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MSGS, Madison Square Garden Sports Corp.

Casinos & Gaming capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. owns and operates a portfolio of assets featuring some of the most recognized teams in all of sports, including the New York Knickerbockers of the National Basketball Association and the New York Rangers of the National Hockey League.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MSGS · Madison Square Garden Sports Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.0B

+1.2% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.1B 5-yr avg $838M

Operating margin −2.4% 5-yr avg 3.4%

Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 9%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Event-related (45%) and Media rights (27%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 14% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −4.3%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Event-related at 45%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Event-related45%$463M
Media rights27%$286M
Sponsorship, signage and suite licenses22%$230M
League Distribution6%$61M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.1B	$1.3B	$712M	$729M	$603M	$416M	$821M	$887M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.1B	RevenueRevenue
30%	31%	41%	45%	53%	50%	28%	28%	25%	26%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($59M)	($56M)	($18M)	($58M)	($94M)	($78M)	$86M	$85M	$146M	$15M	($26M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−5.3%	−4.3%	−2.6%	−8.0%	−15.6%	−18.9%	10.5%	9.6%	14.2%	1.4%	−2.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($77M)	($73M)	$142M	$11M	($182M)	($14M)	$51M	$48M	$59M	($22M)	($22M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	—	—	—	33%	48%	44%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$126M	$224M	$218M	$161M	$4M	($35M)	$178M	$152M	$92M	$92M	$55M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$102M	$107M	$122M	$119M	$93M	$6M	$5M	$4M	$3M	$3M	$3M	DepreciationDeprec.
$76M	$148M	($94M)	($29M)	$36M	($57M)	$98M	$76M	$9M	$93M	$52M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$72M	$44M	$192M	$189M	$362M	$466K	$932K	$1M	$1M	$4M	$2M	CapexCapex
6.4%	3.4%	26.9%	25.9%	60.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%	0.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$54M	$179M	$26M	($28M)	($359M)	($36M)	$177M	$151M	$91M	$88M	$53M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.8%	13.6%	3.6%	−3.8%	−59.5%	−8.6%	21.6%	17.0%	8.8%	8.5%	4.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$54M	$179M	$26M	($28M)	($359M)	($36M)	$177M	$151M	$91M	$88M	$53M	Free cash flowFCF
4.8%	13.6%	3.6%	−3.8%	−59.5%	−8.6%	21.6%	17.0%	8.8%	8.5%	4.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$192M	$8M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$171M	$701K	$633K	$472K	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$106M	$148M	$12M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-4%	-2%	-1%	-2%	-114%	-72%	—	—	—	—	—	ROICROIC
-3%	-3%	6%	0%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
											Balance sheet
$1.4B	$931K	$1M	$113M	$78M	$65M	$91M	$40M	$89M	$145M	$438M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$76M	$102M	$101M	$16M	$7M	$74M	$47M	—	—	—	$81M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$14M	$24M	$29M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$11M	—	—	—	$8M	Accounts payablePayables
$62M	$78M	$72M	$15M	$5M	$72M	$36M	—	—	—	$73M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$128M	$185M	$205M	$149M	$217M	$251M	$296M	Current assetsCur. assets
$615M	$762M	$766M	$760M	$290M	$368M	$438M	$521M	$522M	$564M	$638M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×	1.9×	1.8×	1.9×	0.4×	0.5×	0.5×	0.3×	0.4×	0.4×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$277M	$380M	$393M	$227M	$227M	$227M	$227M	$227M	$227M	$227M	$227M	GoodwillGoodwill
$3.5B	$3.7B	$3.7B	$3.8B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Total assetsAssets
—	$105M	$106M	$6M	$350M	$355M	$220M	$295M	$275M	$267M	$247M	Total debtDebt
—	$105M	$105M	($107M)	$272M	$290M	$129M	$255M	$186M	$122M	($191M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-28.9×	-13.4×	-5.2×	-11.7×	-21.0×	-7.4×	7.3×	3.7×	5.3×	0.7×	-1.2×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.6B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$2.6B	($207M)	($204M)	($147M)	($337M)	($266M)	($281M)	($295M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.2%	3.1%	6.7%	8.2%	9.4%	7.3%	3.0%	2.8%	2.1%	1.7%	2.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
24.8M	23.9M	23.8M	23.9M	23.9M	24.1M	24.4M	24.2M	24.1M	24.1M	24.1M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$45.06	$55.27	$29.88	$30.52	$25.20	$17.23	$33.66	$36.68	$42.63	$43.14	$44.68	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-3.12	$-3.05	$5.94	$0.48	$-7.62	$-0.58	$2.10	$1.98	$2.44	$-0.93	$-0.92	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.18	$7.52	$1.08	$-1.15	$-14.99	$-1.48	$7.26	$6.25	$3.76	$3.65	$2.19	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.18	$7.52	$1.08	$-1.15	$-14.99	$-1.48	$7.26	$6.25	$3.76	$3.65	$2.19	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$7.06	$0.03	$0.03	$0.02	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.90	$1.85	$8.05	$7.90	$15.14	$0.02	$0.04	$0.05	$0.06	$0.15	$0.07	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$104.48	$100.96	$106.37	$109.64	$-8.65	$-8.47	$-6.03	$-13.94	$-11.05	$-11.68	$-12.23	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−0.5%/yr	+11.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+5.9%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−28.0%/yr	−60.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income-89.9%
“Operating income For the year ended June 30, 2025, operating income decreased $131,230, or 90%, to $14,808 as compared to the prior year. The decrease in operating income was primarily due to higher direct operating expenses and, to a lesser extent, higher selling, general and administrative expenses, partially offset by higher revenues.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

24Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

−72%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$88Mowner earningsvs.($22M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $22M loss into $88M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($22M)	$59M	$48M	$51M	($14M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$3M	+$3M	+$4M	+$5M	+$6M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$18M	+$21M	+$25M	+$24M	+$30M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$93M	+$9M	+$76M	+$98M	−$57M
Cash from operations	$92M	$92M	$152M	$178M	($35M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$4M	−$1M	−$1M	−$932K	−$466K
Owner earnings	$88M	$91M	$151M	$177M	($36M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	8%	9%	17%	22%	-9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $18M), owner earnings is nearer $70M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.7×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $15M ÷ interest expense $22M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $20M · 1.4× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $145M + ST investments $108M − debt $273M

What this means
Netting $253M of cash and short-term investments against $273M of debt leaves $20M owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (18.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not meaningful here

Invested capital ($153M) = debt $273M + equity ($281M) − cash

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
Invested capital is near zero or negative, usually years of buybacks pulling equity down. ROIC explodes or flips sign and stops meaning anything. Judge this one on Owner Earnings instead.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $88M = operating cash $92M − maintenance capex $4M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 5%)

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $18M of SBC) leaves $70M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $92M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($22M) · cash from operations $92M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 1%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $633K ÷ Owner Earnings $88M

What this means
Of $88M Owner Earnings, $633K (1%) went back to shareholders, $633K dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.13×

Maintaining

Capex $4M ÷ depreciation $3M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.45×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $273M vs ($312M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.16/share (latest year $-0.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-11.65/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −4% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −4% early to 8% lately, median −4% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −3%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 3% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −18.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.3%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$296M

Cash & short-term investments$438M
Receivables$81M

Current liabilities$638M

Debt due within a year$5M
Accounts payable$8M
Other current liabilities$625M

Current ratio0.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.46×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.69×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($342M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $438M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.4× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($522M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$909M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $1.2B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$103Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$54M

'27$60M

'28$62M

'29$64M

'30$65M

later$2.1B

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$54Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$2.4Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$894Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$273M

Lease obligations (present value)$894M

Total fixed claims on the business$1.2B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $1.2B, of which the leases are 77%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jun 30, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$867M · 72%
Dividends$172M · 14%
Buybacks$266M · 22%

Returned to owners$438M
127% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $172M as dividends and $266M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$94M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $94M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: cash and short-term investments drew down $1.0B.
Average price paid for buybacks$168.46
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $254M, about $168.46 each.
Net change in share count−2.4%
The diluted count fell from 25M to 24M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.03/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Lustgarten	$6.5M	$8.0M	($36M)
2022	Lustgarten	$8.3M	$7.6M	$177M
2023	Dolan	$11.0M	$14.5M	$151M
2023	Lustgarten	$12.0M	$12.6M	$151M
2024	Dolan	$10.2M	$10.1M	$91M
2025	Dolan	$13.2M	$14.9M	$88M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio212:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$18M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 121% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 3 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Casinos & Gaming

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MTNVail Resorts Inc.	$3.0B	—	18.3%	12%	18%
PRKSUnited Parks & Resorts Inc.	$1.7B	—	18.6%	16%	10%
PLNTPlanet Fitness	$1.3B	81%	28.6%	16%	20%
LUCKLucky Strike Entertainment Corporation	$1.2B	30%	11.4%	8%	4%
MSGSMadison Square Garden Sports Corp.	$1.0B	—	-3.4%	-3%	7%
MSGEMadison Square Garden Entertainment Corp.	$863M	—	12.6%	13%	—
BATRAAtlanta Braves Holdings Inc. Series A	$732M	—	-5.6%	-3%	-10%
PRSUPursuit Attractions and Hospitality Inc.	$452M	91%	6.3%	4%	2%
Group median	—	—	12.0%	10%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. has delivered.

Madison Square Garden Sports Corp.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. earns about $69M on its 6.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($69M) Net of stock comp (−$21M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+6%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $53M on 24M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $191M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MSGS against another business →

The owners of MSGS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Madison Square Garden Sports Corp. (MSGS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MSGS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MSGE its page in the Manual MSI →

Industry order: ← MSGE the Casinos & Gaming chapter MTN →