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BROS, Dutch Bros Inc.

Restaurants consumer brand Cyclical

Revenue is Company-operated shops (92%) and Franchising and other (8%).

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BROS · Dutch Bros Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.6B

+27.9% YoY · 38% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.7B 5-yr avg $1.0B

Gross margin 25% 5-yr avg 27%

Operating margin 9.4% 5-yr avg 0.0%

ROIC 21% 5-yr avg −14%

Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg −6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: A restaurant business, earning on traffic through its doors and the returns on each new unit.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 27% and operating margin about 4.8% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −22% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on same-store sales and unit economics. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 7%). By owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Company-operated shops is 92% of revenue, with Franchising and other the other meaningful segment at 8%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Company-operated shops92%$1.5B
Franchising and other8%$129M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$238M	$327M	$498M	$739M	$966M	$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.7B	RevenueRevenue
40%	35%	31%	24%	26%	27%	26%	25%	Gross marginGross mgn
28%	32%	53%	25%	21%	18%	16%	16%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$30M	$11M	($111M)	($3M)	$46M	$106M	$161M	$164M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
12.7%	3.4%	−22.3%	−0.4%	4.8%	8.3%	9.8%	9.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$0	$0	($13M)	($5M)	$2M	$35M	$80M	$81M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	34%	19%	20%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$57M	$54M	$80M	$60M	$140M	$246M	$296M	$343M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$10M	$16M	$25M	$45M	$69M	$93M	$115M	$127M	DepreciationDeprec.
$40M	$3M	($90M)	($22M)	$30M	$107M	$83M	$117M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$39M	$41M	$118M	$188M	$228M	$222M	$241M	$253M	CapexCapex
16.6%	12.4%	23.8%	25.4%	23.7%	17.3%	14.7%	14.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$47M	$38M	$55M	$15M	$71M	$153M	$180M	$216M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
19.7%	11.6%	11.1%	2.1%	7.3%	12.0%	11.0%	12.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$17M	$13M	($38M)	($128M)	($89M)	$25M	$54M	$91M	Free cash flowFCF
7.2%	4.0%	−7.6%	−17.3%	−9.2%	1.9%	3.3%	5.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$530K	$5M	$5M	$6M	$0	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	8%	-110%	-1%	7%	14%	21%	21%	ROICROIC
—	0%	-13%	-4%	0%	7%	12%	12%	Return on equityROE
—	0%	−13%	−4%	0%	7%	12%	12%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$16M	$32M	$19M	$20M	$134M	$293M	$269M	$264M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$11M	$11M	$12M	$9M	$11M	$18M	$19M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$16M	$23M	$39M	$47M	$36M	$49M	$37M	InventoryInvent.
—	$16M	$20M	$21M	$30M	$32M	$38M	$42M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$10M	$14M	$30M	$26M	$15M	$30M	$14M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$63M	$61M	$82M	$205M	$358M	$357M	$340M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$60M	$139M	$213M	$138M	$203M	$240M	$255M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.1×	0.4×	0.4×	1.5×	1.8×	1.5×	1.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$17M	$18M	$19M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	$22M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$260M	$554M	$1.2B	$1.8B	$2.5B	$3.0B	$3.1B	Total assetsAssets
—	$28M	$4M	$100M	$99M	$238M	$202M	$201M	Total debtDebt
—	($3M)	($15M)	$80M	($34M)	($55M)	($67M)	($62M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	$76M	$95M	$129M	$364M	$537M	$681M	$696M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.8%	10.7%	31.7%	5.6%	4.1%	0.9%	1.1%	1.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
—	—	45.9M	51.9M	62.1M	104M	126M	127M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	—	$10.86	$14.25	$15.56	$12.30	$13.03	$13.72	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	—	$-0.28	$-0.09	$0.03	$0.34	$0.63	$0.63	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	$1.20	$0.29	$1.14	$1.47	$1.43	$1.70	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	$-0.83	$-2.47	$-1.43	$0.24	$0.43	$0.71	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	$2.58	$3.62	$3.68	$2.13	$1.92	$1.98	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	—	$2.06	$2.49	$5.87	$5.16	$5.41	$5.47	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.68 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.7%/yr (4-yr)	+4.7%/yr (4-yr)
Owner earnings / share	+4.5%/yr (4-yr)	+4.5%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share	−7.2%/yr (4-yr)	−7.2%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share	+27.3%/yr (4-yr)	+27.3%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

126Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

21%low FY2021

Gross margin

26%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$180Mowner earningsvs.$80Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $180M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $115M it takes just to hold its position. It put $126M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $54M.

Reported net income$80M

Owner earnings$180M · 11% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$80M	$35M	$2M	($5M)	($13M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$115M	+$93M	+$69M	+$45M	+$25M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$18M	+$11M	+$39M	+$42M	+$158M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$83M	+$107M	+$30M	−$22M	−$90M
Cash from operations	$296M	$246M	$140M	$60M	$80M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$115M	−$93M	−$69M	−$45M	−$25M
Owner earnings	$180M	$153M	$71M	$15M	$55M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$126M	−$129M	−$159M	−$143M	−$93M
Free cash flow	$54M	$25M	($89M)	($128M)	($38M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	11%	12%	7%	2%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $115M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $126M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $18M), owner earnings is nearer $162M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“For example, in connection with the audit of our consolidated financial statements as of and for the year ended December 31, 2022, our management and auditors determined that material weaknesses existed in the internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$67M

Net cash

Cash $269M − debt $202M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $67M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 7d

Tight

DSO 4 + DIO 15 − DPO 11 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -110%–21%; 21% latest = NOPAT $131M ÷ invested capital $614M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 21% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range 2%–20%; latest $180M = operating cash $296M − maintenance capex $115M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 7 years. It chose to put $126M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $54M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $18M of SBC) leaves $162M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.70×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $296M ÷ net income $80M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Investing or harvesting? 2.09×

Expanding

Capex $241M ÷ depreciation $115M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.49×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $202M vs $117M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.25/share (latest year $0.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $4.42/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −2% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 8% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 27%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +26%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 26% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −22.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Failure to properly manage AI technologies within our business processes, could also lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and could harm our reputation and competitive position.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$340M

Cash & short-term investments$264M
Receivables$19M
Inventory$37M
Other current assets$21M

Current liabilities$255M

Debt due within a year$4M
Accounts payable$42M
Other current liabilities$210M

Current ratio1.33×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.19×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.03×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$85Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$4M due · $264M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+30.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.2× → 1.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$674Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$745M$546M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.1B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$62Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$77M

'27$87M

'28$88M

'29$89M

'30$91M

later$976M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$77Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$889Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$202M

Lease obligations (present value)$889M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.1B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.1B, of which the leases are 81%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $932M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.1B · 116%

Source of funding−$145M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $145M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Net change in share count177.7%
The diluted count rose from 46M to 127M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained89%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($99M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $88M, so each retained $1 added about 0.89 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	—	$62.4M	$84.8M	$55M
2021	—	$1.5M	$1.5M	$55M
2022	Jonathan “Joth” Ricci	$1.1M	−$10.6M	$15M
2023	—	$1.9M	$2.8M	$71M
2024	—	$5.0M	$8.4M	$153M
2025	Ms. Barone	$6.7M	$8.2M	$180M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$18M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 11% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Dutch Bros Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?10.1% vs 14.1%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 14.1% early in the record and 10.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?177.7%
Diluted shares grew 177.7% over 2019–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Restaurants

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
WENWendy's	$2.2B	64%	15.7%	8%	12%
PLAYDave & Buster's Entertainment Inc.	$2.1B	83%	13.0%	15%	13%
BROSDutch Bros Inc.	$1.6B	27%	4.8%	7%	11%
JACKJack in the Box	$1.5B	56%	19.1%	19%	8%
SHAKShake Shack	$1.4B	—	2.4%	5%	7%
BJRIBJ's Restaurants Inc.	$1.4B	74%	2.2%	6%	3%
FWRGFirst Watch Restaurant Group Inc.	$1.2B	—	2.3%	2%	4%
CAVACAVA Group	$1.2B	—	0.6%	10%	7%
Group median	—	64%	3.6%	8%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Dutch Bros Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Dutch Bros Inc. earns about $181M on its 11.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($181M) Net of stock comp (−$19M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($228M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+48%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’19→’25+17%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $91M on 154M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2024-12-31; net cash $62M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($253M) runs well above depreciation ($127M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $228M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BROS against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Dutch Bros Inc. (BROS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BROS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BRO its page in the Manual BRSP →

Industry order: ← BRCB the Restaurants chapter CAKE →