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CCO, Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc.
Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. is a leading provider of out-of-home advertising solutions, offering advertisers impactful and innovative opportunities to reach mass audiences across a variety of high-traffic public spaces.
Development of our Business Historically, we have operated in the United States ("U.S.") and in certain international markets.
In 2023, we sold our businesses in Switzerland, Italy and France, which, along with our business in Spain, comprised our Europe-South segment.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 9.4% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −16% and 24% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 8.6% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 19% | 19% | 19% | 19% | 24% | 19% | 17% | 16% | 17% | 16% | 16% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $632M | $232M | $252M | $253M | ($292M) | $59M | $256M | $217M | $279M | $311M | $305M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 23.6% | 9.0% | 9.3% | 9.4% | −15.8% | 3.3% | 18.5% | 15.1% | 18.5% | 19.4% | 18.6% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $135M | ($644M) | ($218M) | ($363M) | ($583M) | ($434M) | ($97M) | ($311M) | ($179M) | $20M | ($91M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $309M | $160M | $187M | $215M | ($138M) | ($133M) | $140M | $31M | $80M | $115M | $103M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $344M | $326M | $319M | $309M | $269M | $213M | $174M | $197M | $174M | $175M | $173M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($181M) | $469M | $78M | $253M | $162M | $68M | $42M | $125M | $59M | ($106M) | ($5M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $230M | $224M | $211M | $232M | $124M | $148M | $185M | $167M | $142M | $83M | $73M | CapexCapex |
| 8.6% | 8.7% | 7.8% | 8.7% | 6.7% | 8.4% | 13.4% | 11.6% | 9.5% | 5.2% | 4.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $79M | ($64M) | ($24M) | ($18M) | ($262M) | ($282M) | ($45M) | ($135M) | ($63M) | $32M | $30M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.9% | −2.5% | −0.9% | −0.7% | −14.1% | −15.9% | −3.2% | −9.4% | −4.2% | 2.0% | 1.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $79M | ($64M) | ($24M) | ($18M) | ($262M) | ($282M) | ($45M) | ($135M) | ($63M) | $32M | $30M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 2.9% | −2.5% | −0.9% | −0.7% | −14.1% | −15.9% | −3.2% | −9.4% | −4.2% | 2.0% | 1.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | — | — | — | — | — | $62M | $12M | $27M | $563K | $563K | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $756M | $333M | $31M | $740K | $405K | — | — | — | — | — | $405K | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 11% | — | — | — | -11% | — | — | — | — | 16% | — | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $542M | $144M | $182M | $399M | $785M | $411M | $282M | $172M | $110M | $190M | $182M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $593M | $659M | $706M | $710M | $468M | $643M | $454M | $315M | $344M | $371M | $346M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $21M | $22M | $18M | $21M | $17M | — | — | — | — | — | $17M | InventoryInvent. |
| $87M | $88M | $114M | $95M | $101M | $109M | $73M | $45M | $39M | $32M | $35M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $527M | $593M | $611M | $636M | $384M | $535M | $380M | $270M | $305M | $339M | $327M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.3B | $974M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $957M | $1.7B | $793M | $734M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $642M | $658M | $730M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $884M | $1.3B | $618M | $586M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 1.5× | 1.4× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $696M | $714M | $706M | $704M | $710M | $660M | $651M | $508M | $508M | $508M | $508M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $5.7B | $4.7B | $4.5B | $6.4B | $5.8B | $5.3B | $5.1B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $3.8B | $3.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $5.2B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.2B | $5.6B | $5.7B | $5.6B | $5.7B | $5.7B | $5.1B | $5.1B | Total debtDebt |
| $4.6B | $5.2B | $5.1B | $4.8B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $5.4B | $5.5B | $5.6B | $5.0B | $5.0B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.7× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.6× | -0.8× | 0.2× | 0.8× | 0.5× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($947M) | ($1.9B) | ($2.1B) | ($2.1B) | ($2.8B) | ($3.2B) | ($3.3B) | ($3.5B) | ($3.6B) | ($3.4B) | ($3.4B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.4% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 1.1% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 1.7% | 1.6% | 1.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| $7M | $2M | — | — | $10M | — | — | — | — | — | — | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 362M | 361M | 362M | 413M | 465M | 468M | 484M | 482M | 488M | 495M | 498M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $7.41 | $7.17 | $7.52 | $6.50 | $3.99 | $3.78 | $2.86 | $2.98 | $3.09 | $3.24 | $3.30 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.37 | $-1.78 | $-0.60 | $-0.88 | $-1.25 | $-0.93 | $-0.20 | $-0.65 | $-0.37 | $0.04 | $-0.18 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.22 | $-0.18 | $-0.07 | $-0.04 | $-0.56 | $-0.60 | $-0.09 | $-0.28 | $-0.13 | $0.06 | $0.06 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.22 | $-0.18 | $-0.07 | $-0.04 | $-0.56 | $-0.60 | $-0.09 | $-0.28 | $-0.13 | $0.06 | $0.06 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $2.09 | $0.92 | $0.08 | $0.00 | $0.00 | — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.64 | $0.62 | $0.58 | $0.56 | $0.27 | $0.32 | $0.38 | $0.35 | $0.29 | $0.17 | $0.15 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-2.62 | $-5.15 | $-5.81 | $-4.97 | $-5.99 | $-6.82 | $-6.75 | $-7.16 | $-7.46 | $-6.85 | $-6.90 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −8.8%/yr | −4.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −12.6%/yr | — |
| EPS | −21.9%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | −85.7%/yr (4-yr) | −85.7%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −13.8%/yr | −8.9%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+6.6%
“Consolidated revenue increased by $98.9 million, or 6.6%, in 2025 compared to 2024, reflecting growth across both segments.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $20M of profit into $32M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $20M | ($179M) | ($311M) | ($97M) | ($434M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$175M | +$174M | +$197M | +$174M | +$213M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$26M | +$26M | +$20M | +$21M | +$19M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$106M | +$59M | +$125M | +$42M | +$68M |
| Cash from operations | $115M | $80M | $31M | $140M | ($133M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$83M | −$142M | −$167M | −$185M | −$148M |
| Owner earnings | $32M | ($63M) | ($135M) | ($45M) | ($282M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 2% | -4% | -9% | -3% | -16% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $26M), owner earnings is nearer $6M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $311M ÷ interest expense $396M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.0B · 16.0× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $190M − debt $5.1B
What this means
Netting $190M of cash and short-term investments against $5.1B of debt leaves $5.0B owed, about 16.0× a year's operating profit (16.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle3-yr median, range -11%–16%; 16% latest = NOPAT $249M ÷ invested capital $1.6BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $32M = operating cash $115M − maintenance capex $83M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median -3%)Industry peers: median 21%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a -3% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $26M of SBC) leaves $6M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $115M ÷ net income $20M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $639K ÷ Owner Earnings $32M
What this means
Of $32M Owner Earnings, $639K (2%) went back to shareholders, $405K dividends, $234K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($26M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.47×HarvestingCapex $83M ÷ depreciation $175M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.28×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $5.1B vs $175M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.31/share (latest year $0.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-6.67/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 14% → 18% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 14% early to 18% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −15.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$182M
- Receivables$346M
- Inventory$17M
- Other current assets$189M
- Debt due within a year$316K
- Accounts payable$35M
- Other current liabilities$551M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $6.5B, of which the leases are 21%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $965M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$1.7B · 181%
- Dividends$1.1B · 116%
- Returned to owners$1.1B
$1.1B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.9B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $360M.
- Net change in share count37.9%
The diluted count rose from 362M to 498M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 86% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$19M written down across 3 years (2016, 2017, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 18% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | — | $4.5M | $4.0M | ($262M) |
| 2021 | Mr. Christopher W. Eccleshare | $6.2M | $11.9M | ($282M) |
| 2022 | — | $6.0M | −$1.0M | ($45M) |
| 2023 | Mr. Wells | $4.8M | $7.1M | ($135M) |
| 2024 | — | $9.7M | $6.1M | ($63M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.
- Insider ownership7.7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio185:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$26M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 8% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?37.9%
Diluted shares grew 37.9% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $335M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Advertising & Marketing
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AKAMAkamai | $4.2B | 64% | 17.7% | 9% | 26% |
| ALLEAllegion | $4.1B | 44% | 19.4% | 23% | 15% |
| CSGPCoStar Group Inc. | $3.2B | 79% | 17.7% | 9% | 21% |
| FTAIFTAI Aviation Ltd. | $2.5B | 55% | -8.2% | -1% | -12% |
| CTOSCustom Truck One Source Inc. | $1.9B | 24% | 7.0% | 4% | 11% |
| CCOClear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. | $1.6B | — | 12.3% | 11% | -3% |
| CTEVClaritev Corporation | $965M | — | 9.9% | -1% | 22% |
| HRIHerc Holdings Inc. Common Stock | $862M | 95% | 11.2% | 6% | 31% |
| Group median | — | — | 11.7% | 8% | 18% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. has delivered.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $30M on 509M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $5.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CCNEP its page in the Manual CCOI →
Industry order: ← 4324 the Advertising & Marketing chapter CRTO →