Owner Scorecard


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GME, GameStop Corp.

Specialty Retail retail Revenue in runoff

GameStop Corp. offers games, collectibles, and entertainment products through its stores and ecommerce platforms.

Maximizing the cash flow of our legacy retail business by optimizing our store fleet.

Permissible investment instruments include cash and cash equivalents (e.g., bank obligations, money market funds, and commercial paper), fixed income securities (e.g., obligations of the U.S.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
GME · GameStop Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$3.6B
−5.1% YoY · −7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.7B 5-yr avg $4.9B
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 26%
Operating margin 10.3% 5-yr avg −1.3%
ROIC 13% 5-yr avg −38%
Owner-earnings margin 20% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin 20% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by United States (73%) and Australia (14%), with 2 more segments behind.
Situation
Revenue in runoff. Revenue has shrunk about 8% a year across the record while operations still generate cash.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −4.7% through the cycle on a 28% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −59%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, United States, is also where the profit is made: 73% of revenue and 98% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Europe ran a $34M operating loss; Canada ran a $22M operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2026
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • United States73%$2.7B98% of profit
  • Australia14%$495M2% of profit
  • Europe12%$429Mloss of $34M
  • Canada1%$38Mloss of $22M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$8.0B$8.5B$8.3B$6.5B$5.1B$6.0B$5.9B$5.3B$3.8B$3.6B$3.7BRevenueRevenue
31%29%28%30%25%22%23%25%29%33%34%Gross marginGross mgn
23%24%24%30%30%28%28%25%30%25%24%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$482M$439M($702M)($400M)($238M)($369M)($312M)($35M)($26M)$232M$386MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.0%5.1%−8.5%−6.2%−4.7%−6.1%−5.3%−0.7%−0.7%6.4%10.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$353M$35M($673M)($471M)($215M)($381M)($313M)$7M$131M$418M$763MNet incomeNet inc.
26%49%4%-9%9%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$537M$435M$325M($415M)$124M($434M)$108M($204M)$146M$615M$760MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$137M$122M$106M$95M$80M$77M$62M$56M$38M$19M$19MDepreciationDeprec.
$29M$252M$882M($48M)$251M($160M)$320M($289M)($40M)$150M($53M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$143M$113M$94M$79M$60M$62M$56M$35M$16M$18M$19MCapexCapex
1.8%1.3%1.1%1.2%1.2%1.0%0.9%0.7%0.4%0.5%0.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$394M$322M$231M($493M)$64M($496M)$52M($239M)$130M$597M$741MOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.0%3.8%2.8%−7.6%1.3%−8.3%0.9%−4.5%3.4%16.5%19.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$394M$322M$231M($493M)$64M($496M)$52M($239M)$130M$597M$741MFree cash flowFCF
5.0%3.8%2.8%−7.6%1.3%−8.3%0.9%−4.5%3.4%16.5%19.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$441M$9M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$156M$155M$157M$41M$300K$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$63M$22M$0$199M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
15%-104%-59%-71%-77%-105%-4%-13%7%13%ROICROIC
16%2%-50%-77%-49%-24%-24%1%3%8%13%Return on equityROE
9%−5%−62%−84%−49%−24%−24%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$665M$854M$1.6B$499M$509M$1.3B$1.4B$1.2B$4.8B$9.0B$8.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$221M$139M$134M$142M$105M$141M$154M$91M$61M$45M$59MReceivablesReceiv.
$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$860M$603M$915M$683M$633M$480M$403M$423MInventoryInvent.
$617M$892M$1.1B$381M$342M$471M$531M$324M$149M$147M$263MAccounts payablePayables
$726M$497M$333M$621M$366M$585M$306M$400M$393M$301M$219MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.1B$3.0B$3.1B$1.6B$1.6B$2.6B$2.3B$2.0B$5.4B$10.0B$10.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.8B$1.9B$2.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.3B$935M$665M$655M$860MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.6×1.4×1.3×1.2×1.9×1.7×2.1×8.0×15.3×12.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.4B$1.4B$364M$0$0$0GoodwillGoodwill
$5.0B$5.0B$4.0B$2.8B$2.5B$3.5B$3.1B$2.7B$5.9B$10.4B$11.0BTotal assetsAssets
$815M$818M$821M$420M$338M$45M$50M$39M$27M$4.2B$4.2BTotal debtDebt
$151M($36M)($804M)($80M)($171M)($1.2B)($1.3B)($1.2B)($4.7B)($4.8B)($4.2B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
9.0×7.7×-12.4×-14.7×-7.4×-13.7×133.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.3B$2.2B$1.3B$612M$437M$1.6B$1.3B$1.3B$4.9B$5.4B$5.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.3%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.5%0.7%0.4%0.4%0.7%0.8%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
311M305M306M263M260M290M304M305M395M549M592MShares out (diluted)Shares
$25.58$28.07$27.05$24.63$19.58$20.70$19.48$17.28$9.69$6.61$6.30Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.13$0.11$-2.20$-1.79$-0.83$-1.31$-1.03$0.02$0.33$0.76$1.29EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.27$1.06$0.76$-1.88$0.24$-1.71$0.17$-0.78$0.33$1.09$1.25Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.27$1.06$0.76$-1.88$0.24$-1.71$0.17$-0.78$0.33$1.09$1.25Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.50$0.51$0.51$0.15$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.46$0.37$0.31$0.30$0.23$0.21$0.18$0.11$0.04$0.03$0.03Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.24$7.27$4.36$2.33$1.68$5.52$4.35$4.39$12.49$9.92$9.86Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−14.0%/yr−19.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.7%/yr+34.7%/yr
EPS−4.3%/yr
Capital spending / share−25.6%/yr−32.7%/yr
Book value / share+3.6%/yr+42.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
549Mpeak FY2026
ROIC
7%low FY2023
Gross margin
33%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$597Mowner earningsvs.$418Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned $418M of profit into $597M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$418M
Owner earnings$597M · 16% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$418M$131M$7M($313M)($381M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$19M+$38M+$56M+$62M+$77M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$27M+$16M+$22M+$40M+$31M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$150M−$40M−$289M+$320M−$160M
Cash from operations$615M$146M($204M)$108M($434M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$18M−$16M−$35M−$56M−$62M
Owner earnings$597M$130M($239M)$52M($496M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%3%-5%1%-8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer $571M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $232M ÷ interest expense $27M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $6.3B + ST investments $2.7B − debt $4.2B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $4.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 5 + DIO 60 − DPO 22 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -105%–15%; 7% latest = NOPAT $232M ÷ invested capital $3.3B
    Industry peers: median 44%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -8%–16%; latest $597M = operating cash $615M − maintenance capex $18M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 16% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves $571M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $615M ÷ net income $418M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $597M
    What this means

    Of $597M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.90×
    Maintaining
    Capex $18M ÷ depreciation $19M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 15.30×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.2B vs $9.4B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.41/share (latest year $0.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.13/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 5 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 1% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 1% early, 2% lately, median −5%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +0%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 0% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · −8.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We may incorporate artificial intelligence into workflows and processes, including customer-facing and operation activities, and challenges with properly managing its use could result in reputational harm, competitive harm and legal liability, and adversely affect our results of operations.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$10.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$8.4B
  • Receivables$59M
  • Inventory$423M
  • Other current assets$1.8B
Current liabilities$860M
  • Accounts payable$263M
  • Other current liabilities$597M
Current ratio12.40×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio11.91×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio9.73×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$9.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters6.2× → 12.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$5.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$5.5BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.3B$173M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$348Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$675M · 55%
  • Dividends$509M · 41%
  • Buybacks$284M · 23%
  • Returned to owners$793M

    141% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $509M as dividends and $284M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$230M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $230M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $815M to $4.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$2.12

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 123M shares were bought for $262M, about $2.12 each.

  • Net change in share count90.2%

    The diluted count rose from 311M to 592M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$34M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$450Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $675M of capital spent building

$1.3B written down across 2 years (2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022George E. Sherman$652k−$132.0M($496M)
2022Matthew Furlong$16.8M$9.1M($496M)
2023Matthew Furlong$2.5M$2.1M$52M
2024Mark Robinson$564k−$93k($239M)
2024Matthew Furlong$1.1M−$4.2M($239M)
2025Ryan Cohen$269k$269k$130M
2026Ryan Cohen$1.8M$1.8M$597M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership9.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$27M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why GameStop Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?90.2%

    Diluted shares grew 90.2% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $284M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$815M → $4.2B

    Debt rose from $815M to $4.2B while owner earnings went from about $316M to $163M — about 2.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 26 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $3.3B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Specialty Retail

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BBYBest Buy Co. Inc.$41.7B23%4.4%44%4%
WSMWilliams-Sonoma$7.8B46%14.7%88%12%
GMEGameStop Corp.$3.6B28%-2.7%-59%2%
RHRH$3.4B44%11.7%29%9%
ARHSArhaus Inc.$1.4B39%6.4%45%8%
HVTHaverty Furniture Companies Inc.$759M56%5.7%12%5%
Group median42%6.1%36%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what GameStop Corp. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $741M on 449M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-05; net cash $4.2B. The if-converted diluted count is 592M, 32% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "GameStop Corp. (GME), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GME, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GM its page in the Manual GMED →

Industry order: ← GCO the Specialty Retail chapter HBI →