Share count
142Mpeak FY2023
← All companies ← LTH Manual LULU → ← LLYVK Entertainment & Studios LYV →
LUCK, Lucky Strike Entertainment Corporation
Lucky Strike Entertainment Corporation is one of the world's premier operators of location-based entertainment.
We are well-positioned in highly attractive markets across North America to capitalize on the very large addressable market for out-of-home entertainment.
Retail consists of our walk-in customers and is by far our largest and most diverse audience.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+4.0% YoY · 32% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $944M
Revenue $342M +0.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 19.2% yr-ago 18.3%
Net income $13M yr-ago $10M
Net margin 3.9% yr-ago 3.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Bowling (46%), Food & beverage (35%) and Amusement and Other (19%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 27% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −10% to 19% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 14% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Bowling at 46%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Bowling46%$550M
- Food & beverage35%$424M
- Amusement And Other19%$227M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $395M | $912M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 5% | 33% | 32% | 27% | — | 32% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 20% | 20% | 13% | 13% | 12% | 11% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($39M) | $117M | $201M | $92M | $137M | $142M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −9.8% | 12.8% | 19.0% | 7.9% | 11.4% | 11.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($126M) | ($30M) | $82M | ($84M) | ($10M) | ($84M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $58M | $178M | $218M | $155M | $177M | $138M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $92M | $107M | $109M | $145M | $157M | $136M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $90M | $50M | $11M | $79M | $9M | $73M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $43M | $162M | $149M | $194M | $141M | $114M | CapexCapex |
| 10.9% | 17.8% | 14.1% | 16.8% | 11.7% | 9.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $15M | $71M | $108M | $9M | $36M | $25M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.8% | 7.8% | 10.2% | 0.8% | 3.0% | 2.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $15M | $15M | $68M | ($39M) | $36M | $25M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 3.8% | 1.7% | 6.5% | −3.4% | 3.0% | 2.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $5M | $73M | $112M | $191M | $81M | $118M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | $17M | $33M | $34M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $31M | $96M | $254M | $72M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -7% | 13% | 14% | 8% | 7% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $187M | $132M | $196M | $67M | $60M | $326M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $8M | $10M | $11M | $13M | $16M | $15M | InventoryInvent. |
| $29M | $38M | $54M | $50M | $34M | $42M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($21M) | ($28M) | ($42M) | ($37M) | ($18M) | ($26M) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $207M | $169M | $231M | $114M | $113M | $120M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $107M | $119M | $169M | $183M | $194M | $240M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $726M | $743M | $754M | $834M | $844M | $887M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $3.1B | $3.2B | $3.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $876M | $870M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.7B | Total debtDebt |
| $688M | $738M | $952M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($276M) | ($14M) | $155M | ($177M) | ($299M) | ($363M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.8% | 5.5% | 1.5% | 1.2% | 1.8% | 1.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| 147M | 156M | 176M | 151M | 142M | 137M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.69 | $5.85 | $6.02 | $7.63 | $8.44 | $9.06 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.86 | $-0.19 | $0.47 | $-0.55 | $-0.07 | $-0.61 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.10 | $0.45 | $0.62 | $0.06 | $0.25 | $0.18 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.10 | $0.10 | $0.39 | $-0.26 | $0.25 | $0.18 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | $0.11 | $0.23 | $0.25 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.29 | $1.04 | $0.85 | $1.28 | $0.99 | $0.83 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-1.88 | $-0.09 | $0.88 | $-1.17 | $-2.10 | $-2.64 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +33.1%/yr | +33.1%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +25.4%/yr | +25.4%/yr (4-yr) |
| Dividends / share | +105.4%/yr (1-yr) | +105.4%/yr (1-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +35.5%/yr | +35.5%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
7%low FY2021
Gross margin
27%low FY2021
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
34.6×peak FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$36Mowner earningsvs.($10M)net incomelow FY2024
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2021FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $10M loss into $36M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($10M) | ($84M) | $82M | ($30M) | ($126M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$157M | +$145M | +$109M | +$107M | +$92M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$22M | +$14M | +$16M | +$50M | +$3M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$9M | +$79M | +$11M | +$50M | +$90M |
| Cash from operations | $177M | $155M | $218M | $178M | $58M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$141M | −$145M | −$109M | −$107M | −$43M |
| Owner earnings | $36M | $9M | $108M | $71M | $15M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$49M | −$40M | −$55M | — |
| Free cash flow | $36M | ($39M) | $68M | $15M | $15M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 1% | 10% | 8% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $22M), owner earnings is nearer $15M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.3B · 9.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $60M − debt $1.3B
What this means
Netting $60M of cash and short-term investments against $1.3B of debt leaves $1.3B owed, about 9.1× a year's operating profit (9.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median, range -7%–14%; 7% latest = NOPAT $69M ÷ invested capital $953MIndustry peers: median -3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle5-yr median margin, range 1%–10%; latest $36M = operating cash $177M − maintenance capex $141MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $22M of SBC) leaves $15M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($10M) · cash from operations $177M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $106M ÷ Owner Earnings $36M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $36M of Owner Earnings, $106M (292%) went back to shareholders, $33M dividends, $72M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $22M stock comp, the real buyback was about $51M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.90×MaintainingCapex $141M ÷ depreciation $157M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.58×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.3B vs ($82M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (5-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 2 of 5 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.03/share (latest year $-0.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 5
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → 10% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 10% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 11%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −15%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 15% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · −9.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 29, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$120M
- Cash & short-term investments$71M
- Receivables$327K
- Inventory$15M
- Other current assets$34M
Current liabilities$240M
- Debt due within a year$10M
- Accounts payable$42M
- Other current liabilities$189M
Current ratio0.50×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.44×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.29×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($120M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$10M due · $71M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 29, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($3.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.4B$606M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $2.6B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$15Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$117Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$3.1Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.3Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$1.3B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.3B
Total fixed claims on the business$2.6B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $2.6B, of which the leases are 50%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jun 29, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $786M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$690M · 88%
- Dividends$51M · 6%
- Buybacks$454M · 58%
- Returned to owners$505M
210% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $51M as dividends and $454M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$409M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $409M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $876M to $1.7B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $116M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $454M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−6.6%
The diluted count fell from 147M to 137M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.23/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 105% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$890M28% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$461Mover 5 years buying other businesses, against $690M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$22M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 16% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Lucky Strike Entertainment Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.9% vs 5.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.8% early in the record and 1.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$876M → $1.7B
Debt rose from $876M to $1.7B while owner earnings went from about $65M to $51M — about 14 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 34 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 5 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 5 years, $66M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Entertainment & Studios
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FUNCedar Fair | $3.1B | 91% | 14.2% | -19% | 6% |
| PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc. | $1.7B | — | 18.6% | 16% | 10% |
| PLNTPlanet Fitness | $1.3B | 81% | 28.6% | 16% | 20% |
| SPHRSphere Entertainment Co. | $1.2B | — | -21.3% | -6% | -10% |
| LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation | $1.2B | 30% | 11.4% | 8% | 4% |
| MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp. | $1.0B | — | -3.4% | -3% | 7% |
| MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. | $863M | — | 12.6% | 13% | — |
| BATRAAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series A | $732M | — | -5.6% | -3% | -10% |
| Group median | — | 81% | 12.0% | 3% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Lucky Strike Entertainment Corporation has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Lucky Strike Entertainment Corporation earns about $46M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−15%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $25M on 137M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $1.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Lucky Strike Entertainment Corporation (LUCK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LUCK, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← LTH its page in the Manual LULU →
Industry order: ← LLYVK the Entertainment & Studios chapter LYV →