Owner Scorecard


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BP, BP p.l.c.

Refining & Marketing capital-intensive Cyclical

Revenue is led by Oil products (59%) and Natural Gas Products (14%), with 2 more lines behind.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · 1 ADS = 6 ordinary shares
BP · BP p.l.c.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$192.5B
−1.1% YoY · 12% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $192.5B 5-yr avg $202.7B
Operating margin 6.6% 5-yr avg 8.7%
ROIC 9% 5-yr avg 12%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
An oil and gas business, whose fortunes rise and fall with a price it does not set.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 6.4% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −20% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Oil products at 59%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Oil products59%$114.2B
  • Natural Gas Products14%$27.5B
  • Product And Service Other 18%$15.1B
  • Crude oil1%$2.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$186.6B$244.6B$303.7B$163.5B$109.1B$164.2B$248.9B$213.0B$194.6B$192.5B$192.5BRevenueRevenue
($430M)$9.5B$19.4B$11.7B($21.7B)$18.1B$18.0B$27.3B$11.3B$12.6B$12.6BOperating incomeOp. inc.
−0.2%3.9%6.4%7.2%−19.9%11.0%7.2%12.8%5.8%6.6%6.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$115M$3.4B$9.4B$4.0B($20.3B)$7.6B($2.5B)$15.2B$381M$55M$55MNet incomeNet inc.
52%43%50%47%34%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$10.7B$18.9B$22.9B$25.8B$12.2B$23.6B$40.9B$32.0B$27.3B$24.5B$24.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$14.5B$15.6B$15.5B$17.8B$14.9B$14.8B$14.3B$15.9B$16.6B$17.8B$17.8BDepreciationDeprec.
($3.9B)($42M)($2.0B)$4.0B$17.6B$1.2B$29.1B$872M$10.3B$6.6B$6.6BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$16.7B$16.6B$16.7B$15.4B$12.3B$10.9B$12.1B$14.3B$15.3B$13.2B$13.2BCapexCapex
8.9%6.8%5.5%9.4%11.3%6.6%4.8%6.7%7.9%6.9%6.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($6.0B)$2.4B$6.2B$10.4B($144M)$12.7B$28.9B$17.8B$12.0B$11.3B$11.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
−3.2%1.0%2.0%6.3%−0.1%7.7%11.6%8.3%6.2%5.9%5.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($6.0B)$2.4B$6.2B$10.4B($144M)$12.7B$28.9B$17.8B$12.0B$11.3B$11.3BFree cash flowFCF
−3.2%1.0%2.0%6.3%−0.1%7.7%11.6%8.3%6.2%5.9%5.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$4.6B$6.2B$6.7B$6.9B$6.3B$4.3B$4.4B$4.8B$5.0B$5.1B$5.1BDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$343M$355M$1.5B$776M$3.2B$10.0B$7.9B$7.1B$4.5BBuybacksBuybacks
-0%4%8%4%-17%10%11%21%8%9%9%ROICROIC
0%3%9%4%-28%10%-4%22%1%0%0%Return on equityROE
−5%−3%3%−3%−37%4%−10%15%−8%−9%−9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$23.5B$25.7B$22.7B$22.6B$31.4B$31.0B$29.8B$33.9B$39.4B$36.7B$36.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$20.7B$24.8B$24.5B$24.4B$17.9B$27.1B$34.0B$31.1B$27.1B$26.0B$26.0BReceivablesReceiv.
$17.7B$19.0B$18.0B$20.9B$16.9B$23.7B$28.1B$22.8B$23.2B$22.5B$22.5BInventoryInvent.
$37.9B$44.2B$46.3B$46.8B$36.0B$52.6B$64.0B$61.2B$58.4B$56.8B$56.8BAccounts payablePayables
$415M($349M)($3.8B)($1.5B)($1.2B)($1.8B)($1.9B)($7.2B)($8.1B)($8.3B)($8.3B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$67.8B$75.0B$71.3B$82.1B$73.0B$92.6B$107.7B$104.1B$102.8B$101.8B$101.8BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$58.4B$64.7B$68.2B$73.6B$59.8B$80.3B$99.0B$86.1B$82.2B$80.6B$80.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.2×1.0×1.1×1.2×1.2×1.1×1.2×1.3×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$11.2B$11.6B$12.2B$11.9B$12.5B$12.4B$12.0B$12.5B$14.9B$10.3B$10.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$263.3B$276.5B$282.2B$295.2B$267.7B$287.3B$288.1B$280.3B$282.2B$278.5B$278.5BTotal assetsAssets
$51.7B$55.5B$55.8B$57.2B$63.3B$55.6B$43.7B$48.7B$55.1B$54.6B$54.6BTotal debtDebt
$28.1B$29.8B$33.1B$34.6B$31.9B$24.7B$14.0B$14.8B$15.7B$17.9B$17.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-0.3×4.6×7.7×3.4×-7.0×6.3×6.7×7.1×2.4×2.5×2.5×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$95.3B$98.5B$99.4B$98.4B$71.3B$75.5B$67.6B$70.3B$59.2B$53.1B$53.1BShareholders’ equityEquity

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

ROIC
9%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.6×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$11.3Bowner earningsvs.$55Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $55M of profit into $11.3B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$55M
Owner earnings$11.3B · 6% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$55M$381M$15.2B($2.5B)$7.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$17.8B+$16.6B+$15.9B+$14.3B+$14.8B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$6.6B+$10.3B+$872M+$29.1B+$1.2B
Cash from operations$24.5B$27.3B$32.0B$40.9B$23.6B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$13.2B−$15.3B−$14.3B−$12.1B−$10.9B
Owner earnings$11.3B$12.0B$17.8B$28.9B$12.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%6%8%12%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $12.6B ÷ interest expense $5.1B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $17.9B · 1.4× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $36.6B + ST investments $158M − debt $54.6B
    What this means

    Netting $36.7B of cash and short-term investments against $54.6B of debt leaves $17.9B owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (4.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -17%–21%; 9% latest = NOPAT $6.3B ÷ invested capital $71.1B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–12%; latest $11.3B = operating cash $24.5B − maintenance capex $13.2B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $24.5B ÷ net income $55M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $9.5B ÷ Owner Earnings $11.3B
    What this means

    Of $11.3B Owner Earnings, $9.5B (85%) went back to shareholders, $5.1B dividends, $4.5B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.74×
    Harvesting
    Capex $13.2B ÷ depreciation $17.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $192.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.26×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $54.6B vs $21.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +22%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. . Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 8% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −19.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“We continuously monitor the evolving threat landscape and emerging technologies including AI, quantum computing, and cloud infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities and disruptors.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$101.8B
  • Cash & short-term investments$36.7B
  • Receivables$26.0B
  • Inventory$22.5B
  • Other current assets$16.6B
Current liabilities$80.6B
  • Accounts payable$56.8B
  • Other current liabilities$23.7B
Current ratio1.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.98×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.46×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$21.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$34.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($102.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$69.2B$14.6B of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $238.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$143.5B · 60%
  • Dividends$54.3B · 23%
  • Buybacks$35.7B · 15%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$5.4B · 2%
  • Returned to owners$89.9B

    94% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $54.3B as dividends and $35.7B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $35.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count

    No continuous share count across the span.

  • Dividend recordPays

    Paid in 10 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why BP p.l.c. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
XOMExxon Mobil Corporation$332.2B7.6%7%7%
BPBP p.l.c.$192.5B6.5%8%6%
CVXChevron Corporation$184.4B41%8.2%5%9%
MPCMarathon Petroleum Corporation$132.7B10%5.1%11%5%
PSXPhillips 66$132.4B12%3.9%10%
VLOValero Energy Corporation$122.7B5%3.7%11%4%
COPConocoPhillips$51.8B57%29.3%13%14%
PBFPBF Energy$29.3B4%2.4%9%2%
Group median5.8%10%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “Each ADS represents six ordinary”; BP p.l.c. reports in USD, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BP p.l.c. has delivered.

$
million The share count isn’t tagged in a form this tool can read; enter it too (any quote page lists it). The rest is from the record.

Through the cycle, BP p.l.c. earns about $11.6B on its 6.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−14%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021−3%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $11.3B on the share count you enter above; net debt $17.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BP p.l.c. (BP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BOSC its page in the Manual BPYPM →

Industry order: ← 5020 the Refining & Marketing chapter CAPL →