2B | C$3.1B | C$3.5B | C$3.5B | Total debtDebt |
| — | C$2.4B | C$2.3B | C$2.2B | C$1.5B | C$2.5B | C$3.0B | C$3.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.1× | 2.0× | 2.2× | 1.3× | 2.1× | -0.2× | -1.4× | -2.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| C$1.2B | C$1.5B | C$416M | C$481M | C$662M | C$710M | C$531M | C$531M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 49.5M | 49.5M | 45.2M | 12.3M | 13.4M | 13.9M | 14.6M | 14.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| C$18.39 | C$16.56 | C$16.79 | C$61.66 | C$52.48 | C$40.97 | C$28.55 | C$28.16 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| C$3.78 | C$4.94 | C$2.05 | C$-1.93 | C$11.71 | C$-6.29 | C$-10.61 | C$-10.47 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| C$7.42 | C$7.17 | C$5.80 | C$16.80 | C$9.48 | C$-0.17 | C$-5.04 | C$-4.97 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| C$7.42 | C$7.17 | C$5.80 | C$16.80 | C$9.48 | C$-0.17 | C$-5.04 | C$-4.97 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| C$0.00 | C$0.00 | C$0.00 | — | — | — | — | C$0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| C$0.17 | C$0.33 | C$0.70 | C$2.66 | C$3.20 | C$4.65 | C$9.60 | C$9.47 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| C$25.15 | C$29.47 | C$9.20 | C$39.11 | C$49.33 | C$50.96 | C$36.26 | C$35.76 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/3.67 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.6%/yr | +11.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | −26.0%/yr (2-yr) | −26.0%/yr (2-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +96.2%/yr | +96.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.3%/yr | +4.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−7%low FY2025
Gross margin
93%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
12.0×peak FY2023
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
(C$74M)owner earningsvs.(C$155M)net incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2019FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a C$155M loss into (C$74M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | (C$155M) | (C$88M) | C$157M | (C$24M) | C$93M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +C$105M | +C$127M | +C$183M | +C$189M | +C$204M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +C$117M | +C$23M | −C$170M | +C$75M | −C$3M |
| Cash from operations | C$67M | C$62M | C$170M | C$240M | C$293M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −C$141M | −C$65M | −C$43M | −C$33M | −C$32M |
| Owner earnings | (C$74M) | (C$2M) | C$127M | C$207M | C$262M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -18% | 0% | 18% | 27% | 35% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -2.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income (C$304M) ÷ interest expense C$152M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash C$510M + ST investments C$430K − debt C$3.5B
What this means
Netting C$510M of cash and short-term investments against C$3.5B of debt leaves C$3.0B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 51 + DIO 21 − DPO 813 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median, range -7%–17%; -7% latest = NOPAT (C$240M) ÷ invested capital C$3.5BIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran -7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -18%–43%; latest (C$74M) = operating cash C$67M − maintenance capex C$141MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -18% of revenue this year, a 27% median across 7 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income (C$155M) · cash from operations C$67M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.34×ExpandingCapex C$141M ÷ depreciation C$105M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · C$418M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.25×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · C$3.5B vs (C$2.5B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 3 of 7 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −116%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are C$-1.93/share (latest year C$-10.47), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is C$35.76/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 52% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 52% early to 0% lately, median 49% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2025 · −72.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsC$832M
- Cash & short-term investmentsC$510M
- ReceivablesC$58M
- InventoryC$1M
- Other current assetsC$262M
Current liabilitiesC$3.3B
- Debt due within a yearC$2.3B
- Accounts payableC$57M
- Other current liabilitiesC$919M
Current ratio0.25×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.25×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.15×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(C$2.5B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cashC$2.3B due · C$510M cash
cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value(C$2.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(C$4.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesC$3.5BC$2M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated C$1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedC$337M · 21%
- DividendsC$40K · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)C$1.2B · 79%
- Returned to ownersC$40K
0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, C$40K as dividends and C$0 as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments fell C$517M.
- Net change in share count−70.0%
The diluted count fell from 50M to 15M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend recordC$0.00/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 26% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−75%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (C$415M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell C$311M, so each retained C$1 gave back about 0.75 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangiblesC$2.7B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiringC$0over 7 years buying other businesses, against C$337M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why TELESAT CORPORATION is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−0.0% vs 39.4%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 39.4% early in the record and −0.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈C$267M · 64% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For the year ended December 31, 2025, Telesat's top five GEO customers together accounted for approximately 64% of its revenues.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Telecom Operators
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CALXCalix | $1.0B | 50% | -0.8% | -2% | 3% |
| CCOICogent Communications Holdings Inc. | $976M | 57% | 16.1% | 17% | 14% |
| GOGOGogo Inc. | $910M | 93% | 28.4% | 5% | 7% |
| IRDMIridium Communications Inc | $872M | 95% | 10.5% | 2% | 35% |
| EVCEntravision Communications Corporation | $448M | 70% | 4.9% | 4% | 16% |
| ADEAAdeia Inc. | $443M | — | 34.5% | 13% | 47% |
| TSATTELESAT CORPORATION | C$418M | 95% | 49.3% | 8% | 27% |
| GSATGlobalstar Inc. | $273M | 96% | -47.3% | -6% | 10% |
| Group median | — | 93% | 13.3% | 4% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. TELESAT CORPORATION reports in CAD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that CAD, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in CAD. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TELESAT CORPORATION has delivered.
TELESAT CORPORATION’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
C$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings (C$74M) on 15M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-12-31; net debt C$3.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TELESAT CORPORATION (TSAT), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TSAT, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← TS its page in the Manual TSEM →
Industry order: ← TMUS the Telecom Operators chapter TU →