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BV, BrightView Holdings Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive Serial acquirer

We are the largest provider of commercial landscaping services in the United States, with revenues approximately 4 times those of our next largest commercial landscaping competitor.

We provide commercial landscaping services ranging from landscape maintenance and enhancements to tree care and landscape development.

We serve a geographically diverse set of customers through our strategically located network of branches in 36 U.S. states and, through our qualified service partner network, we are able to efficiently provide nationwide coverage across the United States.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

BV · BrightView Holdings Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.7B

−3.4% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.7B 5-yr avg $2.7B

Gross margin 22% 5-yr avg 24%

Operating margin 4.5% 5-yr avg 4.2%

ROIC 4% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin −2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 61% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 9 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 25% and operating margin about 3.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.3% to 5.7% — on a steadier 25% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on debt terms & refinancing, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$2.7B	$2.7B	RevenueRevenue
28%	27%	27%	25%	25%	24%	24%	23%	23%	22%	Gross marginGross mgn
21%	20%	19%	22%	20%	19%	19%	18%	17%	17%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$8M	$40M	$130M	$12M	$91M	$88M	$101M	$157M	$135M	$122M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.3%	1.7%	5.4%	0.5%	3.5%	3.2%	3.6%	5.7%	5.0%	4.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($52M)	($15M)	$44M	($42M)	$46M	$14M	($8M)	$66M	$56M	$47M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	22%	—	9%	29%	—	31%	31%	33%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$112M	$180M	$170M	$245M	$148M	$107M	$130M	$206M	$292M	$222M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$79M	$75M	$80M	$81M	$85M	$99M	$105M	$108M	$142M	$170M	DepreciationDeprec.
$82M	$91M	$30M	$183M	($2M)	($25M)	$10M	$11M	$75M	($12M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$76M	$86M	$90M	$53M	$61M	$107M	$71M	$78M	$254M	$275M	CapexCapex
3.5%	3.7%	3.7%	2.2%	2.4%	3.9%	2.5%	2.8%	9.5%	10.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$36M	$94M	$80M	$192M	$87M	($400K)	$59M	$127M	$150M	$52M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.7%	4.0%	3.3%	8.2%	3.4%	−0.0%	2.1%	4.6%	5.6%	1.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$36M	$94M	$80M	$192M	$87M	($400K)	$59M	$127M	$38M	($53M)	Free cash flowFCF
1.7%	4.0%	3.3%	8.2%	3.4%	−0.0%	2.1%	4.6%	1.4%	−1.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$104M	$64M	$90M	$110M	$93M	$14M	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$30M	$3M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$164M	$2M	$3M	$24M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	4%	—	3%	—	—	6%	5%	4%	ROICROIC
-7%	-1%	3%	-3%	3%	1%	-1%	5%	4%	4%	Return on equityROE
−7%	−1%	3%	−3%	3%	1%	−1%	5%	4%	4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$68M	$35M	$39M	$157M	$124M	$20M	$67M	$140M	$75M	$10M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$317M	$334M	$319M	$379M	$398M	$442M	$415M	$393M	$432M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$24M	$27M	$7M	—	—	—	—	—	$7M	InventoryInvent.
—	$94M	$100M	$117M	$144M	$151M	$136M	$144M	$138M	$124M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$247M	$260M	$209M	$235M	$246M	$306M	$271M	$255M	$314M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$531M	$551M	$633M	$711M	$677M	$742M	$780M	$666M	$630M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$332M	$333M	$450M	$496M	$488M	$467M	$543M	$515M	$512M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.6×	1.7×	1.4×	1.4×	1.4×	1.6×	1.4×	1.3×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$2.9B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$3.4B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$888M	$803M	$790M	$824M	Total debtDebt
—	$1.1B	$1.1B	$983M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$821M	$662M	$716M	$814M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.1×	0.4×	1.8×	0.2×	2.1×	1.7×	1.0×	2.5×	2.5×	2.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$705M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	1.2%	0.7%	1.0%	0.8%	0.7%	0.8%	0.7%	0.7%	0.6%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
77.7M	83.4M	103M	104M	106M	98.2M	93.4M	96.1M	96.5M	94.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$28.13	$28.23	$23.26	$22.63	$24.16	$28.27	$30.15	$28.80	$27.70	$28.93	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.67	$-0.18	$0.43	$-0.40	$0.44	$0.14	$-0.08	$0.69	$0.58	$0.49	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.47	$1.13	$0.77	$1.86	$0.83	$-0.00	$0.63	$1.32	$1.55	$0.55	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.47	$1.13	$0.77	$1.86	$0.83	$-0.00	$0.63	$1.32	$0.39	$-0.56	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.97	$1.04	$0.87	$0.51	$0.58	$1.09	$0.76	$0.82	$2.63	$2.92	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.08	$14.72	$12.42	$12.26	$12.70	$12.40	$13.31	$13.27	$13.40	$13.16	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.2%/yr	+4.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+14.2%/yr	−3.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+11.7%/yr	+39.0%/yr
Book value / share	+4.4%/yr	+1.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

97Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

5%low FY2021

Gross margin

23%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

4.8×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$150Mowner earningsvs.$56Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $150M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $142M it takes just to hold its position. It put $112M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $38M.

Reported net income$56M

Owner earnings$150M · 6% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$56M	$66M	($8M)	$14M	$46M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$142M	+$108M	+$105M	+$99M	+$85M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$18M	+$20M	+$22M	+$19M	+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$75M	+$11M	+$10M	−$25M	−$2M
Cash from operations	$292M	$206M	$130M	$107M	$148M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$142M	−$78M	−$71M	−$107M	−$61M
Owner earnings	$150M	$127M	$59M	($400K)	$87M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$112M	—	—	—	—
Free cash flow	$38M	$127M	$59M	($400K)	$87M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	6%	5%	2%	0%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $142M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $112M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $18M), owner earnings is nearer $131M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.5×

Adequate

Operating income $135M ÷ interest expense $54M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $716M · 5.3× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $75M − debt $790M

What this means
Netting $75M of cash and short-term investments against $790M of debt leaves $716M owed, about 5.3× a year's operating profit (5.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 30d

Tight

DSO 54 + DIO 1 − DPO 25 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range 3%–6%; 5% latest = NOPAT $93M ÷ invested capital $2.0B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 6%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $150M = operating cash $292M − maintenance capex $142M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median 3%)

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 9 years. It chose to put $112M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $38M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $18M of SBC) leaves $131M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 5.21×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $292M ÷ net income $56M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 16%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $24M ÷ Owner Earnings $150M

What this means
Of $150M Owner Earnings, $24M (16%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $24M buybacks. Net of $18M stock comp, the real buyback was about $6M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.79×

Expanding

Capex $254M ÷ depreciation $142M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.30×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $790M vs $152M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.41/share (latest year $0.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.87/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 5% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +9%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 0.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +2.4%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$630M

Cash & short-term investments$10M
Receivables$432M
Inventory$7M
Other current assets$181M

Current liabilities$512M

Accounts payable$124M
Other current liabilities$388M

Current ratio1.23×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.22×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$117Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+6.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($830M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($996M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$903M$79M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$114Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0

'27$62M

'28$0

'29$738M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$62Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$738Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$800Mthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $790M of debt in all

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Sep 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$877M · 55%
Buybacks$231M · 15%
Retained (debt / cash)$482M · 30%

Returned to owners$231M
28% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $231M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $231M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count21.4%
The diluted count rose from 78M to 94M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.1B61% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$476Mover 9 years buying other businesses, against $877M of capital spent building

$16M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Asplund	$5.7M	$8.0M	$87M
2022	Mr. Asplund	$10.4M	$911k	($400K)
2023	Mr. Asplund	$8.3M	$1.7M	$59M
2023	Mr. Asplund	$2.3M	$2.6M	$59M
2024	Mr. Asplund	$15.8M	$29.9M	$127M
2025	Mr. Asplund	$6.4M	$2.1M	$150M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$18M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why BrightView Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?21.4%
Diluted shares grew 21.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $231M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
WERNWerner Enterprises	$2.9B	—	8.0%	12%	5%
BDCBelden Inc	$2.7B	38%	11.1%	10%	8%
LPXLouisiana-Pacific Corporation	$2.7B	27%	18.3%	29%	11%
BVBrightView Holdings Inc.	$2.7B	25%	3.5%	4%	3%
OIIOceaneering International	$2.6B	12%	2.6%	5%	4%
GEOGeo Group Inc (The) REIT	$2.6B	—	12.2%	8%	8%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts	$2.5B	—	13.0%	4%	8%
AVOMission Produce Inc.	$1.4B	12%	5.3%	7%	4%
Group median	—	25%	9.6%	7%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what BrightView Holdings Inc. has delivered.

BrightView Holdings Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, BrightView Holdings Inc. earns about $91M on its 3.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($91M) Net of stock comp (−$18M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($80M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+34%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($53M) on 93M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $814M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($275M) runs well above depreciation ($170M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $80M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh BV against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "BrightView Holdings Inc. (BV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/BV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← BUSEP its page in the Manual BVS →

Industry order: ← BRC the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter CART →