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WLYB, John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Publishing asset-light CyclicalSerial acquirer

Wiley is a predominantly digital company with 85% of revenue for the year ended April 30, 2026 generated by digital products and services.

The Company's content, services, platforms, and knowledge networks are tailored to meet the evolving needs of its customers and partners, including institutions, societies, corporations, researchers, students, instructors, and other professionals.

Wiley also reported a Held for Sale or Sold segment in the years ended April 30, 2025 and 2024 , which primarily included non-core businesses which were classified as held-for-sale until the date of sale, as well as other businesses which were sold.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

WLYB · John Wiley & Sons Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$1.7B

−0.1% YoY · −3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.9B

Gross margin 74% 5-yr avg 70%

Operating margin 16.5% 5-yr avg 9.2%

ROIC 19% 5-yr avg 10%

Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 10%

Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 66% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 69% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −3.0% to 17% — on a steadier 69% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

49% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2026

United States51%$855M
United Kingdom29%$490M
Germany11%$192M
Other countries8%$139M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	RevenueRevenue
71%	70%	69%	68%	68%	66%	66%	69%	74%	74%	74%	Gross marginGross mgn
55%	53%	54%	54%	53%	52%	51%	54%	56%	53%	53%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$211M	$231M	$224M	($54M)	$186M	$219M	$56M	$52M	$221M	$277M	$277M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
12.3%	12.9%	12.4%	−3.0%	9.6%	10.5%	2.8%	2.8%	13.2%	16.5%	16.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$114M	$192M	$168M	($74M)	$148M	$148M	$17M	($200M)	$84M	$222M	$222M	Net incomeNet inc.
41%	10%	21%	—	16%	29%	48%	—	41%	-3%	-3%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$315M	$382M	$251M	$288M	$360M	$339M	$277M	$208M	$203M	$261M	$261M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$157M	$154M	$161M	$175M	$200M	$215M	$213M	$177M	$147M	$143M	$143M	DepreciationDeprec.
$27M	$25M	($97M)	$168M	($11M)	($50M)	$20M	$206M	($51M)	($125M)	($125M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$105M	$114M	$77M	$89M	$77M	$89M	$81M	$76M	$61M	$51M	$51M	CapexCapex
6.1%	6.4%	4.3%	4.8%	4.0%	4.3%	4.0%	4.1%	3.7%	3.1%	3.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$210M	$268M	$174M	$200M	$283M	$250M	$196M	$132M	$141M	$209M	$209M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
12.2%	14.9%	9.6%	10.9%	14.6%	12.0%	9.7%	7.0%	8.4%	12.5%	12.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$210M	$268M	$174M	$200M	$283M	$250M	$196M	$132M	$141M	$209M	$209M	Free cash flowFCF
12.2%	14.9%	9.6%	10.9%	14.6%	12.0%	9.7%	7.0%	8.4%	12.5%	12.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$126M	$0	$190M	$230M	$300M	$76M	$7M	$3M	$4M	$243K	$243K	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$72M	$74M	$76M	$77M	$77M	$77M	$77M	$77M	$76M	$74M	$74M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$50M	$40M	$60M	$47M	$16M	$30M	$35M	$45M	$60M	$100M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
10%	15%	11%	-3%	9%	8%	2%	—	9%	19%	19%	ROICROIC
11%	16%	14%	-8%	14%	13%	2%	-27%	11%	26%	26%	Return on equityROE
4%	10%	8%	−16%	7%	6%	−6%	−37%	1%	17%	17%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$59M	$170M	$93M	$202M	$94M	$100M	$107M	$83M	$86M	$76M	$76M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$189M	$212M	$307M	$309M	$312M	$332M	$310M	$224M	$228M	$244M	$244M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$48M	$39M	$36M	$44M	$43M	$37M	$31M	$26M	$23M	$19M	$19M	InventoryInvent.
$76M	$90M	$91M	$94M	$96M	$77M	$84M	$56M	$61M	$67M	$67M	Accounts payablePayables
$160M	$162M	$251M	$259M	$258M	$291M	$257M	$195M	$190M	$196M	$196M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$360M	$480M	$503M	$615M	$526M	$551M	$541M	$454M	$440M	$420M	$420M	Current assetsCur. assets
$788M	$874M	$882M	$927M	$989M	$969M	$896M	$873M	$821M	$779M	$779M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×	0.5×	0.6×	0.7×	0.5×	0.6×	0.6×	0.5×	0.5×	0.5×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$982M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.6B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$2.6B	Total assetsAssets
$365M	$360M	$479M	$775M	$822M	$787M	$748M	$775M	$799M	$683M	$683M	Total debtDebt
$306M	$190M	$386M	$573M	$728M	$687M	$642M	$691M	$714M	$608M	$608M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
12.5×	17.4×	13.9×	-2.2×	10.1×	11.1×	1.5×	1.1×	4.2×	6.3×	6.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$934M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$740M	$752M	$848M	$848M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.0%	0.6%	1.0%	1.1%	1.1%	1.2%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.2%	1.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$4M	—	$110M	—	—	$100M	$108M	—	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
58.2M	57.9M	57.8M	56.2M	56.5M	56.6M	56.4M	54.9M	54.8M	53.2M	53.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$29.53	$31.03	$31.12	$32.58	$34.39	$36.80	$35.84	$34.09	$30.60	$31.49	$31.49	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.95	$3.32	$2.91	$-1.32	$2.63	$2.62	$0.31	$-3.65	$1.53	$4.16	$4.16	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.61	$4.63	$3.00	$3.56	$5.00	$4.42	$3.48	$2.39	$2.57	$3.93	$3.93	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.61	$4.63	$3.00	$3.56	$5.00	$4.42	$3.48	$2.39	$2.57	$3.93	$3.93	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.23	$1.27	$1.31	$1.36	$1.36	$1.36	$1.37	$1.40	$1.39	$1.40	$1.40	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.81	$1.97	$1.33	$1.58	$1.37	$1.57	$1.44	$1.38	$1.12	$0.96	$0.96	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$17.24	$20.57	$20.42	$16.61	$19.33	$20.18	$18.54	$13.46	$13.72	$15.93	$15.93	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+0.7%/yr	−1.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+1.0%/yr	−4.7%/yr
EPS	+8.8%/yr	+9.7%/yr
Dividends / share	+1.4%/yr	+0.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	−6.8%/yr	−6.9%/yr
Book value / share	−0.9%/yr	−3.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

53Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

19%low FY2020

Gross margin

74%low FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.9×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$209Mowner earningsvs.$222Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported $222M of profit but $209M of owner earnings: $12M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$222M

Owner earnings$209M · 12% of revenue

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$222M	$84M	($200M)	$17M	$148M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$143M	+$147M	+$177M	+$213M	+$215M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$21M	+$22M	+$25M	+$27M	+$26M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$125M	−$51M	+$206M	+$20M	−$50M
Cash from operations	$261M	$203M	$208M	$277M	$339M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$51M	−$61M	−$76M	−$81M	−$89M
Owner earnings	$209M	$141M	$132M	$196M	$250M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	12%	8%	7%	10%	12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $21M), owner earnings is nearer $189M.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Restated past financials

“Our Amended and Restated CA contains certain restrictive covenants related to our consolidated leverage ratio and interest coverage ratio, which we were in compliance with as of April 30, 2026.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 6.3×

Comfortable

Operating income $277M ÷ interest expense $44M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $608M · 2.2× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $76M − debt $683M

What this means
Netting $76M of cash and short-term investments against $683M of debt leaves $608M owed, about 2.2× a year's operating profit (2.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 13d

Tight

DSO 53 + DIO 16 − DPO 57 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 9%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median, range -3%–19%; 19% latest = NOPAT $277M ÷ invested capital $1.5B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 19% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 7%–15%; latest $209M = operating cash $261M − maintenance capex $51M

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 12% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $21M of SBC) leaves $189M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.18×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $261M ÷ net income $222M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 83%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $174M ÷ Owner Earnings $209M

What this means
Of $209M Owner Earnings, $174M (83%) went back to shareholders, $74M dividends, $100M buybacks. Net of $21M stock comp, the real buyback was about $79M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.36×

Harvesting

Capex $51M ÷ depreciation $143M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.54×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $683M vs ($359M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −78%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.67/share (latest year $4.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.17/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 13% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 13% early, 11% lately, median 11%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −3.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.0%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Technological developments in AI could disrupt the markets in which we operate and subject us to increased competition, cannibalization, legal and regulatory risks, and compliance costs.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$420M

Cash & short-term investments$76M
Receivables$244M
Inventory$19M
Other current assets$81M

Current liabilities$779M

Debt due within a year$13M
Accounts payable$67M
Other current liabilities$699M

Current ratio0.54×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.51×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($359M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$13M due · $76M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($863M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$769M$85M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$469Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $2.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$821M · 28%
Dividends$756M · 26%
Buybacks$483M · 17%
Retained (debt / cash)$823M · 29%

Returned to owners$1.2B
60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $756M as dividends and $483M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $483M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.
Net change in share count−8.5%
The diluted count fell from 58M to 53M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.40/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.7B66% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$936Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $821M of capital spent building

$322M written down across 4 years (2018, 2020, 2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 34% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Matthew S. Kissner	$7.3M	$10.7M	$283M
2022	Matthew S. Kissner	$4.9M	$3.9M	$250M
2023	Matthew S. Kissner	$4.4M	$1.8M	$196M
2024	Matthew S. Kissner	$3.4M	$3.8M	$132M
2024	Matthew S. Kissner	$4.5M	$1.5M	$132M
2025	Matthew S. Kissner	$5.5M	$5.7M	$141M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$21M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why John Wiley & Sons Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$365M → $683M
Debt rose from $365M to $683M while owner earnings went from about $217M to $161M — about 1.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $443M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$201M · 12% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Although no book customer accounts for more than 6% of total consolidated revenue and 7% of accounts receivable, net at April 30, 2026 , the top 10 book customers account for approximately 12% of total consolidated revenue and approximately 20% of accounts receivable, net at April 30, 2026 .”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (asset-light compounder), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
NYTNew York Times Company (The)	$2.8B	53%	10.7%	15%	10%
DLXDeluxe Corporation	$2.1B	58%	8.3%	6%	11%
OSISOSI Systems Inc. Common Stock (DE)	$1.7B	35%	9.6%	11%	6%
HURNHuron Consulting	$1.7B	37%	7.6%	6%	11%
WLYBJohn Wiley & Sons Inc.	$1.7B	69%	11.4%	9%	11%
TDCTeradata Corporation	$1.7B	57%	8.3%	47%	16%
VRSNVeriSign Inc.	$1.7B	86%	65.4%	—	56%
IOTSamsara Inc.	$1.6B	73%	-37.1%	-28%	-10%
Group median	—	58%	9.0%	9%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what John Wiley & Sons Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, John Wiley & Sons Inc. earns about $192M on its 11.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($192M) Net of stock comp (−$21M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $209M on 52M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $608M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh WLYB against another business →

The owners of WLYB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "John Wiley & Sons Inc. (WLYB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WLYB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← WLY its page in the Manual WM →

Industry order: ← WLY the Publishing chapter