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ACDC, ProFrac Holding Corp.

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ACDC · ProFrac Holding Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.9B

−11.4% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.8B 5-yr avg $2.0B

Operating margin −16.1% 5-yr avg 1.3%

ROIC −14% 5-yr avg −5%

Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 17% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −2.8%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 10% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on cyclicality & demand, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
							Income statement
$548M	$768M	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.8B	RevenueRevenue
9%	8%	9%	9%	9%	10%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($95M)	($18M)	$412M	$167M	($60M)	($226M)	($288M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−17.3%	−2.3%	17.0%	6.3%	−2.8%	−11.6%	−16.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($119M)	($42M)	$92M	($98M)	($215M)	($369M)	($435M)	Net incomeNet inc.
							Cash flow & returns
$45M	$44M	$415M	$554M	$367M	$190M	$160M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$151M	$141M	$267M	$438M	$442M	$416M	$407M	DepreciationDeprec.
$13M	($54M)	($11M)	$183M	$133M	$133M	$179M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$48M	$87M	$356M	$267M	$255M	$170M	$158M	CapexCapex
8.8%	11.4%	14.7%	10.2%	11.6%	8.7%	8.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($3M)	($44M)	$148M	$287M	$112M	$20M	$2M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−0.5%	−5.7%	6.1%	10.9%	5.1%	1.0%	0.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($3M)	($44M)	$59M	$287M	$112M	$20M	$2M	Free cash flowFCF
−0.5%	−5.7%	2.4%	10.9%	5.1%	1.0%	0.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M	$4M	$641M	$455M	$194M	—	$194M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	-3%	—	—	-2%	-10%	-14%	ROICROIC
—	-29%	—	-8%	-21%	-51%	-70%	Return on equityROE
—	−29%	—	−8%	−21%	−51%	−70%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
							Balance sheet
$3M	$5M	$35M	$25M	$15M	$23M	$34M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$162M	$536M	$346M	$313M	$267M	$319M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$74M	$250M	$237M	$201M	$151M	$159M	InventoryInvent.
—	$137M	$339M	$319M	$324M	$257M	$296M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$99M	$446M	$264M	$190M	$161M	$182M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$252M	$3M	$638M	$574M	$484M	$534M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$247M	$3M	$649M	$660M	$597M	$651M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.0×	0.9×	1.0×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	$241M	$326M	$302M	$290M	$290M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$665M	$1.3B	$3.1B	$3.0B	$2.6B	$2.6B	Total assetsAssets
—	$302M	$925M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.1B	Total debtDebt
—	$296M	$890M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$997M	$1.0B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.1×	-0.7×	6.9×	1.1×	-0.4×	-1.6×	-2.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
—	$147M	($1.2B)	$1.2B	$1.0B	$718M	$617M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	2.8%	1.1%	0.3%	0.5%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	—	$75M	$11M	$11M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
							Per share
—	—	134M	131M	160M	168M	182M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	—	$18.17	$20.09	$13.70	$11.54	$9.84	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	—	$0.69	$-0.75	$-1.35	$-2.19	$-2.39	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	$1.11	$2.19	$0.70	$0.12	$0.01	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	$0.44	$2.19	$0.70	$0.12	$0.01	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	$2.67	$2.04	$1.59	$1.01	$0.87	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	—	$-8.87	$9.25	$6.30	$4.26	$3.39	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	5-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−14.0%/yr (3-yr)	−14.0%/yr (3-yr)
Owner earnings / share	−52.8%/yr (3-yr)	−52.8%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	−27.7%/yr (3-yr)	−27.7%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

168Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−10%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

50.9×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$20Mowner earningsvs.($369M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $369M loss into $20M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($369M)	($215M)	($98M)	$92M	($42M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$416M	+$442M	+$438M	+$267M	+$141M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$7M	+$30M	+$67M	—
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$133M	+$133M	+$183M	−$11M	−$54M
Cash from operations	$190M	$367M	$554M	$415M	$44M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$170M	−$255M	−$267M	−$267M	−$87M
Owner earnings	$20M	$112M	$287M	$148M	($44M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$89M	—
Free cash flow	$20M	$112M	$287M	$59M	($44M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	1%	5%	11%	6%	-6%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $10M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -1.6×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($226M) ÷ interest expense $139M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $997M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $23M − debt $1.0B

What this means
Netting $23M of cash and short-term investments against $1.0B of debt leaves $997M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 34d

Tight

DSO 50 + DIO 23 − DPO 39 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -3%

Below average through the cycle

3-yr median, range -10%–-2%; -10% latest = NOPAT ($178M) ÷ invested capital $1.7B

Industry peers: median 1%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran -10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 1%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $20M = operating cash $190M − maintenance capex $170M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (6-yr median 1%)

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $10M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $190M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($369M) · cash from operations $190M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 0.41×

Harvesting

Capex $170M ÷ depreciation $416M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.81×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $1.0B vs ($114M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.26/share (latest year $-2.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 1 of 6

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −1% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about −1% early to −3% lately, median −3% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −17.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$534M

Cash & short-term investments$34M
Receivables$319M
Inventory$159M
Other current assets$23M

Current liabilities$651M

Debt due within a year$151M
Accounts payable$296M
Other current liabilities$204M

Current ratio0.82×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.58×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($117M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$151M due · $34M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−25.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$224Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$146M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2020–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.2B · 73%
Retained (debt / cash)$431M · 27%

Net change in share count36.3%
The diluted count rose from 134M to 182M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$402M16% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity40%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.3Bover 6 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$86M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2023	Matthew D. Wilks	$901k	−$147k	$287M
2024	Matthew D. Wilks	$1.4M	$1.3M	$112M
2025	Matthew D. Wilks	$1.4M	$658k	$20M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ProFrac Holding Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?36.3%
Diluted shares grew 36.3% over 2020–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OIIOceaneering International	$2.6B	12%	2.6%	5%	4%
ACDCProFrac Holding Corp.	$1.9B	—	-2.5%	-3%	3%
RESRPC	$1.6B	26%	4.8%	7%	5%
XPROExpro Group Holdings N.V.	$1.6B	95%	-12.2%	-8%	-1%
WTTRSelect Water Solutions	$1.4B	12%	1.9%	-0%	6%
NESRNational Energy Services Reunited Corp	$1.3B	13%	7.4%	8%	9%
HLXHelix Energy Solutions Group Inc.	$1.3B	12%	3.3%	1%	9%
PUMPProPetro Holding Corp.	$1.3B	—	0.1%	0%	7%
Group median	—	—	2.3%	0%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ProFrac Holding Corp. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, ProFrac Holding Corp. earns about $60M on its 3.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($60M) Net of stock comp (−$9M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022−31%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2M on 181M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $1.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ACDC against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ProFrac Holding Corp. (ACDC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ACDC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ACCO its page in the Manual ACEL →

Industry order: the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter AESI →