Share count
542Mpeak FY2021
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XP, XP Inc.
Capital Markets & Asset Management financial
Our results of operations are affected by levels of interest rates, the expansion or retraction of the capital markets, trading volumes and market inflows in Brazil, each of which impacts the number and overall volume of capital markets transactions and available overall liquidity.
Inflation (IGP-M) is the general market price index measured by the FGV.
Exchange Rates Brazil's foreign exchange system permits the purchase and sale of foreign currency and the international transfer of reais by individuals and legal entities, subject to applicable regulatory procedures.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2024
R$7.4B
+13.7% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue R$7.4B 5-yr avg R$6.2B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on equity has run high across the record (median 22%, above 12% in 8 of 8 years). A bank that earns above its cost of equity through the cycle compounds book value; whether this one did it by underwriting discipline or by reaching for risk is what the 10-K, and the worst years in the record, will tell you.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | TTMTTMDec 2024 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| R$1.3B | R$2.1B | R$3.6B | R$5.0B | R$6.2B | R$5.9B | R$6.5B | R$7.4B | R$7.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| R$640M | R$861M | R$48M | R$91M | R$193M | R$564M | R$790M | R$997M | R$997M | Noninterest incomeFee inc. |
| R$414M | R$461M | R$1.1B | R$2.1B | R$3.6B | R$3.6B | R$3.9B | R$4.5B | R$4.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 27% | 28% | 30% | 14% | 6% | -4% | 1% | 9% | 9% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| — | 2.6% | 2.5% | 2.2% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 1.3% | Return on assetsROA |
| 36% | 22% | 15% | 19% | 25% | 21% | 20% | 23% | 23% | Return on equityROE |
| 19% | 7% | 8% | 19% | 25% | 21% | 2% | 12% | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| 36% | 29% | 16% | 19% | 25% | 21% | 20% | 23% | 23% | Return on tangible equityROTCE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| — | R$17.7B | R$43.6B | R$96.0B | R$139.3B | R$192.0B | R$249.0B | R$347.5B | R$347.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | R$70M | R$3.0B | R$6M | R$13M | R$450M | R$625M | R$3.0B | DepositsDeposits |
| R$1.2B | R$2.1B | R$7.2B | R$10.9B | R$14.4B | R$17.0B | R$19.4B | R$20.0B | R$20.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||
| 485M | 493M | 511M | 552M | 559M | 555M | 540M | 542M | 540M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| R$0.85 | R$0.94 | R$2.11 | R$3.76 | R$6.42 | R$6.44 | R$7.22 | R$8.33 | R$8.36 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| R$0.39 | R$0.66 | R$0.98 | R$0.00 | R$0.00 | R$0.00 | R$6.56 | R$3.76 | R$3.77 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| R$2.38 | R$4.23 | R$13.99 | R$19.73 | R$25.79 | R$30.67 | R$36.03 | R$37.00 | R$37.13 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| R$2.38 | R$3.20 | R$12.90 | R$19.73 | R$25.79 | R$30.67 | R$36.03 | R$37.00 | R$36.11 | Tangible book / shareTBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +26.5%/yr | +14.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +68.8%/yr | — |
| EPS | +38.5%/yr | +31.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +38.1%/yr | +30.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +23.0%/yr | +13.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +48.0%/yr | +21.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2024Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
R$7.4Blow FY2017
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Return on equity 23%Very high (≥17%)Net income R$4.5B ÷ equity R$20.0BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.
- Very high (≥18%)Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill R$0 − intangibles R$553M)Industry peers: median 17%
What this means
The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 72%
What this means
Noninterest expense or revenue missing.
Is it sound?
- Capital (equity / assets) 5.8%ThinEquity R$20.0B ÷ assets R$347.5B
What this means
A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.
- Funding —Not enough data
What this means
Deposits or total assets missing.
- Credit cost —Not enough data
What this means
Provision or net interest income missing.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Amaral holds a bachelor's degree in law from Pontif cia Universidade Cat lica do Rio de Janeiro and an LLM in business law from IBMEC Group.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | ROE | ROTCE | Efficiency | NII / assets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MSMorgan Stanley | $70.6B | 11% | 13% | 72% | 0.6% |
| GSGoldman Sachs Group Inc. (The) | $58.3B | 10% | 10% | 65% | 0.4% |
| SCHWCharles Schwab Corporation (The) | $23.9B | 13% | 18% | — | 1.9% |
| RJFRaymond James Financial Inc. | $15.9B | 16% | 18% | 82% | 2.1% |
| XPXP Inc. | R$7.4B | 22% | 22% | — | — |
| SFStifel Financial | $6.3B | 12% | 17% | — | — |
| FRHCFreedom Holding Corp. | $2.2B | 17% | 18% | — | 1.5% |
| OPYOppenheimer Holdings Inc. | $1.6B | 7% | 9% | — | — |
| Group median | — | 12% | 18% | — | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. XP Inc. reports in BRL, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that BRL, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in BRL. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what XP Inc.’s record justifies.
R$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered23%/yr’19→’24
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity22%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’22–’24)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book R$19.5B on 540M shares, a 22% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "XP Inc. (XP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XP, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← XNET its page in the Manual XPEV →
Industry order: ← WYFI the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter XYF →