Share count
199Mpeak FY2020
← All companies ← PJT Manual PKBK → ← PENN Hotels & Resorts PLNT →
PK, Park Hotels & Resorts
We are one of the largest publicly-traded lodging real estate investment trusts with a diverse portfolio of iconic and market-leading hotels and resorts with significant underlying real estate value.
As of February 20, 2026, our portfolio consists of 34 premium-branded hotels and resorts with approximately 23,000 rooms, located in prime United States ("U.S.") markets with high barriers to entry.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$2.5B
−2.2% YoY · 24% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $2.3B
Revenue $622M −1.3% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 10.0% yr-ago 1.1%
Net income $12M yr-ago ($57M)
Net margin 1.9% yr-ago −9.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Rooms (59%) and Food and beverage (27%), with 2 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 13% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −141% and 18% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 8.3% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Rooms at 59%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Rooms59%$1.5B
- Food and beverage27%$685M
- Ancillary hotel10%$259M
- Other4%$92M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.7B | $2.8B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $852M | $1.4B | $2.5B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 3% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 7% | 5% | 3% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 3% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $419M | $371M | $504M | $426M | ($1.2B) | ($179M) | $296M | $343M | $391M | ($33M) | $22M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 15.4% | 13.3% | 18.4% | 15.0% | −141.1% | −13.1% | 11.8% | 12.7% | 15.0% | −1.3% | 0.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $133M | $2.6B | $472M | $306M | ($1.4B) | ($459M) | $162M | $97M | $212M | ($283M) | ($215M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 38% | — | 5% | 10% | — | — | 0% | 28% | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $399M | $653M | $444M | $499M | ($438M) | ($137M) | $409M | $503M | $429M | $398M | $371M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $300M | $288M | $277M | $264M | $298M | $281M | $269M | $287M | $257M | $336M | $331M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($34M) | ($2.3B) | ($321M) | ($87M) | $684M | $22M | ($39M) | $101M | ($59M) | $326M | $236M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $227M | $185M | $178M | $240M | $86M | $54M | $168M | $285M | $227M | $296M | $302M | CapexCapex |
| 8.3% | 6.6% | 6.5% | 8.4% | 10.1% | 4.0% | 6.7% | 10.6% | 8.7% | 11.6% | 11.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $172M | $468M | $266M | $259M | ($524M) | ($191M) | $241M | $218M | $202M | $102M | $69M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.3% | 16.8% | 9.7% | 9.1% | −61.5% | −14.0% | 9.6% | 8.1% | 7.8% | 4.0% | 2.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $172M | $468M | $266M | $259M | ($524M) | ($191M) | $241M | $218M | $202M | $102M | $69M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.3% | 16.8% | 9.7% | 9.1% | −61.5% | −14.0% | 9.6% | 8.1% | 7.8% | 4.0% | 2.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $11M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $180M | $386M | $464M | $494M | $241M | $0 | $7M | $152M | $512M | $280M | $199M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | $348M | $0 | $66M | $0 | $227M | $180M | $116M | $45M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 4% | 4% | 6% | 4% | -10% | -2% | 4% | 4% | 6% | -0% | — | ROICROIC |
| 3% | 44% | 8% | 5% | -29% | -10% | 4% | 3% | 6% | -9% | -7% | Return on equityROE |
| −1% | 37% | 0% | −3% | −34% | −10% | 4% | −1% | −8% | −18% | −13% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $337M | $364M | $410M | $346M | $951M | $688M | $906M | $717M | $402M | $232M | $156M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $130M | $125M | $153M | $180M | $26M | $96M | $129M | $112M | $131M | $116M | $142M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $130M | $125M | $153M | $180M | $26M | $96M | $129M | $112M | $131M | $116M | $142M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $604M | $606M | $607M | $607M | — | — | — | — | — | — | $607M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $9.8B | $9.7B | $9.4B | $11.3B | $10.6B | $9.7B | $9.7B | $9.4B | $9.2B | $7.7B | $7.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.9B | $5.2B | $4.7B | $4.6B | $3.8B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $3.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.5B | $3.5B | $4.2B | $4.0B | $3.7B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.3× | 3.0× | 4.0× | 3.0× | -5.6× | -0.8× | 1.4× | 1.7× | 1.8× | -0.2× | 0.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $3.9B | $6.0B | $5.6B | $6.5B | $4.9B | $4.5B | $4.3B | $3.8B | $3.6B | $3.1B | $3.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.6% | 2.3% | 1.4% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 198M | 214M | 204M | 213M | 236M | 236M | 228M | 215M | 209M | 199M | 200M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $13.77 | $13.04 | $13.42 | $13.35 | $3.61 | $5.77 | $10.97 | $12.55 | $12.44 | $12.77 | $12.66 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.67 | $12.27 | $2.31 | $1.44 | $-6.10 | $-1.94 | $0.71 | $0.45 | $1.01 | $-1.42 | $-1.07 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.87 | $2.19 | $1.30 | $1.22 | $-2.22 | $-0.81 | $1.06 | $1.01 | $0.97 | $0.51 | $0.34 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.87 | $2.19 | $1.30 | $1.22 | $-2.22 | $-0.81 | $1.06 | $1.01 | $0.97 | $0.51 | $0.34 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.91 | $1.80 | $2.27 | $2.32 | $1.02 | $0.00 | $0.03 | $0.71 | $2.45 | $1.41 | $0.99 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.15 | $0.86 | $0.87 | $1.13 | $0.36 | $0.23 | $0.74 | $1.33 | $1.09 | $1.49 | $1.51 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $19.56 | $28.09 | $27.61 | $30.50 | $20.73 | $18.86 | $19.03 | $17.74 | $17.44 | $15.73 | $15.44 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −0.8%/yr | +28.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −5.7%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +5.0%/yr | +6.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +2.9%/yr | +32.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | −2.4%/yr | −5.4%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−0%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
35.5×peak FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$102Mowner earningsvs.($283M)net incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $283M loss into $102M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($283M) | $212M | $97M | $162M | ($459M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$336M | +$257M | +$287M | +$269M | +$281M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$19M | +$19M | +$18M | +$17M | +$19M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$326M | −$59M | +$101M | −$39M | +$22M |
| Cash from operations | $398M | $429M | $503M | $409M | ($137M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$296M | −$227M | −$285M | −$168M | −$54M |
| Owner earnings | $102M | $202M | $218M | $241M | ($191M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 8% | 8% | 10% | -14% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer $83M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -0.2×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($33M) ÷ interest expense $209M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $232M − debt $3.9B
What this means
Netting $232M of cash and short-term investments against $3.9B of debt leaves $3.6B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -10%–6%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($26M) ÷ invested capital $6.8BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -62%–17%; latest $102M = operating cash $398M − maintenance capex $296MIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves $83M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($283M) · cash from operations $398M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $325M ÷ Owner Earnings $102M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $102M of Owner Earnings, $325M (319%) went back to shareholders, $280M dividends, $45M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $19M stock comp, the real buyback was about $26M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.88×MaintainingCapex $296M ÷ depreciation $336M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record NearUninterrupted dividends · 9 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −99%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.04/share (latest year $-1.41), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.55/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 7 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 16% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 16% early to 9% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −141.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year.
Due in the next 12 months$1.6Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$1.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.6Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$3.9Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $3.9B of debt in all
Against what the business has and earns
Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$156M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$102M
Together, against $1.6B due next year0.16×
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $258M against the $1.6B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 16% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $3.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.9B · 62%
- Dividends$2.7B · 86%
- Buybacks$982M · 31%
- Returned to owners$3.7B
305% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $2.7B as dividends and $982M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$2.5B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $2.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $3.0B to $3.9B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $982M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count1.0%
The diluted count rose from 198M to 200M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.41/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$648M8% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity19%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$11Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.9B of capital spent building
$607M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Baltimore | $9.4M | $8.2M | ($191M) |
| 2022 | Mr. Baltimore | $9.4M | −$884k | $241M |
| 2023 | Mr. Baltimore | $10.8M | $18.0M | $218M |
| 2024 | Mr. Baltimore | $10.4M | $9.2M | $202M |
| 2025 | Mr. Baltimore | $9.7M | $4.3M | $102M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio35:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$19M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Park Hotels & Resorts is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.6% vs 10.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.9% early in the record and 6.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.0B → $3.9B
Debt rose from $3.0B to $3.9B while owner earnings went from about $302M to $174M — about 10.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 22 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $1.2B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Hotels & Resorts
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CZRCaesars Entertainment Inc. | $11.5B | — | 15.7% | 5% | 5% |
| WYNNWynn Resorts Limited | $7.1B | — | 12.4% | 6% | 8% |
| PENNPENN Entertainment Inc. | $7.0B | — | 12.1% | 12% | 8% |
| BYDBoyd Gaming | $4.1B | — | 16.3% | 14% | 13% |
| PKPark Hotels & Resorts | $2.5B | — | 13.0% | 4% | 8% |
| RRRRed Rock Resorts | $2.0B | — | 24.8% | — | 13% |
| XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | 9.8% | 4% | 10% |
| SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. | $960M | — | 13.6% | 5% | 9% |
| Group median | — | — | 13.3% | 5% | 9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Park Hotels & Resorts has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Park Hotels & Resorts earns about $201M on its 7.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+57%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $69M on 201M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $3.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Park Hotels & Resorts (PK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PK, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← PJT its page in the Manual PKBK →
Industry order: ← PENN the Hotels & Resorts chapter PLNT →