Owner Scorecard


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CART, Maplebear Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies asset-light Cyclical

We enable more than 2,200 retail banners as of December 31, 2025 to grow by providing technology that can accelerate the digital transformation of their entire business both online and in-store.

Instacart is the leading technology and enablement partner for the grocery industry — helping consumers save time, retailers run their businesses online and in-store, and connect brands with customers.

Customers can place orders for delivery or pickup across a variety of use cases including the weekly shop, bulk stock-up, convenience, special occasions, from restaurants, and using our in-store technologies.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CART · Maplebear Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.7B
+10.8% YoY · 20% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.9B 5-yr avg $2.9B
Gross margin 73% 5-yr avg 72%
Operating margin 14.8% 5-yr avg −9.0%
ROIC 25% 5-yr avg −20%
Owner-earnings margin 23% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 23% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Transaction (72%) and Advertising and other (28%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 74% and operating margin about 2.4% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −70% to 14% — on a steadier 74% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 8.9% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 21%, above 15% in 2 of 3 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Transaction is 72% of revenue, with Advertising and other the other meaningful line at 28%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Transaction72%$2.7B
  • Advertising and other28%$1.1B
By geographyUnited States96%International4%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2021–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.8B$2.6B$3.0B$3.4B$3.7B$3.9BRevenueRevenue
67%72%75%75%74%73%Gross marginGross mgn
16%13%26%11%13%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
20%20%76%18%17%17%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($86M)$62M($2.1B)$489M$498M$570MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−4.7%2.4%−70.4%14.5%13.3%14.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($73M)$428M($1.6B)$457M$447M$485MNet incomeNet inc.
17%20%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
($204M)$277M$586M$687M$971M$941MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$16M$34M$43M$56M$91M$102MDepreciationDeprec.
($169M)($218M)($591M)($126M)$81M($12M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$13M$24M$54M$64M$61M$59MCapexCapex
0.7%0.9%1.8%1.9%1.6%1.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($217M)$253M$543M$623M$910M$882MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−11.8%9.9%17.9%18.4%24.3%22.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($217M)$253M$532M$623M$910M$882MFree cash flowFCF
−11.8%9.9%17.5%18.4%24.3%22.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$54M$93M$0$0$106M$106MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$36M$1.4B$1.4BBuybacksBuybacks
-105%22%21%25%ROICROIC
-43%15%18%20%Return on equityROE
−43%15%18%20%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.1B$1.7B$2.2B$1.4B$768M$753MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$842M$853M$1.0B$1.1B$1.1BReceivablesReceiv.
$88M$72M$80M$70M$48MAccounts payablePayables
$754M$781M$934M$1.1B$1.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.7B$3.3B$2.7B$2.2B$2.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$795M$733M$798M$917M$885MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.4×4.5×3.4×2.4×2.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$263M$317M$318M$317M$393M$393MGoodwillGoodwill
$3.7B$4.7B$4.1B$3.7B$3.5BTotal assetsAssets
($1.1B)($1.7B)($2.2B)($1.4B)($768M)($753M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($573M)($64M)$3.8B$3.1B$2.5B$2.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.2%1.3%90.6%8.9%9.4%9.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
65.9M101M131M289M280M254MShares out (diluted)Shares
$27.84$25.14$23.29$11.68$13.38$15.24Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.11$4.22$-12.42$1.58$1.60$1.91EPS (diluted)EPS
$-3.29$2.49$4.16$2.15$3.25$3.48Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-3.29$2.49$4.07$2.15$3.25$3.48Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.20$0.24$0.41$0.22$0.22$0.23Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-8.70$-0.63$28.71$10.70$9.01$9.44Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.54 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.21 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
4-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−16.7%/yr−16.7%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+2.5%/yr+2.5%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2021–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
280Mpeak FY2024
ROIC
21%low FY2023
Gross margin
74%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$910Mowner earningsvs.$447Mnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2022FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $447M of profit into $910M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$447M
Owner earnings$910M · 24% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$447M$457M($1.6B)$428M($73M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$91M+$56M+$43M+$34M+$16M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$352M+$300M+$2.8B+$33M+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$81M−$126M−$591M−$218M−$169M
Cash from operations$971M$687M$586M$277M($204M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$61M−$64M−$43M−$24M−$13M
Owner earnings$910M$623M$543M$253M($217M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$11M
Free cash flow$910M$623M$532M$253M($217M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue24%18%18%10%-12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $352M), owner earnings is nearer $558M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $637M + ST investments $50M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $687M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $81M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $768M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 110 + DIO 0 − DPO 26 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    5-yr median margin, range -12%–24%; latest $910M = operating cash $971M − maintenance capex $61M
    Industry peers: median 26%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $352M of SBC) leaves $558M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $971M ÷ net income $447M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $1.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $910M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $910M of Owner Earnings, $1.4B (152%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1.4B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $352M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.0B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.67×
    Harvesting
    Capex $61M ÷ depreciation $91M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.40×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (5-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.02/share (latest year $1.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $10.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2021–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 5
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −1% → 14% (2-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −1% early to 14% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +155%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 155% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · −70.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Further, our use of any AI-assisted coding tools that use or are based on any open source software may heighten the foregoing risks.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$690M
  • Receivables$1.1B
  • Other current assets$306M
Current liabilities$885M
  • Accounts payable$48M
  • Other current liabilities$837M
Current ratio2.36×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.36×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.78×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+13.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.4× → 2.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1.1BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$34M$34M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$230Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2021–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$216M · 9%
  • Buybacks$2.8B · 122%
  • Returned to owners$2.8B

    134% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $2.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$723M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $723M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $456M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$24.85

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 1M shares were bought for $36M, about $24.85 each.

  • Net change in share count285.0%

    The diluted count rose from 66M to 254M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023$5.3M$55.2M$543M
2024$47.8M$76.4M$623M
2025$22.3M−$48.4M$910M
2025$29.8M$31.2M$910M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio72:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$352M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 9% of revenue, equal to 71% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Maplebear Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?285.0%

    Diluted shares grew 285.0% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent $2.8B on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CPAYCorpay Inc.$4.5B98%43.9%11%37%
FOURShift4 Payments$4.2B23%1.9%-1%9%
CARTMaplebear Inc.$3.7B74%2.4%21%18%
MSCIMSCI Inc.$3.1B80%52.3%38%46%
ETSYEtsy Inc.$2.9B70%10.5%24%26%
ZZillow Group Inc. Class C Capital Stock$2.6B78%-8.9%-3%10%
EXLSExlService$2.1B86%12.5%14%12%
FICOFair Isaac$2.0B73%30.6%35%29%
Group median76%11.5%18%22%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Maplebear Inc. has delivered.

Maplebear Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Maplebear Inc. earns about $668M on its 17.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+155%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $882M on 235M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $753M. The if-converted diluted count is 254M, 8% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Maplebear Inc. (CART), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CART, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CARS its page in the Manual CASH →

Industry order: ← BV the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter CASS →