Owner Scorecard


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CAPL, CrossAmerica Partners LP Common

Refining & Marketing capital-intensive

We are one of the ten largest independent distributors by motor fuel volume in the United States for ExxonMobil, BP and Marathon, and we also distribute Shell, Valero and Phillips 66-branded motor fuels.

The remaining gallons are either retail sales or wholesale DTW contracts that provide for variable, market-based pricing.

The following table highlights the aggregate volume of motor fuel distributed to each of our principal customer groups (in millions).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CAPL · CrossAmerica Partners LP Common
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.7B
−10.6% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.6B 5-yr avg $4.1B
Gross margin 11% 5-yr avg 9%
Operating margin 3.3% 5-yr avg 1.9%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 7.7% and operating margin about 1.7% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 1.0% to 6.0% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.9B$2.1B$2.4B$2.1B$1.9B$3.6B$5.0B$4.4B$4.1B$3.7B$3.6BRevenueRevenue
8%8%7%7%11%8%8%9%10%11%11%Gross marginGross mgn
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$32M$32M$35M$43M$116M$36M$96M$88M$71M$98M$119MOperating incomeOp. inc.
1.7%1.5%1.4%2.0%6.0%1.0%1.9%2.0%1.7%2.7%3.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$11M$23M$5M$18M$107M$22M$64M$43M$22M$42M$60MNet incomeNet inc.
-4%-7%-8%1%6%16%19%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$79M$89M$90M$72M$104M$95M$161M$117M$88M$91M$104MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$54M$57M$67M$55M$69M$78M$81M$77M$76M$90M$80MDepreciationDeprec.
$10M$6M$17M($2M)($72M)($5M)$15M($6M)($12M)($42M)($37M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$21M$12M$14M$25M$37M$42M$30M$35M$26M$36M$29MCapexCapex
1.1%0.6%0.6%1.1%1.9%1.2%0.6%0.8%0.6%1.0%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$59M$76M$76M$48M$67M$54M$131M$82M$61M$56M$75MOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.1%3.7%3.1%2.2%3.5%1.5%2.6%1.9%1.5%1.5%2.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$59M$76M$76M$48M$67M$54M$131M$82M$61M$56M$75MFree cash flowFCF
3.1%3.7%3.1%2.2%3.5%1.5%2.6%1.9%1.5%1.5%2.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$94M$76M$485K$28M$273M$30M$30MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$80M$84M$76M$72M$78M$80M$80M$80M$80M$80M$80MDividends paidDiv. paid
Balance sheet
$1M$4M$3M$2M$513K$8M$16M$5M$3M$3M$7MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$29M$28M$16M$38M$29M$33M$31M$31M$32M$29M$31MReceivablesReceiv.
$13M$15M$14M$6M$23M$46M$47M$52M$63M$60M$65MInventoryInvent.
$35M$36M$33M$57M$64M$67M$77M$69M$74M$63M$77MAccounts payablePayables
$8M$7M($2M)($13M)($12M)$12M$1M$15M$21M$25M$19MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$65M$81M$51M$69M$75M$106M$118M$109M$119M$111M$125MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$75M$93M$88M$113M$147M$164M$175M$161M$163M$155M$168MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×0.9×0.6×0.6×0.5×0.6×0.7×0.7×0.7×0.7×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$89M$89M$89M$89M$89M$100M$99M$99M$99M$99M$99MGoodwillGoodwill
$932M$947M$867M$911M$1.0B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$965M$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$471M$534M$523M$542M$533M$830M$779M$767M$775M$697M$742MTotal debtDebt
$469M$530M$520M$540M$533M$822M$763M$762M$772M$694M$734MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.4×1.2×1.1×1.6×7.0×2.0×3.0×2.0×1.3×2.0×2.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
0.2%0.1%0.0%0.1%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.0%0.1%0.0%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
32.2M33.9M34.3M34.5M37.4M37.9M38.1M38.1M38.2M38.2M38.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$58.04$61.88$71.22$62.33$51.71$94.48$130.52$115.07$107.36$95.76$95.08Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.33$0.68$0.15$0.52$2.88$0.57$1.67$1.12$0.59$1.09$1.56EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.82$2.26$2.21$1.38$1.80$1.42$3.44$2.16$1.61$1.46$1.97Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.82$2.26$2.21$1.38$1.80$1.42$3.44$2.16$1.61$1.46$1.97Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.48$2.47$2.20$2.10$2.08$2.10$2.09$2.09$2.09$2.09$2.09Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.64$0.37$0.40$0.71$0.99$1.10$0.80$0.91$0.69$0.93$0.76Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.7%/yr+13.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−2.4%/yr−4.2%/yr
EPS+14.2%/yr−17.6%/yr
Dividends / share−1.9%/yr+0.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.2%/yr−1.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
38Mpeak FY2025
Gross margin
11%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
12.4×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$56Mowner earningsvs.$42Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $42M of profit into $56M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$42M
Owner earnings$56M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$42M$22M$43M$64M$22M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$90M+$76M+$77M+$81M+$78M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$2M+$2M+$3M+$2M+$1M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$42M−$12M−$6M+$15M−$5M
Cash from operations$91M$88M$117M$161M$95M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$36M−$26M−$35M−$30M−$42M
Owner earnings$56M$61M$82M$131M$54M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%1%2%3%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer $54M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $98M ÷ interest expense $48M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $694M · 7.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $3M − debt $697M
    What this means

    Netting $3M of cash and short-term investments against $697M of debt leaves $694M owed, about 7.1× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 3 + DIO 7 − DPO 7 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–4%; latest $56M = operating cash $91M − maintenance capex $36M
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves $54M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $91M ÷ net income $42M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $83M ÷ Owner Earnings $56M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $56M of Owner Earnings, $83M (149%) went back to shareholders, $80M dividends, $3M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $2M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.40×
    Harvesting
    Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $90M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.72×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $697M vs ($44M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +173%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.93/share (latest year $1.10), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 2% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 2% early, 2% lately, median 2%.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 1.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$125M
  • Cash & short-term investments$7M
  • Receivables$31M
  • Inventory$65M
  • Other current assets$22M
Current liabilities$168M
  • Debt due within a year$3M
  • Accounts payable$77M
  • Other current liabilities$88M
Current ratio0.75×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.04×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($43M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $7M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Net current asset value($956M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$846M$111M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $988M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$278M · 28%
  • Dividends$788M · 80%
  • Buybacks$3M · 0%
  • Returned to owners$791M

    111% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $788M as dividends and $3M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$81M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $81M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $471M to $742M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $3M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count18.9%

    The diluted count rose from 32M to 38M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$2.09/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 2% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$161M17% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$501Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $278M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$2M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why CrossAmerica Partners LP Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.6% vs 3.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.3% early in the record and 1.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?18.9%

    Diluted shares grew 18.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $3M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$471M → $742M

    Debt rose from $471M to $742M while owner earnings went from about $70M to $67M — about 6.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UNFIUnited Natural Foods$31.8B14%0.4%5%1%
GLPGlobal Partners LP Common$18.6B6%1.4%1%
ANDEAndersons$11.0B6%1.0%4%1%
SEBSeaboard Corporation$9.7B8%3.5%4%2%
CAPLCrossAmerica Partners LP Common$3.7B8%1.8%2%
CENTCentral Garden & Pet$3.1B30%7.4%10%7%
ASHAshland$1.8B30%3.0%2%4%
MGPIMGP Ingredients Inc.$536M28%13.3%14%8%
Group median11%2.4%2%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what CrossAmerica Partners LP Common has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, CrossAmerica Partners LP Common earns about $89M on its 2.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $75M on 38M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $734M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "CrossAmerica Partners LP Common (CAPL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CAPL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CALY its page in the Manual CAR →

Industry order: ← BP the Refining & Marketing chapter CLMT →