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CCSI, Consensus Cloud Solutions Inc.

Software asset-light Serial acquirer

Consensus Cloud Solutions, Inc. is a provider of secure information delivery services.

With our most prominent brand eFax established over twenty-five years ago, Consensus has now evolved the service platform from pure cloud Fax to efficient and secure information exchange featuring solutions for data extraction, comprehension and transformation, facilitating interoperability and process improvement.

Consensus is committed to security and compliance in data exchange, and our scalable Software-as-a-Service ("SaaS") platform is particularly attractive to regulated industries like healthcare and healthcare technology, public sector, financial services, law, and education.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CCSI · Consensus Cloud Solutions Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$350M

−0.2% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $351M 5-yr avg $356M

Gross margin 80% 5-yr avg 82%

Operating margin 42.9% 5-yr avg 43.6%

ROIC 23% 5-yr avg 25%

Owner-earnings margin 31% 5-yr avg 30%

Free cash flow margin 31% 5-yr avg 30%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Corporate (64%) and Small office home office (“SoHo”) (36%).
Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 59% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 7 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 83% and operating margin about 43% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 24%, above 15% in 7 of 7 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 30% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Corporate is 64% of revenue, with Small office home office (“SoHo”) the other meaningful line at 36%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Corporate64%$223M
Small office home office (“SoHo”)36%$127M
Other0%$12K

By geographyUnited States78%Canada16%Ireland3%All other countries2%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$323M	$331M	$353M	$362M	$363M	$350M	$350M	$351M	RevenueRevenue
85%	84%	84%	83%	81%	80%	80%	80%	Gross marginGross mgn
7%	8%	17%	20%	20%	21%	20%	20%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$190M	$197M	$175M	$152M	$147M	$149M	$150M	$150M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
58.9%	59.4%	49.7%	41.9%	40.6%	42.6%	43.0%	42.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$213M	$153M	$109M	$73M	$77M	$89M	$85M	$88M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	16%	27%	26%	25%	27%	26%	25%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$227M	$239M	$234M	$83M	$114M	$122M	$136M	$141M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$81M	$80M	$52M	$15M	$17M	$21M	$19M	$18M	DepreciationDeprec.
($71M)	$499K	$70M	($25M)	$1M	($5M)	$15M	$17M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$23M	$32M	$33M	$30M	$36M	$33M	$30M	$30M	CapexCapex
7.1%	9.8%	9.4%	8.3%	10.1%	9.5%	8.6%	8.7%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$204M	$206M	$201M	$53M	$78M	$88M	$106M	$111M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
63.2%	62.3%	56.9%	14.7%	21.4%	25.2%	30.3%	31.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$204M	$206M	$201M	$53M	$78M	$88M	$106M	$111M	Free cash flowFCF
63.2%	62.3%	56.9%	14.7%	21.4%	25.2%	30.3%	31.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$282M	$50M	$57M	$12M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$8M	$24M	$1M	$23M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
46%	16%	33%	25%	24%	23%	22%	23%	ROICROIC
46%	14%	—	—	—	—	614%	400%	Return on equityROE
46%	14%	—	—	—	—	614%	400%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$51M	$66M	$67M	$94M	$89M	$34M	$75M	$92M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$16M	$25M	$28M	$26M	$25M	$24M	$24M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$33M	$5M	$6M	$10M	$7M	$8M	$11M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($17M)	$20M	$22M	$16M	$18M	$16M	$14M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$198M	$96M	$137M	$125M	$75M	$117M	$130M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$205M	$78M	$71M	$71M	$79M	$66M	$72M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.0×	1.2×	1.9×	1.8×	0.9×	1.8×	1.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$320M	$342M	$339M	$347M	$349M	$345M	$353M	$351M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.5B	$563M	$634M	$647M	$602M	$664M	$679M	Total assetsAssets
—	$0	$792M	$794M	$734M	$593M	$558M	$557M	Total debtDebt
—	($66M)	$725M	$700M	$645M	$559M	$484M	$465M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.4×	2.6×	12.3×	3.0×	3.2×	4.4×	4.2×	4.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$466M	$1.1B	($333M)	($255M)	($176M)	($79M)	$14M	$22M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%	1.7%	0.7%	5.5%	5.0%	4.8%	5.1%	5.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
19.9M	19.9M	20.0M	20.0M	19.6M	19.4M	19.4M	19.0M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$16.21	$16.64	$17.64	$18.16	$18.50	$18.08	$17.98	$18.43	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$10.70	$7.68	$5.45	$3.64	$3.94	$4.61	$4.35	$4.62	EPS (diluted)EPS
$10.24	$10.37	$10.04	$2.66	$3.96	$4.56	$5.44	$5.81	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$10.24	$10.37	$10.04	$2.66	$3.96	$4.56	$5.44	$5.81	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.15	$1.63	$1.65	$1.51	$1.86	$1.73	$1.55	$1.60	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$23.42	$56.40	$-16.64	$-12.79	$-8.99	$-4.10	$0.71	$1.16	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.7%/yr	+1.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−10.0%/yr	−12.1%/yr
EPS	−13.9%/yr	−10.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.1%/yr	−1.0%/yr
Book value / share	−44.2%/yr	−58.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

19Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

22%low FY2020

Gross margin

80%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.6×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$106Mowner earningsvs.$85Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $85M of profit into $106M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$85M

Owner earnings$106M · 30% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$85M	$89M	$77M	$73M	$109M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$19M	+$21M	+$17M	+$15M	+$52M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$18M	+$17M	+$18M	+$20M	+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$15M	−$5M	+$1M	−$25M	+$70M
Cash from operations	$136M	$122M	$114M	$83M	$234M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$30M	−$33M	−$36M	−$30M	−$33M
Owner earnings	$106M	$88M	$78M	$53M	$201M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	30%	25%	21%	15%	57%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $18M), owner earnings is nearer $88M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4.2×

Adequate

Operating income $150M ÷ interest expense $36M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $484M · 3.2× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $75M − debt $558M

What this means
Netting $75M of cash and short-term investments against $558M of debt leaves $484M owed, about 3.2× a year's operating profit (3.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -14d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 25 + DIO 0 − DPO 39 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 24%

High through the cycle

7-yr median, range 16%–46%; 22% latest = NOPAT $111M ÷ invested capital $497M

Industry peers: median -6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 22% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 30%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 15%–63%; latest $106M = operating cash $136M − maintenance capex $30M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 30% of revenue this year, a 30% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $18M of SBC) leaves $88M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.61×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $136M ÷ net income $85M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 22%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $23M ÷ Owner Earnings $106M

What this means
Of $106M Owner Earnings, $23M (22%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $23M buybacks. Net of $18M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.61×

Expanding

Capex $30M ÷ depreciation $19M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $350M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.79×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $558M vs $52M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (7-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −47%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.55/share (latest year $4.59), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.75/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 7

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 56% → 42% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 56% early to 42% lately, median 43% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −12%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 12% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · 40.6% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$130M

Cash & short-term investments$92M
Receivables$24M
Other current assets$14M

Current liabilities$72M

Debt due within a year$7M
Accounts payable$11M
Other current liabilities$55M

Current ratio1.80×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.80×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.28×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$58Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$7M due · $92M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($368M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($527M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$569M$12M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$22Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$219M · 19%
Buybacks$56M · 5%
Retained (debt / cash)$880M · 76%

Returned to owners$56M
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $56M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$16.65
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $32M, about $16.65 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $9.05 (2022) to $22.90 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($23M).
Net change in share count−4.3%
The diluted count fell from 20M to 19M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−15%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($743M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $113M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$392M59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$401Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $219M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Scott Turicchi	$17.3M	$25.4M	$201M
2022	Scott Turicchi	$948k	−$235k	$53M
2023	Scott Turicchi	$1.2M	−$10.9M	$78M
2024	Scott Turicchi	$2.2M	$1.1M	$88M
2025	Scott Turicchi	$1.8M	−$261k	$106M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$18M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Consensus Cloud Solutions Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?25.6% vs 60.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 60.8% early in the record and 25.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$32M · 9% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our top 10 customers represent approximately $33 million or 9% of total revenues.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
AVPTAvePoint Inc.	$419M	72%	-10.2%	—	12%
CERTCertara Inc.	$419M	61%	4.7%	-0%	21%
GDYNGrid Dynamics Holdings Inc.	$412M	38%	-0.5%	-1%	7%
DDD3D Systems Corporation	$387M	42%	-15.2%	-11%	-6%
CCSIConsensus Cloud Solutions Inc.	$350M	83%	43.0%	24%	30%
AMPLAmplitude Inc.	$343M	70%	-32.2%	-77%	-4%
MKTWMarketWise Inc.	$328M	57%	11.6%	—	14%
DOMODomo, Inc.	$319M	73%	-34.5%	—	-8%
Group median	—	65%	-5.4%	-1%	10%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Consensus Cloud Solutions Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Consensus Cloud Solutions Inc. earns about $106M on its 30.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 30.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($106M) Net of stock comp (−$18M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25−12%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $111M on 18M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $465M. The if-converted diluted count is 19M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CCSI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Consensus Cloud Solutions Inc. (CCSI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CCSI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CCS its page in the Manual CCZ →

Industry order: ← CCCS the Software chapter CDNS →