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UBER, Uber Technologies Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies diversified

Uber runs a set of phone apps that match people who want something moved with the independent drivers and couriers who will move it: a rider to a destination, a meal from a restaurant, freight from a shipper to a carrier. It owns the network and the software, not the cars and not the labor; the drivers are not its employees. It earns its keep by taking a cut of each fare or order that crosses the platform.

We develop and operate proprietary technology applications supporting a variety of offerings on our platform ("platform(s)" or "Platform(s)").

We use this same network, technology, operational excellence and product expertise to connect shippers ("Shipper(s)") with carriers ("Carrier(s)") in the freight industry by providing Carriers with the ability to book a shipment, transportation management and other logistics services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

UBER · Uber Technologies Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$52.0B

+18.3% YoY · 36% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $53.7B 5-yr avg $36.5B

Operating margin 11.7% 5-yr avg −1.5%

ROIC 21% 5-yr avg 2%

Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 8%

Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: The question is whether matching the two sides is a franchise or a toll anyone with an app can build. The test is the network: if more drivers pull in more riders, and more riders pull in more drivers, the lead feeds on itself and the cut holds — but the filing concedes the mobility, delivery, and logistics industries are highly competitive, full of well-established, low-cost alternatives. Watch, too, whether the labor stays lawful as structured: the whole arrangement rests on drivers treated as contractors rather than employees, and complaints in several jurisdictions, including the United States and Brazil, challenge that point — a ruling against it could turn a contractor's fare into a payroll. The figures for margins, returns, and the net debt are in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −12%, above 15% in 1 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$7.9B	$10.4B	$13.0B	$11.1B	$17.5B	$31.9B	$37.3B	$44.0B	$52.0B	$53.7B	RevenueRevenue
29%	20%	25%	24%	13%	10%	7%	8%	6%	6%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
15%	14%	37%	20%	12%	9%	8%	7%	7%	7%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($4.1B)	($3.0B)	($8.6B)	($4.9B)	($3.8B)	($1.8B)	$1.1B	$2.8B	$5.6B	$6.3B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−51.4%	−29.1%	−66.1%	−43.7%	−22.0%	−5.7%	3.0%	6.4%	10.7%	11.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($4.0B)	$997M	($8.5B)	($6.8B)	($496M)	($9.1B)	$1.9B	$9.9B	$10.1B	$8.5B	Net incomeNet inc.
										Cash flow & returns
($1.4B)	($1.5B)	($4.3B)	($2.7B)	($445M)	$642M	$3.6B	$7.1B	$10.1B	$10.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$510M	$426M	$472M	$575M	$902M	$947M	$823M	$711M	$719M	$732M	DepreciationDeprec.
$2.0B	($3.1B)	($883M)	$2.6B	($2.0B)	$7.0B	($1.1B)	($5.2B)	($2.5B)	($1.0B)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$821M	$558M	$588M	$616M	$298M	$252M	$223M	$242M	$336M	$327M	CapexCapex
10.4%	5.3%	4.5%	5.5%	1.7%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($1.9B)	($2.0B)	($4.9B)	($3.4B)	($743M)	$390M	$3.4B	$6.9B	$9.8B	$9.8B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−24.3%	−18.9%	−37.8%	−30.2%	−4.3%	1.2%	9.0%	15.7%	18.8%	18.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($2.2B)	($2.1B)	($4.9B)	($3.4B)	($743M)	$390M	$3.4B	$6.9B	$9.8B	$9.8B	Free cash flowFCF
−28.2%	−20.1%	−37.8%	−30.2%	−4.3%	1.2%	9.0%	15.7%	18.8%	18.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$64M	$7M	$1.5B	$2.3B	$59M	$0	$0	$815M	$821M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$1.3B	$6.5B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	-75%	-27%	-16%	-12%	6%	11%	18%	21%	ROICROIC
—	—	-60%	-55%	-3%	-125%	17%	46%	37%	35%	Return on equityROE
—	—	−60%	−55%	−3%	−125%	17%	46%	37%	35%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$4.4B	$6.4B	$11.3B	$6.8B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$5.4B	$7.0B	$7.6B	$16.5B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$919M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$2.4B	$2.8B	$3.4B	$3.3B	$3.8B	$3.9B	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$150M	$272M	$235M	$860M	$728M	$790M	$858M	$1.0B	$1.2B	Accounts payablePayables
—	$769M	$942M	$838M	$1.6B	$2.1B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$2.7B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$8.7B	$13.9B	$9.9B	$8.8B	$9.2B	$11.3B	$12.2B	$14.0B	$12.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$4.3B	$5.6B	$6.9B	$9.0B	$8.9B	$9.5B	$11.5B	$12.3B	$12.0B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	2.0×	2.5×	1.4×	1.0×	1.0×	1.2×	1.1×	1.1×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$39M	$153M	$167M	$6.1B	$8.4B	$8.3B	$8.2B	$8.1B	$8.9B	$8.9B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$24.0B	$31.8B	$33.3B	$38.8B	$32.1B	$38.7B	$51.2B	$61.8B	$59.9B	Total assetsAssets
—	$6.9B	$5.7B	$7.6B	$9.3B	$9.3B	$9.5B	$9.5B	$10.5B	$10.5B	Total debtDebt
—	$490M	($5.6B)	$760M	$5.0B	$5.0B	$4.1B	$2.5B	$2.9B	($6.0B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-8.5×	-4.7×	-15.4×	-10.6×	-7.9×	-3.2×	1.8×	5.4×	12.6×	14.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($8.6B)	($7.4B)	$14.2B	$12.3B	$14.5B	$7.3B	$11.2B	$21.6B	$27.0B	$24.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.6%	1.6%	35.4%	7.4%	6.7%	5.6%	5.2%	4.1%	3.5%	3.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	$100M	$73M	—	—	—	—	$73M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
										Per share
426M	479M	1.25B	1.75B	1.90B	1.97B	2.09B	2.15B	2.12B	2.07B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$18.60	$21.78	$10.41	$6.35	$9.21	$16.14	$17.82	$20.45	$24.54	$25.92	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-9.46	$2.08	$-6.81	$-3.86	$-0.26	$-4.63	$0.90	$4.58	$4.74	$4.12	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-4.52	$-4.11	$-3.93	$-1.92	$-0.39	$0.20	$1.61	$3.21	$4.61	$4.73	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-5.25	$-4.38	$-3.93	$-1.92	$-0.39	$0.20	$1.61	$3.21	$4.61	$4.73	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.93	$1.16	$0.47	$0.35	$0.16	$0.13	$0.11	$0.11	$0.16	$0.16	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-20.07	$-15.42	$11.37	$7.00	$7.63	$3.72	$5.38	$10.02	$12.76	$11.95	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.61 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.4 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.5%/yr	+31.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	−26.8%/yr	−14.7%/yr
Book value / share	—	+12.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

2.1Bpeak FY2024

ROIC

18%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$9.8Bowner earningsvs.$10.1Bnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2022FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $10.1B of profit but $9.8B of owner earnings: $290M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$10.1B

Owner earnings$9.8B · 19% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$10.1B	$9.9B	$1.9B	($9.1B)	($496M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$719M	+$711M	+$823M	+$947M	+$902M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$1.8B	+$1.8B	+$1.9B	+$1.8B	+$1.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$2.5B	−$5.2B	−$1.1B	+$7.0B	−$2.0B
Cash from operations	$10.1B	$7.1B	$3.6B	$642M	($445M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$336M	−$242M	−$223M	−$252M	−$298M
Owner earnings	$9.8B	$6.9B	$3.4B	$390M	($743M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	16%	9%	1%	-4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $1.8B), owner earnings is nearer $7.9B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 12.6×

Comfortable

Operating income $5.6B ÷ interest expense $440M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.9B · 0.5× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $7.1B + ST investments $528M − debt $10.5B

What this means
Netting $7.6B of cash and short-term investments against $10.5B of debt leaves $2.9B owed, about 0.5× a year's operating profit (1.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -12%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range -75%–18%; 18% latest = NOPAT $5.6B ÷ invested capital $30.5B

Industry peers: median 16%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 19%

High, recently turned positive

latest $9.8B = operating cash $10.1B − maintenance capex $336M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median -4%)

Industry peers: median 19%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a -4% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.8B of SBC) leaves $7.9B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.00×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $10.1B ÷ net income $10.1B

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 67%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $6.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $9.8B

What this means
Of $9.8B Owner Earnings, $6.5B (67%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $6.5B buybacks. Net of $1.8B stock comp, the real buyback was about $4.7B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.47×

Harvesting

Capex $336M ÷ depreciation $719M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $52.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $10.5B vs $1.7B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.57/share (latest year $4.94), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.28/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −49% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −49% early to 7% lately, median −22% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Worst year 2019 · −66.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“For example, shifts in consumer behavior, including the use of new or emerging technologies, such as AI-enabled platforms and digital assistants, may disintermediate our relationship with consumers by controlling how our products are accessed, presented or selected, which could redirect demand to competitors and advers…”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$12.8B

Cash & short-term investments$6.1B
Receivables$3.9B
Other current assets$2.8B

Current liabilities$12.0B

Accounts payable$1.2B
Other current liabilities$10.8B

Current ratio1.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.07×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.51×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$830Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$14.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($21.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$12.4B$1.9B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $12.3B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$121Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0

'27$0

'28$2.9B

'29$1.5B

'30$1.3B

later$5.0B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$2.9Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$10.6Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$432M

'27$312M

'28$246M

'29$227M

'30$195M

later$1.6B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$432Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$3.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$1.8Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$10.5B

Lease obligations (present value)$1.8B

Total fixed claims on the business$12.3B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $12.3B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $11.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$3.9B · 36%
Buybacks$7.8B · 71%

Returned to owners$7.8B
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $7.8B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$716M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $716M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$79.50
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 98M shares were bought for $7.8B, about $79.50 each.
Net change in share count385.8%
The diluted count rose from 426M to 2071M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Khosrowshahi	$19.9M	$4.2M	($743M)
2022	Mr. Khosrowshahi	$24.3M	−$8.9M	$390M
2023	Mr. Khosrowshahi	$24.2M	$109.7M	$3.4B
2024	Mr. Khosrowshahi	$39.4M	$74.3M	$6.9B
2025	Mr. Khosrowshahi	$35.6M	$66.7M	$9.8B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership3.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio360:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$1.8B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 33% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Uber Technologies Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?385.8%
Diluted shares grew 385.8% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $7.8B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ACNAccenture PLC	$69.7B	32%	14.6%	54%	14%
UBERUber Technologies Inc.	$52.0B	—	-22.0%	-12%	-4%
VVisa Inc.	$40.0B	—	64.4%	28%	53%
PYPLPayPal Holdings Inc.	$33.2B	—	15.8%	16%	19%
MAMastercard Incorporated	$32.8B	—	53.2%	81%	42%
MELIMercadoLibre Inc.	$20.3B	36%	11.0%	14%	23%
AMTMAmentum Holdings Inc.	$14.4B	10%	2.5%	3%	1%
DASHDoorDash Inc.	$13.7B	—	-12.2%	-14%	8%
Group median	—	—	12.8%	15%	17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Uber Technologies Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($6.7B) Net of stock comp (−$1.9B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+193%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $9.8B on 2036M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net cash $6.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh UBER against another business →

The owners of UBER: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Uber Technologies Inc. (UBER), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UBER, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UAN its page in the Manual UBSI →

Industry order: ← TNET the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter UNF →