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CWAN, Clearwater Analytics

Software asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

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Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CWAN · Clearwater Analytics

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$731M

+61.9% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $826M 5-yr avg $421M

Gross margin 66% 5-yr avg 71%

Operating margin −0.7% 5-yr avg 2.0%

ROIC −0% 5-yr avg −1%

Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 15%

Free cash flow margin 18% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 72% and operating margin about 1.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −10% to 15% — on a steadier 72% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 17% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 0%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

25% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States75%$545M
International25%$186M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$168M	$203M	$252M	$303M	$368M	$452M	$731M	$826M	RevenueRevenue
72%	74%	73%	71%	71%	73%	67%	66%	Gross marginGross mgn
22%	22%	17%	21%	25%	22%	21%	19%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
23%	27%	29%	31%	34%	33%	27%	26%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$26M	($20M)	$28M	$5M	($17M)	$12M	($8M)	($6M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
15.3%	−10.0%	11.3%	1.7%	−4.5%	2.7%	−1.1%	−0.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$8M	($44M)	($8M)	($8M)	($22M)	$424M	($39M)	($48M)	Net incomeNet inc.
								Cash flow & returns
($230M)	($6M)	$3M	$58M	$85M	$74M	$176M	$169M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$2M	$2M	$3M	$5M	$10M	$12M	$86M	$112M	DepreciationDeprec.
($246M)	$11M	($29M)	($5M)	($8M)	($465M)	$1M	($28M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$3M	$4M	$5M	$8M	$6M	$5M	$12M	$17M	CapexCapex
2.0%	1.9%	2.0%	2.6%	1.5%	1.2%	1.6%	2.0%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($232M)	($9M)	($135K)	$53M	$79M	$69M	$164M	$153M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−138.1%	−4.3%	−0.1%	17.4%	21.5%	15.3%	22.5%	18.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($233M)	($10M)	($2M)	$50M	$79M	$69M	$164M	$153M	Free cash flowFCF
−138.9%	−5.1%	−0.7%	16.6%	21.5%	15.3%	22.5%	18.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	$0	$66M	$0	$40M	$1.1B	$1.1B	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$4M	$567K	$626K	$0	$0	$0	$18M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	—	3%	-7%	1%	-0%	-0%	ROICROIC
—	—	-3%	-2%	-6%	42%	-2%	-2%	Return on equityROE
								Balance sheet
—	$61M	$255M	$256M	$296M	$255M	$91M	$82M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$33M	$50M	$73M	$92M	$106M	$167M	$170M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$1M	$1M	$3M	$3M	$3M	$4M	$2M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$32M	$49M	$69M	$89M	$103M	$163M	$168M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$102M	$321M	$356M	$416M	$385M	$296M	$294M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$38M	$31M	$66M	$81M	$77M	$161M	$130M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	2.7×	10.3×	5.4×	5.1×	5.0×	1.8×	2.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	$44M	$45M	$71M	$1.3B	$1.3B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$116M	$344M	$482M	$559M	$1.2B	$3.0B	$3.0B	Total assetsAssets
—	$422M	$54M	$52M	$46M	$43M	$823M	$806M	Total debtDebt
—	$361M	($200M)	($204M)	($250M)	($212M)	$731M	$725M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.4×	-0.9×	1.1×	—	—	—	—	-0.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
—	—	$262M	$338M	$354M	$1.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
3.7%	12.1%	14.6%	21.6%	28.4%	22.8%	17.5%	16.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
—	—	178M	186M	200M	254M	271M	295M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	—	$1.42	$1.64	$1.84	$1.78	$2.70	$2.80	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	—	$-0.05	$-0.04	$-0.11	$1.67	$-0.14	$-0.16	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	$-0.00	$0.28	$0.40	$0.27	$0.61	$0.52	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	$-0.01	$0.27	$0.40	$0.27	$0.61	$0.52	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	$0.03	$0.04	$0.03	$0.02	$0.04	$0.06	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	—	$1.47	$1.82	$1.77	$3.96	$7.45	$6.95	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+17.4%/yr (4-yr)	+17.4%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	+10.8%/yr (4-yr)	+10.8%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share	+50.0%/yr (4-yr)	+50.0%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

271Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−0%low FY2023

Gross margin

67%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.5×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$164Mowner earningsvs.($39M)net incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2021FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $39M loss into $164M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($39M)	$424M	($22M)	($8M)	($8M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$86M	+$12M	+$10M	+$5M	+$3M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$128M	+$103M	+$104M	+$66M	+$37M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1M	−$465M	−$8M	−$5M	−$29M
Cash from operations	$176M	$74M	$85M	$58M	$3M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$12M	−$5M	−$6M	−$5M	−$3M
Owner earnings	$164M	$69M	$79M	$53M	($135K)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$3M	−$2M
Free cash flow	$164M	$69M	$79M	$50M	($2M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	22%	15%	21%	17%	0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $128M), owner earnings is nearer $36M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($8M) ÷ interest expense $26M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $731M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $91M − debt $823M

What this means
Netting $91M of cash and short-term investments against $823M of debt leaves $731M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 77d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 84 + DIO 0 − DPO 6 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -0%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range -7%–3%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($6M) ÷ invested capital $2.8B

Industry peers: median -17%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 15%

High through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -138%–22%; latest $164M = operating cash $176M − maintenance capex $12M

Industry peers: median 0%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 22% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $128M of SBC) leaves $36M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $176M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($39M) · cash from operations $176M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 110%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $181M ÷ Owner Earnings $164M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $164M of Owner Earnings, $181M (110%) went back to shareholders, $163M dividends, $18M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($128M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.14×

Harvesting

Capex $12M ÷ depreciation $86M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $731M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.83×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $823M vs $134M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 7 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.41/share (latest year $-0.13), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 6% early to −1% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2020 · −10.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +7.3%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$294M

Cash & short-term investments$82M
Receivables$170M
Other current assets$43M

Current liabilities$130M

Debt due within a year$8M
Accounts payable$2M
Other current liabilities$121M

Current ratio2.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.26×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.62×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$164Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$8M due · $82M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+74.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters4.8× → 2.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$120Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($678M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$861M$54M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$28Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $160M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$42M · 27%
Dividends$163M · 102%
Buybacks$23M · 14%

Returned to owners$186M
150% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $163M as dividends and $23M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$69M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $69M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $23M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count66.0%
The diluted count rose from 178M to 295M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend recordPays
Paid in 1 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained148%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($125M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $184M, so each retained $1 added about 1.48 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.0B65% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity63%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 7 years buying other businesses, against $42M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Stock-based compensation$128M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 17% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Clearwater Analytics is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?66.0%
Diluted shares grew 66.0% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $23M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.51×
Across the record the business reported $311M of net income but generated $160M of operating cash, a 0.51-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
COURCoursera Inc.	$758M	53%	-22.9%	—	0%
BANDBandwidth Inc.	$754M	44%	-2.3%	-2%	5%
SPSCSPS Commerce	$752M	67%	14.1%	13%	21%
BRZEBraze	$738M	67%	-30.7%	-30%	-5%
CWANClearwater Analytics	$731M	72%	1.7%	0%	15%
APPNAppian Corporation	$727M	71%	-18.7%	-50%	-6%
NTSKNetskope Inc.	$709M	65%	-76.9%	-107%	-27%
BLBlackLine	$700M	76%	-9.4%	-3%	11%
Group median	—	67%	-14.0%	-3%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Clearwater Analytics has delivered.

Clearwater Analytics’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Clearwater Analytics earns about $120M on its 16.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 22.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($120M) Net of stock comp (−$133M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($158M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+45%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2022+48%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $153M on 295M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $725M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($17M) runs well above depreciation ($112M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $158M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CWAN against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Clearwater Analytics (CWAN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CWAN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CW its page in the Manual CWBC →

Industry order: ← CVLT the Software chapter CXM →