Owner Scorecard


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XHR, Xenia Hotels & Resorts Inc.

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Xenia Hotels & Resorts, Inc. is a Maryland corporation that primarily invests in uniquely positioned luxury and upper upscale hotels and resorts with a focus on the top 25 lodging markets as well as key leisure destinations in the United States.

The market data and certain other statistical information used throughout this Annual Report are based on independent industry publications, government publications or other published independent sources.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
XHR · Xenia Hotels & Resorts Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.1B
+3.8% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $951M
Gross margin 31% 5-yr avg 30%
Operating margin 10.4% 5-yr avg 5.8%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 9% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Occupancy (55%), Food and Beverage (35%) and Hotel, Other (9%).
Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 31% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −65% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 8.1% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Occupancy at 55%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Occupancy55%$597M
  • Food and Beverage35%$380M
  • Hotel, Other9%$102M
By geographyOther26%Orlando, FL14%Houston, TX10%San Diego, CA10%Phoenix, AZ10%Atlanta, GA7%Other23%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$950M$945M$1.1B$1.1B$370M$616M$998M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1BRevenueRevenue
38%36%35%33%5%28%33%31%30%31%31%Gross marginGross mgn
3%3%3%3%8%5%3%4%3%3%3%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$112M$104M$132M$111M($242M)($61M)$111M$98M$87M$108M$113MOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.7%11.0%12.5%9.7%−65.4%−9.9%11.2%9.5%8.4%10.0%10.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$86M$99M$194M$55M($163M)($144M)$56M$19M$16M$63M$67MNet incomeNet inc.
6%7%3%9%4%7%2%2%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$229M$213M$254M$247M($78M)$41M$187M$198M$164M$177M$167MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$152M$153M$158M$155M$147M$129M$133M$132M$129M$131M$129MDepreciationDeprec.
($18M)($49M)($107M)$27M($72M)$43M($13M)$34M$5M($30M)($43M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$59M$86M$108M$93M$69M$32M$70M$121M$141M$87M$69MCapexCapex
6.2%9.1%10.2%8.1%18.7%5.2%7.1%11.8%13.5%8.0%6.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$171M$126M$146M$154M($147M)$9M$117M$77M$23M$90M$97MOwner earningsOwner earn.
18.0%13.4%13.8%13.4%−39.7%1.5%11.7%7.5%2.2%8.3%9.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$171M$126M$146M$154M($147M)$9M$117M$77M$23M$90M$97MFree cash flowFCF
18.0%13.4%13.8%13.4%−39.7%1.5%11.7%7.5%2.2%8.3%9.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$115M$118M$122M$126M$63M$54K$627K$578K$351K$575K$575KDividends paidDiv. paid
$74M$4M$0$0$2M$0$28M$133M$16M$120MBuybacksBuybacks
4%3%4%3%-8%-2%4%4%3%4%5%ROICROIC
5%6%11%3%-11%-10%4%1%1%6%6%Return on equityROE
−2%−1%4%−4%−15%−10%4%1%1%6%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$216M$72M$91M$111M$390M$517M$305M$165M$78M$140M$101MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$23M$36M$35M$37M$9M$29M$38M$32M$26M$27M$46MReceivablesReceiv.
$23M$36M$35M$37M$9M$29M$38M$32M$26M$27M$46MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$42M$40M$34M$25M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5M$5MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.9B$3.1B$3.2B$3.3B$3.1B$3.1B$3.1B$2.9B$2.8B$2.8B$2.8BTotal assetsAssets
$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4BTotal debtDebt
$861M$1.3B$1.1B$1.2B$985M$977M$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
2.3×2.2×2.6×2.3×-3.9×-0.7×1.3×1.1×1.1×1.2×1.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.6B$1.6B$1.8B$1.7B$1.6B$1.4B$1.4B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.9%1.1%0.9%0.8%3.0%1.9%1.1%1.3%1.3%1.2%1.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
108M107M110M113M113M114M114M108M102M97.2M92.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.79$8.83$9.59$10.18$3.26$5.41$8.72$9.46$10.16$11.10$11.70Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.79$0.92$1.75$0.49$-1.44$-1.26$0.49$0.18$0.16$0.65$0.73EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.58$1.18$1.32$1.36$-1.29$0.08$1.02$0.71$0.23$0.93$1.05Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.58$1.18$1.32$1.36$-1.29$0.08$1.02$0.71$0.23$0.93$1.05Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.06$1.11$1.10$1.11$0.56$0.00$0.01$0.01$0.00$0.01$0.01Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.54$0.81$0.98$0.82$0.61$0.28$0.62$1.12$1.37$0.89$0.75Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$15.07$15.09$16.52$15.40$13.69$12.57$12.60$11.91$12.15$11.67$12.31Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.6%/yr+27.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share−5.8%/yr
EPS−2.2%/yr
Dividends / share−43.8%/yr−59.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.6%/yr+7.9%/yr
Book value / share−2.8%/yr−3.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
97Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
4%low FY2020
Gross margin
31%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
14.3×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$90Mowner earningsvs.$63Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $63M of profit into $90M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$63M
Owner earnings$90M · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$63M$16M$19M$56M($144M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$131M+$129M+$132M+$133M+$129M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$13M+$14M+$13M+$11M+$12M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$30M+$5M+$34M−$13M+$43M
Cash from operations$177M$164M$198M$187M$41M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$87M−$141M−$121M−$70M−$32M
Owner earnings$90M$23M$77M$117M$9M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%2%8%12%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer $77M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $108M ÷ interest expense $87M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 11.9× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $140M − debt $1.4B
    What this means

    Netting $140M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 11.9× a year's operating profit (13.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -8%–4%; 4% latest = NOPAT $105M ÷ invested capital $2.4B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -40%–18%; latest $90M = operating cash $177M − maintenance capex $87M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves $77M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $177M ÷ net income $63M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $121M ÷ Owner Earnings $90M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $90M of Owner Earnings, $121M (135%) went back to shareholders, $575K dividends, $120M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $13M stock comp, the real buyback was about $107M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.66×
    Harvesting
    Capex $87M ÷ depreciation $131M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity
    Current ratio ≥ 2× ·
    What this means

    Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −74%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.36/share (latest year $0.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.30/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 9% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −10%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 10% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −65.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$866M · 53%
  • Dividends$547M · 33%
  • Buybacks$377M · 23%
  • Returned to owners$924M

    121% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $547M as dividends and $377M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$158M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $158M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.1B to $1.4B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $115M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$13.39

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 28M shares were bought for $377M, about $13.39 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $12.74 (2023) to $17.07 (2017); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $12.74 ($133M).

  • Net change in share count−14.3%

    The diluted count fell from 108M to 93M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.01/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 44% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Marcel Verbaas$7.0M$8.8M$9M
2022Marcel Verbaas$7.3M$2.0M$117M
2023Marcel Verbaas$7.3M$5.4M$77M
2024Marcel Verbaas$6.9M$10.7M$23M
2025Marcel Verbaas$7.0M$10.1M$90M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$13M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Xenia Hotels & Resorts Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.0% vs 15.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 15.0% early in the record and 6.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.1B → $1.4B

    Debt rose from $1.1B to $1.4B while owner earnings went from about $148M to $63M — about 7.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 22 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 4% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $23M to $46M while revenue grew 14%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 4% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $127M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
WYNNWynn Resorts Limited$7.1B12.4%6%8%
PENNPENN Entertainment Inc.$7.0B12.1%12%8%
BYDBoyd Gaming$4.1B16.3%14%13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts$2.5B13.0%4%8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts$2.0B24.8%13%
XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc.$1.1B32%9.8%4%10%
SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.$960M13.6%5%9%
MCRIMonarch Casino & Resort Inc.$545M17.8%13%19%
Group median13.3%6%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Xenia Hotels & Resorts Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Xenia Hotels & Resorts Inc. earns about $108M on its 10.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $97M on 92M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $1.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Xenia Hotels & Resorts Inc. (XHR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/XHR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← XFOR its page in the Manual XIFR →

Industry order: ← WYNN the Hotels & Resorts chapter XPO →