Share count
86Mpeak FY2021
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ACEL, Accel Entertainment Inc.
We are a leading distributed gaming operator in the United States, as well as a developer of brick-and-mortar casinos that serve local gaming markets and horse racing venues.
We are a preferred partner for local business owners in the markets we serve.
We offer turnkey, full-service gaming solutions to bars, restaurants, convenience stores, truck stops, and fraternal and veteran establishments across the country as well as casinos and horse racing venues.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.3B
+8.1% YoY · 33% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.4B 5-yr avg $1.1B
Revenue $352M +8.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 7.7% yr-ago 8.0%
Net income $15M yr-ago $15M
Net margin 4.2% yr-ago 4.5%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 7.4% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The operating margin has swung widely — from −7.8% to 10% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 8 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Illinois is 72% of revenue, so this is largely a single-region business.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- Illinois72%$963M
- Montana12%$164M
- Nevada8%$109M
- Louisiana3%$38M
- Nebraska2%$33M
- Georgia1%$20M
- All other0%$4M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $248M | $0 | $429M | $316M | $735M | $970M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | RevenueRevenue |
| 18% | — | 16% | 24% | 15% | 15% | 15% | 16% | 16% | 17% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $18M | $25M | $13M | ($25M) | $70M | $97M | $107M | $91M | $108M | $109M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 7.3% | — | 3.1% | −7.8% | 9.6% | 10.0% | 9.2% | 7.4% | 8.1% | 8.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $8M | $11M | ($37M) | ($410K) | $32M | $74M | $46M | $35M | $51M | $52M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 17% | 29% | — | — | 32% | 22% | 31% | 34% | 29% | 29% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $33M | $44M | $46M | ($4M) | $111M | $108M | $133M | $121M | $151M | $149M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $17M | $21M | $26M | $21M | $25M | $29M | $38M | $44M | $53M | $54M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $7M | $12M | $54M | ($30M) | $48M | ($2M) | $40M | $30M | $34M | $30M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $24M | $23M | $21M | $26M | $30M | $47M | $82M | $67M | $89M | $85M | CapexCapex |
| 9.5% | — | 4.9% | 8.1% | 4.0% | 4.9% | 7.0% | 5.4% | 6.7% | 6.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $16M | $21M | $25M | ($29M) | $81M | $79M | $95M | $77M | $98M | $95M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.6% | — | 5.8% | −9.3% | 11.0% | 8.1% | 8.1% | 6.3% | 7.4% | 7.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $9M | $21M | $25M | ($29M) | $81M | $61M | $51M | $55M | $62M | $64M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.8% | — | 5.8% | −9.3% | 11.0% | 6.3% | 4.3% | 4.4% | 4.7% | 4.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $45M | $51M | $101M | $36M | $6M | $144M | $7M | $54M | $5M | $6M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $123K | $3M | $0 | $0 | $9M | $79M | $30M | $25M | $40M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 34% | 9% | — | -6% | 16% | 15% | 16% | 10% | 13% | 13% | ROICROIC |
| 19% | 19% | — | -0% | 20% | 41% | 23% | 14% | 19% | 19% | Return on equityROE |
| 19% | 19% | — | −0% | 20% | 41% | 23% | 14% | 19% | 19% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $0 | $92M | $430M | $134M | $199M | $224M | $262M | $281M | $297M | $274M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | — | — | $5M | $11M | $13M | $11M | $14M | $14M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $7M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $9M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | — | — | $5M | $18M | $21M | $19M | $22M | $22M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $507K | $102M | $151M | $152M | $248M | $299M | $313M | $326M | $343M | $317M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $157K | $86M | $55M | $52M | $72M | $90M | $110M | $118M | $131M | $117M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.2× | 1.2× | 2.8× | 2.9× | 3.5× | 3.3× | 2.9× | 2.8× | 2.6× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $0 | $35M | $46M | $46M | $101M | $102M | $116M | $114M | $114M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $451M | $335M | $509M | $560M | $616M | $863M | $913M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $231M | $350M | $340M | $342M | $542M | $543M | $595M | $607M | $581M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $139M | ($80M) | $206M | $143M | $318M | $281M | $314M | $311M | $306M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.2× | 2.6× | 1.0× | -1.8× | — | — | — | — | — | 8.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $45M | $57M | ($43M) | $128M | $158M | $179M | $198M | $255M | $270M | $272M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | — | 0.5% | 1.8% | 0.9% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 1.0% | 0.9% | 0.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 59.4M | 62.2M | 61.8M | 83.1M | 94.6M | 91.2M | 86.8M | 85.0M | 86.4M | 84.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.18 | $0.00 | $6.93 | $3.81 | $7.76 | $10.63 | $13.48 | $14.49 | $15.41 | $16.16 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.14 | $0.17 | $-0.59 | $-0.00 | $0.33 | $0.81 | $0.53 | $0.41 | $0.60 | $0.61 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.27 | $0.34 | $0.40 | $-0.35 | $0.86 | $0.86 | $1.09 | $0.91 | $1.14 | $1.12 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.16 | $0.34 | $0.40 | $-0.35 | $0.86 | $0.66 | $0.59 | $0.64 | $0.72 | $0.76 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.40 | $0.37 | $0.34 | $0.31 | $0.31 | $0.52 | $0.94 | $0.78 | $1.03 | $1.01 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.75 | $0.92 | $-0.70 | $1.54 | $1.67 | $1.96 | $2.29 | $3.00 | $3.12 | $3.24 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +17.7%/yr | +32.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +19.4%/yr | — |
| EPS | +19.9%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | +12.6%/yr | +27.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +19.5%/yr | +15.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
13%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.2×peak FY2018
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$98Mowner earningsvs.$51Mnet incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2017FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $98M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $53M it takes just to hold its position. It put $36M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $62M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $51M | $35M | $46M | $74M | $32M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$53M | +$44M | +$38M | +$29M | +$25M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$12M | +$12M | +$9M | +$7M | +$6M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$34M | +$30M | +$40M | −$2M | +$48M |
| Cash from operations | $151M | $121M | $133M | $108M | $111M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$53M | −$44M | −$38M | −$29M | −$30M |
| Owner earnings | $98M | $77M | $95M | $79M | $81M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$36M | −$23M | −$44M | −$18M | — |
| Free cash flow | $62M | $55M | $51M | $61M | $81M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 7% | 6% | 8% | 8% | 11% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $53M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $36M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $12M), owner earnings is nearer $86M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $108M ÷ interest expense $14M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $311M · 2.9× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $297M − debt $607M
What this means
Netting $297M of cash and short-term investments against $607M of debt leaves $311M owed, about 2.9× a year's operating profit (5.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median, range -6%–34%; 13% latest = NOPAT $77M ÷ invested capital $581MIndustry peers: median -1%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range -9%–11%; latest $98M = operating cash $151M − maintenance capex $53MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 8 years. It chose to put $36M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $62M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $12M of SBC) leaves $86M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $151M ÷ net income $51M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $40M ÷ Owner Earnings $98M
What this means
Of $98M Owner Earnings, $40M (41%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $40M buybacks. Net of $12M stock comp, the real buyback was about $28M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.69×ExpandingCapex $89M ÷ depreciation $53M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.61×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $607M vs $212M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.54/share (latest year $0.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 1% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 1% early to 8% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 21%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −7.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +4.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$317M
- Cash & short-term investments$274M
- Receivables$14M
- Inventory$9M
- Other current assets$21M
Current liabilities$117M
- Debt due within a year$30M
- Other current liabilities$87M
Current ratio2.71×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.64×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.34×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$200Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$30M due · $274M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 2.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($24M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($478M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$589M$8M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$13Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $743M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$408M · 55%
- Buybacks$187M · 25%
- Retained (debt / cash)$148M · 20%
- Returned to owners$187M
40% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $187M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $274M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$10.54
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 8M shares were bought for $88M, about $10.54 each.
- Net change in share count41.6%
The diluted count rose from 59M to 84M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained210%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($33M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $69M, so each retained $1 added about 2.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$301M27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity42%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$449Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $408M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | (1) | $3.5M | $5.2M | $81M |
| 2022 | (1) | $3.8M | $476k | $79M |
| 2023 | (1) | $5.8M | $8.9M | $95M |
| 2024 | (1) | $3.8M | $3.3M | $77M |
| 2025 | (1) | $3.6M | $4.6M | $98M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership14.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Accel Entertainment Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?41.6%
Diluted shares grew 41.6% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $187M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Casinos & Gaming
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WMGWarner Music | $6.7B | 47% | 9.2% | 13% | 9% |
| DKNGDraftKings Inc. | $6.1B | 38% | -44.5% | -79% | -15% |
| TKOTKO Group Holdings Inc. | $4.7B | — | 17.6% | — | — |
| STUBStubHub Holdings Inc. | $1.7B | — | 7.8% | -73% | 15% |
| ACELAccel Entertainment Inc. | $1.3B | — | 7.7% | 14% | 7% |
| RSIRush Street Interactive Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | -19.3% | — | -1% |
| OSWOneSpaWorld Holdings Limited | $961M | — | 7.2% | 12% | 6% |
| LLYVALiberty Live Holdings, Inc. | $382M | 19% | -13.5% | -1% | — |
| Group median | — | — | 7.5% | 5% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Accel Entertainment Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Accel Entertainment Inc. earns about $93M on its 7.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
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The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $64M on 81M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $306M. The if-converted diluted count is 84M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($85M) runs well above depreciation ($54M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $96M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Accel Entertainment Inc. (ACEL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ACEL, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← ACDC its page in the Manual ACGL →
Industry order: the Casinos & Gaming chapter BALY →