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VRSN, VeriSign Inc.

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Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

VRSN · VeriSign Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.7B

+6.4% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.5B

Gross margin 88% 5-yr avg 87%

Operating margin 67.9% 5-yr avg 66.8%

Owner-earnings margin 62% 5-yr avg 58%

Free cash flow margin 62% 5-yr avg 58%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 86% and operating margin about 65% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (60%–68% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −24 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

34% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States66%$1.1B
EMEA17%$279M
Asia Pacific11%$185M
Other6%$100M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.7B	RevenueRevenue
83%	83%	84%	85%	86%	86%	86%	87%	88%	88%	88%	Gross marginGross mgn
10%	11%	11%	11%	15%	14%	14%	14%	14%	14%	14%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
5%	4%	5%	5%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$687M	$708M	$767M	$806M	$824M	$867M	$943M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
60.1%	60.7%	63.2%	65.5%	65.1%	65.3%	66.2%	67.0%	67.9%	67.7%	67.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$441M	$457M	$582M	$612M	$815M	$785M	$674M	$818M	$786M	$826M	$841M	Net incomeNet inc.
24%	24%	20%	19%	-9%	-0%	23%	16%	23%	23%	23%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$693M	$703M	$698M	$754M	$730M	$807M	$831M	$854M	$903M	$1.1B	$1.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$58M	$50M	$48M	$46M	$46M	$48M	$47M	$44M	$37M	$31M	$29M	DepreciationDeprec.
$144M	$143M	$14M	$45M	($179M)	($79M)	$52M	($68M)	$19M	$165M	$131M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$27M	$49M	$37M	$40M	$43M	$53M	$27M	$46M	$28M	$23M	$24M	CapexCapex
2.3%	4.2%	3.0%	3.3%	3.4%	4.0%	1.9%	3.1%	1.8%	1.4%	1.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$666M	$653M	$661M	$714M	$687M	$754M	$804M	$808M	$875M	$1.1B	$1.0B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
58.3%	56.1%	54.4%	57.9%	54.3%	56.8%	56.4%	54.1%	56.2%	64.5%	62.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$666M	$653M	$661M	$714M	$687M	$754M	$804M	$808M	$875M	$1.1B	$1.0B	Free cash flowFCF
58.3%	56.1%	54.4%	57.9%	54.3%	56.8%	56.4%	54.1%	56.2%	64.5%	62.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$215M	$215M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$662M	$621M	$638M	$783M	$778M	$723M	$1.0B	$901M	$1.2B	$882M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
											Balance sheet
$1.8B	$2.4B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$980M	$926M	$600M	$581M	$556M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$13M	$5M	$6M	$2M	$5M	$5M	$6M	$6M	$6M	$8M	$11M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$19M	$11M	$17M	$16M	$12M	$9M	$10M	$13M	$11M	$14M	$11M	Accounts payablePayables
($6M)	($5M)	($11M)	($14M)	($8M)	($4M)	($4M)	($6M)	($5M)	($6M)	$800K	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.8B	$2.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.0B	$988M	$664M	$653M	$626M	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.5B	$1.6B	$948M	$965M	$989M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×	1.6×	1.4×	1.3×	1.2×	1.2×	0.9×	0.8×	0.4×	0.5×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	$53M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.3B	$2.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Total assetsAssets
$1.2B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Total debtDebt
($561M)	($632M)	$515M	$570M	$623M	$580M	$808M	$864M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
5.9×	5.2×	6.7×	8.9×	9.1×	10.4×	12.5×	13.3×	14.1×	14.6×	15.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($1.2B)	($1.3B)	($1.4B)	($1.5B)	($1.4B)	($1.3B)	($1.6B)	($1.6B)	($2.0B)	($2.2B)	($2.2B)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
4.4%	4.5%	4.3%	4.1%	3.8%	4.0%	4.1%	4.0%	3.9%	4.2%	4.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
129M	124M	123M	119M	115M	112M	108M	104M	98.2M	93.8M	91.8M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$8.87	$9.38	$9.91	$10.35	$10.97	$11.83	$13.19	$14.43	$15.86	$17.66	$18.34	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.42	$3.68	$4.75	$5.15	$7.07	$6.99	$6.24	$7.90	$8.00	$8.80	$9.16	EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.17	$5.26	$5.39	$6.00	$5.96	$6.72	$7.44	$7.81	$8.91	$11.39	$11.42	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.17	$5.26	$5.39	$6.00	$5.96	$6.72	$7.44	$7.81	$8.91	$11.39	$11.42	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$2.29	$2.34	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.21	$0.40	$0.30	$0.34	$0.38	$0.47	$0.25	$0.44	$0.29	$0.24	$0.26	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-9.32	$-10.15	$-11.30	$-12.53	$-12.06	$-11.23	$-14.46	$-15.28	$-19.94	$-22.97	$-24.11	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+8.0%/yr	+10.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+9.2%/yr	+13.8%/yr
EPS	+11.1%/yr	+4.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+1.8%/yr	−8.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

94Mpeak FY2016

Gross margin

88%low FY2016

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

1.1×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.1Bowner earningsvs.$826Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $826M of profit into $1.1B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$826M

Owner earnings$1.1B · 64% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$826M	$786M	$818M	$674M	$785M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$31M	+$37M	+$44M	+$47M	+$48M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$70M	+$61M	+$60M	+$59M	+$53M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$165M	+$19M	−$68M	+$52M	−$79M
Cash from operations	$1.1B	$903M	$854M	$831M	$807M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$23M	−$28M	−$46M	−$27M	−$53M
Owner earnings	$1.1B	$875M	$808M	$804M	$754M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	64%	56%	54%	56%	57%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $70M), owner earnings is nearer $999M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 14.6×

Comfortable

Operating income $1.1B ÷ interest expense $77M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 1.1× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $308M + ST investments $273M − debt $1.8B

What this means
Netting $581M of cash and short-term investments against $1.8B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 1.1× a year's operating profit (1.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -24d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 2 + DIO 0 − DPO 26 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($674M) = debt $1.8B + equity ($2.2B) − cash

Industry peers: median -13%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin 56%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 54%–64%; latest $1.1B = operating cash $1.1B − maintenance capex $23M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 64% of revenue this year, a 56% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $70M of SBC) leaves $999M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.32×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.1B ÷ net income $826M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 103%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $1.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.1B

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $1.1B of Owner Earnings, $1.1B (103%) went back to shareholders, $215M dividends, $882M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $70M stock comp, the real buyback was about $812M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.73×

Harvesting

Capex $23M ÷ depreciation $31M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.49×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.8B vs ($681M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +64%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.90/share (latest year $9.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-23.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 61% → 68% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 61% early to 68% lately, median 65% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +4%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 60.1% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −3.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Recent industry experience has demonstrated that DDoS attacks continue to grow in size and sophistication, due in part to advances in AI-based tools, and have the ability to widely disrupt internet services.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$626M

Cash & short-term investments$556M
Receivables$11M
Other current assets$58M

Current liabilities$1.4B

Accounts payable$11M
Other current liabilities$1.3B

Current ratio0.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.46×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.41×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($729M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($2.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($2.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$9M$9M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$1.4Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$42M

'27$25M

'28$14M

'29$7M

'30$5M

later$300K

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$42Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$67Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$42Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$94Mevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$556M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$1.1B

Together, against $42M due next year38.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.6B against the $42M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 39 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $8.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$374M · 5%
Dividends$215M · 3%
Buybacks$8.3B · 102%

Returned to owners$8.5B
110% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $215M as dividends and $8.3B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$787M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $787M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.2B to $1.8B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $1.2B.
Average price paid for buybacks$162.23
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 51M shares were bought for $8.3B, about $162.23 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $81.70 (2016) to $251.89 (2025); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $182.93 ($1.2B).
Net change in share count−28.7%
The diluted count fell from 129M to 92M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$2.29/sh
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Bidzos	$10.1M	$13.3M	$754M
2022	Bidzos	$11.3M	$6.6M	$804M
2023	Bidzos	$12.2M	$10.2M	$808M
2024	Bidzos	$14.1M	$11.8M	$875M
2025	Bidzos	$15.5M	$24.2M	$1.1B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio67:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$70M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why VeriSign Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ZSZscaler Inc.	$2.7B	78%	-22.3%	-13%	17%
PEGAPegasystems	$1.7B	71%	1.9%	3%	7%
ESTCElastic	$1.7B	74%	-20.9%	-54%	2%
TDCTeradata Corporation	$1.7B	57%	8.3%	47%	16%
VRSNVeriSign Inc.	$1.7B	86%	65.4%	—	56%
IOTSamsara Inc.	$1.6B	73%	-37.1%	-28%	-10%
PATHUiPath	$1.6B	83%	-18.2%	-14%	4%
FAFirst Advantage Corporation	$1.6B	—	9.8%	4%	17%
Group median	—	74%	-8.1%	—	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what VeriSign Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, VeriSign Inc. earns about $932M on its 56.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 64.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($932M) Net of stock comp (−$71M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.0B on 91M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $1.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh VRSN against another business →

The owners of VRSN: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "VeriSign Inc. (VRSN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VRSN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VRSK its page in the Manual VRT →

Industry order: ← VRSK the IT Services & Consulting chapter WDAY →