Owner Scorecard


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WDS, Woodside Energy Group Limited

Oil & Gas Producers capital-intensive

An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
WDS · Woodside Energy Group Limited
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$13.0B
−1.5% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $13.0B 5-yr avg $12.8B
Gross margin 35% 5-yr avg 46%
Operating margin 30.0% 5-yr avg 38.5%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 18%
Free cash flow margin −6% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 43% and operating margin about 30% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −144% to 55% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Asia Pacific at 56%.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • Asia Pacific56%$7.3B
  • Europe24%$3.1B
  • Americas17%$2.2B
  • Other2%$286M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$3.6B$7.0B$16.8B$14.0B$13.2B$13.0B$13.0BRevenueRevenue
17%61%46%43%35%35%Gross marginGross mgn
($5.2B)$3.5B$9.2B$3.3B$4.5B$3.9B$3.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
−143.6%50.2%54.6%23.6%34.3%30.0%30.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($4.0B)$2.0B$6.5B$1.7B$3.6B$2.7B$2.7BNet incomeNet inc.
33%31%28%19%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.8B$3.8B$8.8B$6.1B$5.8B$7.2B$7.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.7B$1.6B$2.8B$4.0B$4.6B$5.1B$5.1BDepreciationDeprec.
$4.1B$227M($495M)$525M($2.3B)($596M)($596M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$3.1B$5.3B$4.9B$8.0B$8.0BCapexCapex
18.6%37.8%37.2%61.4%61.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$5.7B$2.2B$945M$2.1B$2.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
33.7%15.6%7.2%16.3%16.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$5.7B$854M$945M($782M)($782M)Free cash flowFCF
33.7%6.1%7.2%−6.0%−6.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$454M$289M$2.6B$4.3B$2.4B$2.0B$2.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
$45M$0$0$53MBuybacksBuybacks
15%18%6%9%7%7%ROICROIC
-31%15%18%5%10%8%8%Return on equityROE
−35%13%11%−8%3%2%2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3.6B$3.3B$6.9B$1.9B$4.1B$5.9B$5.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$368M$1.6B$1.5B$2.4B$1.8B$1.8BReceivablesReceiv.
$202M$678M$616M$684M$693M$693MInventoryInvent.
$639M$2.1B$1.7B$2.2B$1.8B$1.8BAccounts payablePayables
($69M)$162M$409M$889M$603M$603MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$4.3B$9.3B$5.1B$7.6B$8.6B$8.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.6B$6.6B$5.0B$5.9B$5.4B$5.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.4×1.0×1.3×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$4.6B$4.0B$3.9B$4.0B$4.0BGoodwillGoodwill
$26.5B$59.3B$55.4B$61.3B$66.5B$66.5BTotal assetsAssets
$5.4B$5.1B$4.9B$10.0B$12.0B$12.0BTotal debtDebt
$2.1B($1.7B)$2.9B$5.9B$6.0B$6.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-15.8×15.2×55.0×10.8×12.4×13.0×13.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$12.9B$13.4B$36.3B$34.4B$35.4B$35.9B$35.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
951M963M1.51B1.90B1.90B1.90B1.90BShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.79$7.23$11.13$7.38$6.95$6.85$6.85Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-4.24$2.06$4.30$0.88$1.88$1.43$1.43EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.76$1.15$0.50$1.12$1.12Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.76$0.45$0.50$-0.41$-0.41Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.48$0.30$1.69$2.24$1.29$1.06$1.06Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.08$2.79$2.59$4.21$4.21Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$13.54$13.97$24.04$18.14$18.67$18.95$18.95Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.57 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+12.6%/yr+12.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−33.2%/yr (3-yr)−33.2%/yr (3-yr)
Dividends / share+17.3%/yr+17.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+26.6%/yr (3-yr)+26.6%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share+7.0%/yr+7.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.9Bpeak FY2023
ROIC
7%low FY2023
Gross margin
35%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.8×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.1Bowner earningsvs.$2.7Bnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2020FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $2.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $5.1B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($782M).

Reported net income$2.7B
Owner earnings$2.1B · 16% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$2.7B$3.6B$1.7B$6.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$5.1B+$4.6B+$4.0B+$2.8B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$596M−$2.3B+$525M−$495M
Cash from operations$7.2B$5.8B$6.1B$8.8B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$5.1B−$4.9B−$4.0B−$3.1B
Owner earnings$2.1B$945M$2.2B$5.7B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$2.9B−$1.3B
Free cash flow($782M)$945M$854M$5.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%7%16%34%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $5.1B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $3.9B ÷ interest expense $299M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $6.0B · 1.5× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $5.7B + ST investments $229M − debt $12.0B
    What this means

    Netting $5.9B of cash and short-term investments against $12.0B of debt leaves $6.0B owed, about 1.5× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 49 + DIO 30 − DPO 80 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    5-yr median, range 6%–18%; 7% latest = NOPAT $3.0B ÷ invested capital $42.2B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    4-yr median margin, range 7%–34%; latest $2.1B = operating cash $7.2B − maintenance capex $5.1B
    Industry peers: median 20%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 4 years. It chose to put $2.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($782M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $7.2B ÷ net income $2.7B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $2.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.1B
    What this means

    Of $2.1B Owner Earnings, $2.1B (97%) went back to shareholders, $2.0B dividends, $53M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.57×
    Expanding
    Capex $8.0B ÷ depreciation $5.1B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $13.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.59×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $12.0B vs $3.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (6)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +79%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.39/share (latest year $1.43), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.89/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −13% → 29% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −13% early to 29% lately, median 30% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −27%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 27% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −143.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$5.9B
  • Receivables$1.8B
  • Inventory$693M
  • Other current assets$237M
Current liabilities$5.4B
  • Debt due within a year$782M
  • Accounts payable$1.8B
  • Other current liabilities$2.8B
Current ratio1.59×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.46×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$782M due · $5.9B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$32.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($18.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$13.7B$1.8B of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $28.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$21.3B · 76%
  • Dividends$11.3B · 40%
  • Buybacks$98M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$11.4B

    104% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $11.3B as dividends and $98M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$4.7B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $4.7B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $5.1B to $12.0B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $937M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $98M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count25.4%

    The diluted count rose from 1511M to 1895M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.06/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 14% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−38%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $1.2B, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.38 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Woodside Energy Group Limited is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?11.8% vs 24.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 24.7% early in the record and 11.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?25.4%

    Diluted shares grew 25.4% over 2022–2025, even as the company spent $98M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oil & Gas Producers

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
OXYOccidental Petroleum Corporation$21.6B86%17.9%7%21%
DVNDevon Energy Corporation$16.8B53%20.7%12%20%
FANGDiamondback Energy Inc.$15.0B43.6%7%47%
WDSWoodside Energy Group Limited$13.0B43%32.1%9%16%
EXEExpand Energy Corporation$12.1B-0.9%-0%5%
OVVOvintiv$8.7B17.7%12%17%
EQTEQT Corporation$8.6B63%-3.8%-1%18%
CTRACoterra Energy Inc.$7.3B34.8%9%33%
Group median58%19.3%8%19%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Woodside Energy Group Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Woodside Energy Group Limited has delivered.

Woodside Energy Group Limited’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Woodside Energy Group Limited earns about $2.1B on its 16.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’25−27%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($782M) on 1901M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net debt $6.0B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($8.0B) runs well above depreciation ($5.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $2.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Woodside Energy Group Limited (WDS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WDS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WDH its page in the Manual WF →

Industry order: ← VTS the Oil & Gas Producers chapter WTI →