Owner Scorecard


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CHDN, Churchill Downs

Casinos & Gaming capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Churchill Downs Racetrack is located on 175 acres and has a one-mile dirt track, a 7/8-mile turf track, a stabling area, and a variety of areas, structures, and buildings that provide reserved seating for our patrons.

The demographic profile of our guests, global television viewership, and long-running nature of this iconic event are attractive to sponsors and corporate partners, especially those with luxury and/or marquee brands.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CHDN · Churchill Downs
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.9B
+7.0% YoY · 23% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.9B 5-yr avg $2.3B
Operating margin 23.5% 5-yr avg 21.6%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 25% 5-yr avg 24%
Free cash flow margin 25% 5-yr avg 24%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Live and Historical (48%), Gaming (36%) and Wagering Services and Solutions (17%).
Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 46% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 18% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from 5.7% to 26% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 23% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Live and Historical at 48%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Live and Historical48%$1.4B
  • Gaming36%$1.0B
  • Wagering Services and Solutions17%$488M
  • Other0%$100K

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$822M$883M$1.0B$1.3B$1.1B$1.6B$1.8B$2.5B$2.7B$2.9B$2.9BRevenueRevenue
10%9%9%9%11%9%9%8%9%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$173M$146M$189M$216M$60M$284M$322M$564M$709M$684M$692MOperating incomeOp. inc.
21.0%16.5%18.7%16.2%5.7%17.8%17.8%22.9%25.9%23.4%23.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$108M$141M$353M$138M($82M)$249M$439M$417M$427M$383M$389MNet incomeNet inc.
32%13%29%28%28%26%25%28%29%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$231M$215M$198M$290M$142M$460M$511M$605M$772M$770M$818MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$109M$97M$64M$96M$93M$103M$114M$169M$199M$233M$230MDepreciationDeprec.
($4M)($50M)($240M)$32M$107M$79M($74M)($14M)$110M$124M$168MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$31M$33M$30M$83M$211M$40M$50M$78M$84M$70M$76MCapexCapex
3.8%3.8%2.9%6.2%20.0%2.5%2.8%3.2%3.1%2.4%2.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$201M$182M$168M$207M$49M$420M$461M$528M$688M$700M$742MOwner earningsOwner earn.
24.4%20.6%16.7%15.5%4.6%26.3%25.5%21.4%25.2%23.9%25.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$201M$182M$168M$207M($69M)$420M$461M$528M$688M$700M$742MFree cash flowFCF
24.4%20.6%16.7%15.5%−6.6%26.3%25.5%21.4%25.2%23.9%25.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$24M$0$207M$0$0$2.9B$241M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$19M$22M$24M$22M$23M$25M$26M$27M$29M$31M$31MDividends paidDiv. paid
$39M$181M$531M$95M$28M$298M$175M$56M$186M$428MBuybacksBuybacks
7%8%13%8%10%5%7%9%8%8%ROICROIC
16%22%75%27%-22%81%80%47%39%38%35%Return on equityROE
13%19%70%23%−29%73%75%44%37%35%33%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$45M$52M$133M$96M$67M$291M$130M$145M$176M$201M$200MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$57M$50M$29M$37M$37M$42M$82M$107M$99M$94M$99MReceivablesReceiv.
$17M$12M$12M$11MInventoryInvent.
$50M$54M$47M$58M$71M$82M$146M$159M$180M$184M$218MAccounts payablePayables
$7M($5M)($18M)($21M)($34M)($39M)($64M)($34M)($70M)($79M)($108M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$246M$256M$242M$221M$235M$502M$345M$401M$412M$443M$452MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$468M$453M$257M$301M$424M$395M$622M$756M$729M$733M$836MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.6×0.9×0.7×0.6×1.3×0.6×0.5×0.6×0.6×0.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$302M$318M$338M$367M$367M$367M$724M$900M$900M$900M$900MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.3B$2.4B$1.7B$2.6B$2.7B$3.0B$6.2B$7.0B$7.3B$7.5B$7.5BTotal assetsAssets
$928M$1.1B$896M$1.5B$1.6B$2.0B$4.6B$4.9B$4.9B$5.2B$5.2BTotal debtDebt
$882M$1.1B$763M$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$4.5B$4.7B$4.8B$5.0B$5.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.9×3.0×4.7×3.0×0.8×3.4×2.2×2.1×2.4×2.3×2.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$685M$640M$473M$508M$367M$307M$552M$894M$1.1B$1.0B$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
2.3%3.1%2.1%1.8%2.2%1.7%1.8%1.3%1.3%1.0%1.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
101M96.0M83.2M81.2M80.2M78.4M77.0M76.1M74.6M71.8M70.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$8.14$9.19$12.13$16.38$13.14$20.37$23.50$32.35$36.65$40.75$42.08Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.07$1.46$4.24$1.69$-1.02$3.18$5.71$5.48$5.72$5.33$5.56EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.99$1.89$2.02$2.55$0.61$5.36$5.98$6.93$9.22$9.74$10.59Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.99$1.89$2.02$2.55$-0.86$5.36$5.98$6.93$9.22$9.74$10.59Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.19$0.22$0.28$0.27$0.29$0.32$0.34$0.36$0.39$0.43$0.44Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.31$0.35$0.36$1.02$2.63$0.50$0.65$1.02$1.12$0.98$1.09Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.78$6.67$5.69$6.26$4.58$3.91$7.16$11.74$14.53$14.06$15.66Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+19.6%/yr+25.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+19.3%/yr+74.0%/yr
EPS+19.5%/yr
Dividends / share+9.5%/yr+8.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.8%/yr−18.0%/yr
Book value / share+8.4%/yr+25.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
72Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
8%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.1×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$700Mowner earningsvs.$383Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $383M of profit into $700M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$383M
Owner earnings$700M · 24% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$383M$427M$417M$439M$249M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$233M+$199M+$169M+$114M+$103M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$30M+$36M+$33M+$32M+$28M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$124M+$110M−$14M−$74M+$79M
Cash from operations$770M$772M$605M$511M$460M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$70M−$84M−$78M−$50M−$40M
Owner earnings$700M$688M$528M$461M$420M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue24%25%21%25%26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer $669M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $684M ÷ interest expense $298M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $5.0B · 7.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $201M − debt $5.2B
    What this means

    Netting $201M of cash and short-term investments against $5.2B of debt leaves $5.0B owed, about 7.2× a year's operating profit (7.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 5%–13%; 8% latest = NOPAT $494M ÷ invested capital $6.0B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 5%–26%; latest $700M = operating cash $770M − maintenance capex $70M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves $669M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $770M ÷ net income $383M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $459M ÷ Owner Earnings $700M
    What this means

    Of $700M Owner Earnings, $459M (66%) went back to shareholders, $31M dividends, $428M buybacks. Net of $30M stock comp, the real buyback was about $398M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.30×
    Harvesting
    Capex $70M ÷ depreciation $233M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.60×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.2B vs ($290M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +104%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.87/share (latest year $5.50), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.49/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 19% → 24% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 19% early to 24% lately, median 18% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 5.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +4.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“The Company's competitors may adopt new technologies and technological 18 advancements, such as using artificial intelligence and machine learning, to pursue new products, services and approaches more quickly, successfully, and effectively than the Company.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$452M
  • Cash & short-term investments$200M
  • Receivables$99M
  • Inventory$11M
  • Other current assets$142M
Current liabilities$836M
  • Debt due within a year$63M
  • Accounts payable$218M
  • Other current liabilities$555M
Current ratio0.54×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.53×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($384M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$63M due · $200M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($5.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.0B$39M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$173Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$63M
'27$663M
'28$1.0B
'29$1.6B
'30$1.2B
later$600M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$63Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$726Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.6Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$5.2Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$200M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$700M
Together, against $63M due next year14.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $900M against the $63M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 14 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$709M · 17%
  • Dividends$248M · 6%
  • Buybacks$2.0B · 48%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 29%
  • Returned to owners$2.3B

    63% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $248M as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $4.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $155M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$115.24

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 11M shares were bought for $1.3B, about $115.24 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $30.69 (2016) to $367.37 (2024); its heaviest year, 2025, paid $102.09 ($428M).

  • Net change in share count−30.7%

    The diluted count fell from 101M to 70M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.43/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained148%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($308M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $455M, so each retained $1 added about 1.48 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.4B46% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity89%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$3.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $709M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Carstanjen$13.8M$43.2M$420M
2022Mr. Carstanjen$12.1M$7.8M$461M
2023Mr. Carstanjen$12.2M$28.0M$528M
2024Mr. Carstanjen$15.1M$20.4M$688M
2025Mr. Carstanjen$19.2M$13.0M$700M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio573:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$30M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Churchill Downs is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$928M → $5.2B

    Debt rose from $928M to $5.2B while owner earnings went from about $184M to $638M — about 5.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 10 years, $169M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Casinos & Gaming

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FUNCedar Fair$3.1B91%14.2%-19%6%
LTHLife Time Group Holdings Inc.$3.0B47%8.9%4%7%
MTNVail Resorts Inc.$3.0B18.3%12%18%
CHDNChurchill Downs$2.9B18.3%8%23%
PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc.$1.7B18.6%16%10%
PLNTPlanet Fitness$1.3B81%28.6%16%20%
LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation$1.2B30%11.4%8%4%
MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp.$1.0B-3.4%-3%7%
Group median16.3%8%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Churchill Downs has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Churchill Downs earns about $663M on its 22.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+15%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $742M on 70M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-15; net debt $5.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Churchill Downs (CHDN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CHDN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CHD its page in the Manual CHE →

Industry order: ← CDRO the Casinos & Gaming chapter DKNG →