Share count
249Mpeak FY2021
← All companies ← XPEV Manual YALA → ← XP Capital Markets & Asset Management YRD →
XYF, X Financial
Revenue is led by Loan Facilitation Service (50%) and Financing income (18%), with 4 more lines behind.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
CN¥7.6B
+30.1% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue CN¥7.6B 5-yr avg CN¥5.1B
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- An asset-light business: the value sits in intellectual property and people, not plant, so the question is how durable the advantage is, not how high the margin.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 57% and operating margin about 28% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −65% and 36% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on litigation & contingencies, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 25%, above 15% in 8 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Loan Facilitation Service at 50%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Loan Facilitation Service50%CN¥3.8B
- Financing income18%CN¥1.4B
- Post-origination Service14%CN¥1.1B
- Other revenue9%CN¥688M
- Guarantee Income8%CN¥637M
- Guarantees8%CN¥637M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| CN¥230M | CN¥1.8B | CN¥3.5B | CN¥3.1B | CN¥2.2B | CN¥3.6B | CN¥3.6B | CN¥4.8B | CN¥5.9B | CN¥7.6B | CN¥7.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| −12% | 57% | 67% | 47% | 6% | 46% | 62% | 68% | 70% | 74% | 74% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| (CN¥137M) | CN¥502M | CN¥1.3B | CN¥813M | (CN¥1.4B) | CN¥1.3B | CN¥1.2B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.9B | CN¥1.6B | CN¥1.6B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −59.4% | 28.1% | 36.0% | 26.3% | −65.2% | 36.2% | 34.1% | 30.4% | 31.9% | 21.3% | 21.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| (CN¥120M) | CN¥339M | CN¥883M | CN¥774M | (CN¥1.3B) | CN¥825M | CN¥812M | CN¥1.2B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 29% | — | — | — | 31% | 33% | 18% | 21% | 17% | 17% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| CN¥83M | (CN¥615M) | CN¥5M | CN¥601M | (CN¥679M) | CN¥449M | CN¥627M | CN¥1.4B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| CN¥3M | CN¥5M | CN¥10M | CN¥11M | CN¥12M | CN¥8M | CN¥7M | CN¥5M | CN¥7M | CN¥11M | CN¥11M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| CN¥200M | (CN¥960M) | (CN¥887M) | (CN¥185M) | CN¥617M | (CN¥384M) | (CN¥192M) | CN¥199M | (CN¥24M) | (CN¥8M) | (CN¥8M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| CN¥3M | CN¥21M | CN¥39M | CN¥15M | CN¥5M | CN¥3M | CN¥6M | CN¥8M | CN¥14M | CN¥22M | CN¥22M | CapexCapex |
| 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| CN¥79M | (CN¥621M) | (CN¥4M) | CN¥589M | (CN¥685M) | CN¥447M | CN¥621M | CN¥1.4B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 34.4% | −34.7% | −0.1% | 19.1% | −31.2% | 12.3% | 17.4% | 28.8% | 25.8% | 19.1% | 19.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| CN¥79M | (CN¥636M) | (CN¥33M) | CN¥585M | (CN¥685M) | CN¥447M | CN¥621M | CN¥1.4B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.4B | CN¥1.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 34.4% | −35.6% | −0.9% | 19.0% | −31.2% | 12.3% | 17.4% | 28.7% | 25.7% | 18.9% | 18.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | CN¥103M | — | CN¥0 | CN¥0 | CN¥58M | CN¥117M | CN¥155M | CN¥155M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | — | CN¥0 | CN¥147M | CN¥25M | CN¥182M | CN¥734M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 33% | 52% | 24% | -49% | 27% | 20% | 26% | 25% | 20% | 20% | ROICROIC |
| — | 19% | 25% | 18% | -43% | 21% | 17% | 20% | 22% | 19% | 19% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | 15% | — | 21% | 17% | 19% | 20% | 17% | 17% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| CN¥504M | CN¥671M | CN¥1.1B | CN¥1.0B | CN¥752M | CN¥585M | CN¥602M | CN¥1.2B | CN¥985M | CN¥988M | CN¥994M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | CN¥3.9B | CN¥4.6B | CN¥8.3B | CN¥7.5B | CN¥7.3B | CN¥8.8B | CN¥11.7B | CN¥11.8B | CN¥14.7B | CN¥14.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| (CN¥504M) | (CN¥671M) | (CN¥1.1B) | (CN¥1.0B) | (CN¥752M) | (CN¥585M) | (CN¥602M) | (CN¥1.2B) | (CN¥985M) | (CN¥988M) | (CN¥994M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | CN¥1.8B | CN¥3.5B | CN¥4.4B | CN¥3.1B | CN¥4.0B | CN¥4.8B | CN¥5.8B | CN¥7.0B | CN¥7.8B | CN¥7.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 238M | 280M | 304M | 320M | 321M | 337M | 322M | 291M | 293M | 249M | 235M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| CN¥0.97 | CN¥6.39 | CN¥11.65 | CN¥9.66 | CN¥6.83 | CN¥10.76 | CN¥11.05 | CN¥16.56 | CN¥20.02 | CN¥30.62 | CN¥32.58 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| CN¥-0.50 | CN¥1.21 | CN¥2.90 | CN¥2.42 | CN¥-4.07 | CN¥2.45 | CN¥2.52 | CN¥4.08 | CN¥5.25 | CN¥5.87 | CN¥6.24 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| CN¥0.33 | CN¥-2.22 | CN¥-0.01 | CN¥1.84 | CN¥-2.13 | CN¥1.33 | CN¥1.93 | CN¥4.77 | CN¥5.17 | CN¥5.84 | CN¥6.21 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| CN¥0.33 | CN¥-2.27 | CN¥-0.11 | CN¥1.83 | CN¥-2.13 | CN¥1.33 | CN¥1.93 | CN¥4.76 | CN¥5.14 | CN¥5.79 | CN¥6.16 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | CN¥0.32 | — | CN¥0.00 | CN¥0.00 | CN¥0.20 | CN¥0.40 | CN¥0.62 | CN¥0.66 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| CN¥0.01 | CN¥0.07 | CN¥0.13 | CN¥0.05 | CN¥0.02 | CN¥0.01 | CN¥0.02 | CN¥0.03 | CN¥0.05 | CN¥0.09 | CN¥0.09 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | CN¥6.30 | CN¥11.57 | CN¥13.65 | CN¥9.57 | CN¥11.81 | CN¥14.74 | CN¥20.10 | CN¥23.70 | CN¥31.41 | CN¥33.42 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +46.8%/yr | +35.0%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +37.5%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +11.5%/yr (6-yr) | — |
| Capital spending / share | +22.2%/yr | +39.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +22.2%/yr (8-yr) | +26.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
20%low FY2020
Gross margin
74%low FY2016
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
CN¥1.5Bowner earningsvs.CN¥1.5Bnet incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned CN¥1.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the CN¥11M it takes just to hold its position. It put CN¥11M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was CN¥1.4B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.2B | CN¥812M | CN¥825M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +CN¥11M | +CN¥7M | +CN¥5M | +CN¥7M | +CN¥8M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −CN¥8M | −CN¥24M | +CN¥199M | −CN¥192M | −CN¥384M |
| Cash from operations | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.4B | CN¥627M | CN¥449M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −CN¥11M | −CN¥7M | −CN¥5M | −CN¥6M | −CN¥3M |
| Owner earnings | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.4B | CN¥621M | CN¥447M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −CN¥11M | −CN¥7M | −CN¥3M | — | — |
| Free cash flow | CN¥1.4B | CN¥1.5B | CN¥1.4B | CN¥621M | CN¥447M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 26% | 29% | 17% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about CN¥11M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other CN¥11M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +CN¥994MNet cash, debt-freeCash CN¥988M + ST investments CN¥6M − debt CN¥0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by CN¥994M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -46%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -35%–34%; latest CN¥1.5B = operating cash CN¥1.5B − maintenance capex CN¥11MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops CN¥1.5B ÷ net income CN¥1.5B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks CN¥889M ÷ Owner Earnings CN¥1.5B
What this means
Of CN¥1.5B Owner Earnings, CN¥889M (61%) went back to shareholders, CN¥155M dividends, CN¥734M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.96×ExpandingCapex CN¥22M ÷ depreciation CN¥11M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · CN¥7.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +280%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are CN¥5.96/share (latest year CN¥6.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is CN¥33.42/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 2% → 28% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 28% lately, median 28% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2020 · −65.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.5%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated CN¥4.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- ReinvestedCN¥136M · 3%
- DividendsCN¥433M · 9%
- BuybacksCN¥1.1B · 22%
- Retained (debt / cash)CN¥3.2B · 66%
- Returned to ownersCN¥1.5B
32% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, CN¥433M as dividends and CN¥1.1B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran CN¥1.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−1.5%
The diluted count fell from 238M to 235M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend recordCN¥0.62/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 14% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained34%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (CN¥4.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew CN¥1.6B, so each retained CN¥1 added about 0.34 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why X Financial is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.76×
Across the record the business reported CN¥6.4B of net income but generated CN¥4.9B of operating cash, a 0.76-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| XYFX Financial | CN¥7.6B | 60% | 29.2% | 25% | 18% |
| ENVAEnova International Inc. | $3.2B | 50% | 21.6% | 10% | 56% |
| CHYMChime Financial Inc. | $2.2B | 88% | -18.4% | -88% | 2% |
| MSTRStrategy Inc Common Stock Class A | $477M | 80% | -13.0% | -2% | 6% |
| WLTHWealthfront Corporation | $365M | 90% | 37.2% | -46% | — |
| LPROOpen Lending Corporation | $93M | 77% | 53.2% | 45% | 50% |
| SBETSharplink Inc. | $28M | 31% | -294.4% | -308% | -117% |
| ZSQRZ Squared Inc. | $1M | 87% | -956.9% | -287% | — |
| Group median | — | 78% | 4.3% | -24% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American depositary shares, each ADS represents six Class”; X Financial reports in CNY, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at CNY 1 = $0.147 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CNY.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what X Financial has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, X Financial earns about $206M on its 18.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+34%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+34%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $213M on 39M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-12-31; net cash $147M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3M) runs well above depreciation ($2M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $215M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "X Financial (XYF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XYF, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← XPEV its page in the Manual YALA →
Industry order: ← XP the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter YRD →