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WDS, Woodside Energy Group Limited
An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 30% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −144% to 55% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Asia Pacific at 56%.
- Asia Pacific56%$7.3B
- Europe24%$3.1B
- Americas17%$2.2B
- Other2%$286M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $3.6B | $7.0B | $16.8B | $14.0B | $13.2B | $13.0B | $13.0B | RevenueRevenue |
| 17% | — | 61% | 46% | 43% | 35% | 35% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($5.2B) | $3.5B | $9.2B | $3.3B | $4.5B | $3.9B | $3.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −143.6% | 50.2% | 54.6% | 23.6% | 34.3% | 30.0% | 30.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($4.0B) | $2.0B | $6.5B | $1.7B | $3.6B | $2.7B | $2.7B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 33% | 31% | 28% | 19% | 22% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $1.8B | $3.8B | $8.8B | $6.1B | $5.8B | $7.2B | $7.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.7B | $1.6B | $2.8B | $4.0B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $5.1B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $4.1B | $227M | ($495M) | $525M | ($2.3B) | ($596M) | ($596M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | $3.1B | $5.3B | $4.9B | $8.0B | $8.0B | CapexCapex |
| — | — | 18.6% | 37.8% | 37.2% | 61.4% | 61.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | $5.7B | $2.2B | $945M | $2.1B | $2.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | 33.7% | 15.6% | 7.2% | 16.3% | 16.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | $5.7B | $854M | $945M | ($782M) | ($782M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | 33.7% | 6.1% | 7.2% | −6.0% | −6.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $454M | $289M | $2.6B | $4.3B | $2.4B | $2.0B | $2.0B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | $45M | $0 | $0 | $53M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 15% | 18% | 6% | 9% | 7% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| -31% | 15% | 18% | 5% | 10% | 8% | 8% | Return on equityROE |
| −35% | 13% | 11% | −8% | 3% | 2% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $3.6B | $3.3B | $6.9B | $1.9B | $4.1B | $5.9B | $5.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $368M | $1.6B | $1.5B | $2.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $202M | $678M | $616M | $684M | $693M | $693M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $639M | $2.1B | $1.7B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | ($69M) | $162M | $409M | $889M | $603M | $603M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $4.3B | $9.3B | $5.1B | $7.6B | $8.6B | $8.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $2.6B | $6.6B | $5.0B | $5.9B | $5.4B | $5.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.6× | 1.4× | 1.0× | 1.3× | 1.6× | 1.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $0 | $4.6B | $4.0B | $3.9B | $4.0B | $4.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $26.5B | $59.3B | $55.4B | $61.3B | $66.5B | $66.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $5.4B | $5.1B | $4.9B | $10.0B | $12.0B | $12.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $2.1B | ($1.7B) | $2.9B | $5.9B | $6.0B | $6.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -15.8× | 15.2× | 55.0× | 10.8× | 12.4× | 13.0× | 13.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $12.9B | $13.4B | $36.3B | $34.4B | $35.4B | $35.9B | $35.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 951M | 963M | 1.51B | 1.90B | 1.90B | 1.90B | 1.90B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $3.79 | $7.23 | $11.13 | $7.38 | $6.95 | $6.85 | $6.85 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.24 | $2.06 | $4.30 | $0.88 | $1.88 | $1.43 | $1.43 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | $3.76 | $1.15 | $0.50 | $1.12 | $1.12 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | $3.76 | $0.45 | $0.50 | $-0.41 | $-0.41 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.48 | $0.30 | $1.69 | $2.24 | $1.29 | $1.06 | $1.06 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | $2.08 | $2.79 | $2.59 | $4.21 | $4.21 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $13.54 | $13.97 | $24.04 | $18.14 | $18.67 | $18.95 | $18.95 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.57 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +12.6%/yr | +12.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −33.2%/yr (3-yr) | −33.2%/yr (3-yr) |
| Dividends / share | +17.3%/yr | +17.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +26.6%/yr (3-yr) | +26.6%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +7.0%/yr | +7.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $2.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $5.1B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($782M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $2.7B | $3.6B | $1.7B | $6.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$5.1B | +$4.6B | +$4.0B | +$2.8B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$596M | −$2.3B | +$525M | −$495M |
| Cash from operations | $7.2B | $5.8B | $6.1B | $8.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$5.1B | −$4.9B | −$4.0B | −$3.1B |
| Owner earnings | $2.1B | $945M | $2.2B | $5.7B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$2.9B | — | −$1.3B | — |
| Free cash flow | ($782M) | $945M | $854M | $5.7B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 16% | 7% | 16% | 34% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $5.1B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 13.0×ComfortableOperating income $3.9B ÷ interest expense $299M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $6.0B · 1.5× operating profitModest net debtCash $5.7B + ST investments $229M − debt $12.0B
What this means
Netting $5.9B of cash and short-term investments against $12.0B of debt leaves $6.0B owed, about 1.5× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 49 + DIO 30 − DPO 80 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median, range 6%–18%; 7% latest = NOPAT $3.0B ÷ invested capital $42.2BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle4-yr median margin, range 7%–34%; latest $2.1B = operating cash $7.2B − maintenance capex $5.1BIndustry peers: median 20%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 4 years. It chose to put $2.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($782M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $7.2B ÷ net income $2.7B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $2.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.1B
What this means
Of $2.1B Owner Earnings, $2.1B (97%) went back to shareholders, $2.0B dividends, $53M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.57×ExpandingCapex $8.0B ÷ depreciation $5.1B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $13.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.59×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $12.0B vs $3.2B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (6-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (6)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +79%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.39/share (latest year $1.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.89/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −13% → 29% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −13% early to 29% lately, median 30% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −27%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 27% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −143.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$5.9B
- Receivables$1.8B
- Inventory$693M
- Other current assets$237M
- Debt due within a year$782M
- Accounts payable$1.8B
- Other current liabilities$2.8B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated $28.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$21.3B · 76%
- Dividends$11.3B · 40%
- Buybacks$98M · 0%
- Returned to owners$11.4B
104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $11.3B as dividends and $98M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$4.7B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $4.7B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $5.1B to $12.0B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $937M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $98M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count25.4%
The diluted count rose from 1511M to 1895M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.06/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 14% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−38%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $1.2B, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.38 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Woodside Energy Group Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.8% vs 24.7%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 24.7% early in the record and 11.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?25.4%
Diluted shares grew 25.4% over 2022–2025, even as the company spent $98M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Oil & Gas Producers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OXYOccidental Petroleum Corporation | $21.6B | 86% | 17.9% | 7% | 21% |
| DVNDevon Energy Corporation | $16.8B | 53% | 20.7% | 12% | 20% |
| FANGDiamondback Energy Inc. | $15.0B | — | 43.6% | 7% | 47% |
| WDSWoodside Energy Group Limited | $13.0B | 43% | 32.1% | 9% | 16% |
| EXEExpand Energy Corporation | $12.1B | — | -0.9% | -0% | 5% |
| OVVOvintiv | $8.7B | — | 17.7% | 12% | 17% |
| EQTEQT Corporation | $8.6B | 63% | -3.8% | -1% | 18% |
| CTRACoterra Energy Inc. | $7.3B | — | 34.8% | 9% | 33% |
| Group median | — | 58% | 19.3% | 8% | 19% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Woodside Energy Group Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Woodside Energy Group Limited has delivered.
Woodside Energy Group Limited’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Woodside Energy Group Limited earns about $2.1B on its 16.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($782M) on 1901M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $6.0B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($8.0B) runs well above depreciation ($5.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $2.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← WDH its page in the Manual WF →
Industry order: ← VTS the Oil & Gas Producers chapter WTI →