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SARO, StandardAero Inc.
We are the world's largest independent, pure-play provider of aerospace engine aftermarket services for fixed and rotary wing aircraft, serving the commercial, military and business aviation end markets.
We provide a comprehensive suite of critical, value-added aftermarket solutions, including scheduled and unscheduled engine maintenance, repair and overhaul, engine component repair, on-wing and field service support, asset management and engineering solutions.
We are also one of the largest independent engine component repair platforms globally, providing services to commercial aerospace, military, land and marine and oil and gas end markets.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Engine Services (88%) and Component Repair Services (12%).
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 14% and operating margin about 7.4% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. That margin has held in a narrow 6.3%–9.1% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the backlog and program execution. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Engine Services is 88% of revenue, with Component Repair Services the other meaningful segment at 12%.
- Engine Services88%$5.4B
- Component Repair Services12%$709M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $4.2B | $4.6B | $5.2B | $6.1B | $6.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 13% | 14% | 14% | 15% | 15% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 5% | 4% | 5% | 4% | 4% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $263M | $337M | $403M | $551M | $565M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 6.3% | 7.4% | 7.7% | 9.1% | 9.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($21M) | ($35M) | $11M | $277M | $294M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 26% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| $27M | $68M | $76M | $317M | $221M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $195M | $197M | $187M | $194M | $191M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($147M) | ($94M) | ($139M) | ($168M) | ($279M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $41M | $55M | $103M | $82M | $73M | CapexCapex |
| 1.0% | 1.2% | 2.0% | 1.4% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($14M) | $13M | ($27M) | $234M | $148M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −0.3% | 0.3% | −0.5% | 3.9% | 2.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($14M) | $13M | ($27M) | $234M | $148M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −0.3% | 0.3% | −0.5% | 3.9% | 2.4% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $20M | $31M | $114M | — | $114M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | 4% | 9% | 9% | ROICROIC |
| -2% | -3% | 0% | 10% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| −2% | −3% | 0% | 10% | 11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $120M | $58M | $103M | $290M | $89M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $518M | $581M | $654M | $880M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $699M | $847M | $828M | $763M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $469M | $646M | $680M | $809M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $749M | $782M | $802M | $834M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.0× | 2.0× | 2.2× | 2.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $5.8B | $6.2B | $6.6B | $6.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $3.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $3.1B | $2.1B | $1.9B | $2.1B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.4× | 3.2× | 3.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $1.2B | $1.1B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||
| 275M | 275M | 290M | 334M | 333M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $15.08 | $16.58 | $18.07 | $18.13 | $18.76 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.08 | $-0.13 | $0.04 | $0.83 | $0.88 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.05 | $0.05 | $-0.09 | $0.70 | $0.45 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.05 | $0.05 | $-0.09 | $0.70 | $0.45 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.15 | $0.20 | $0.36 | $0.25 | $0.22 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $4.36 | $4.17 | $8.19 | $7.98 | $8.07 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.3%/yr | +6.3%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +18.0%/yr | +18.0%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +22.3%/yr | +22.3%/yr (3-yr) |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+15.8%
“Revenue increased $825.4 million, or 15.8%, to $6,062.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 from $5,237.2 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was driven by both the Engine Services and Component Repair Services segments, with continued strength across the commercial aerospace and business aviation end markets, which increased 17.6% and 12.1%, respectively, compared to the prior year period.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Engine Services+15.3%
“Engine Services segment revenue increased $709.3 million, or 15.3%, to $5,354.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, compared to $4,644.7 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was driven by continued strong commercial aerospace end market growth, underpinned by ramping volumes from our LEAP, CFM56 DFW Center of Excellence, and CF34 expansion investments, as well as growth on our mid-size and super mid-size business aviation platforms and select military transport programs.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Component Repair Services+19.6%
“Component Repair Services segment revenue increased $116.2 million, or 19.6%, to $708.6 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, compared to $592.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was driven by growth in military and helicopter and other platforms and the contribution from the Aero Turbine acquisition.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $277M of profit but $234M of owner earnings: $43M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $277M | $11M | ($35M) | ($21M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$194M | +$187M | +$197M | +$195M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$13M | +$17M | — | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$168M | −$139M | −$94M | −$147M |
| Cash from operations | $317M | $76M | $68M | $27M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$82M | −$103M | −$55M | −$41M |
| Owner earnings | $234M | ($27M) | $13M | ($14M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | -1% | 0% | 0% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer $221M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“In connection with the preparation of our consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2025, we identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $551M ÷ interest expense $174M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.9B · 3.5× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $290M − debt $2.2B
What this means
Netting $290M of cash and short-term investments against $2.2B of debt leaves $1.9B owed, about 3.5× a year's operating profit (4.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 39 + DIO 58 − DPO 48 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- SolidNOPAT $406M ÷ invested capital $4.6B (debt + equity − cash)Industry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $234M = operating cash $317M − maintenance capex $82M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median -0%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a -0% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves $221M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $317M ÷ net income $277M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.43×HarvestingCapex $82M ÷ depreciation $194M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.1B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.20×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $2.2B vs $1.6B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.25/share (latest year $0.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.02/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 8% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 8% lately, median 7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · 6.3% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +6.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Furthermore, the regulatory framework around the development and use of emerging artificial intelligence ("AI") technologies is rapidly evolving, and many federal, state and foreign government bodies and agencies have introduced or are currently considering additional laws and re…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$89M
- Receivables$880M
- Inventory$763M
- Other current assets$1.3B
- Debt due within a year$23M
- Accounts payable$809M
- Other current liabilities$611M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2022–2025
Over the record, the business generated $488M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$282M · 58%
- Retained (debt / cash)$206M · 42%
- Net change in share count21.1%
The diluted count rose from 275M to 333M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained36%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($232M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $83M, so each retained $1 added about 0.36 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership2.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio111:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$13M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why StandardAero Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?21.1%
Diluted shares grew 21.1% over 2022–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Aerospace & Defense
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TXTTextron | $14.8B | 17% | 7.8% | 16% | 5% |
| TDGTransDigm | $8.8B | 57% | 42.3% | 14% | 20% |
| DANDana Incorporated Common Stock | $7.5B | 9% | 2.6% | 5% | 2% |
| PIIPolaris Inc. | $7.2B | 24% | 7.8% | 14% | 7% |
| SAROStandardAero Inc. | $6.1B | 14% | 7.5% | 9% | -0% |
| DCHDauch Corporation | $5.8B | 13% | 3.2% | 5% | 3% |
| HEIHeico Corp. | $4.5B | 39% | 21.1% | 14% | 18% |
| AIRAAR Corp. | $2.8B | 19% | 4.9% | 5% | 1% |
| Group median | — | 18% | 7.7% | 11% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what StandardAero Inc. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $148M on 332M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $2.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SANM its page in the Manual SATA →
Industry order: ← RTX the Aerospace & Defense chapter SWBI →