Owner Scorecard


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CHKP, Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.

Software asset-light

Our solutions deliver leading protection across infrastructure, to make sure organizations are protected from AI-driven attacks.

The Check Point Mission Securing Our Customers' AI Transformation We are constantly doing the hard work of getting our solutions ready to enable a secure AI transformation.

We continually modify and improve our security platform services by: Regularly updating our security solutions to defend against the full spectrum of evolving threats.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · US listing is the ordinary share
CHKP · Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.7B
+6.3% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.7B 5-yr avg $2.4B
Gross margin 87% 5-yr avg 88%
Operating margin 30.5% 5-yr avg 36.3%
ROIC 77% 5-yr avg 40%
Owner-earnings margin 43% 5-yr avg 45%
Free cash flow margin 43% 5-yr avg 45%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Security Subscriptions (45%) and Software updates and maintenance (35%), with 2 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 88% and operating margin about 42% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 25%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 54% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Security Subscriptions at 45%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Security Subscriptions45%$1.2B
  • Software updates and maintenance35%$958M
  • Network Security Gateways19%$506M
  • Other2%$42M
By geographyEMEA43%Americas42%Asia Pacific12%Israel3%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$1.7B$1.9B$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.3B$2.4B$2.6B$2.7B$2.7BRevenueRevenue
88%89%89%89%89%88%87%88%88%87%87%Gross marginGross mgn
$852M$924M$914M$882M$904M$908M$884M$899M$876M$831M$831MOperating incomeOp. inc.
48.9%49.8%47.7%44.2%43.8%41.9%38.0%37.2%34.2%30.5%30.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$725M$803M$821M$826M$847M$816M$797M$840M$846M$1.1B$840MNet incomeNet inc.
19%17%16%14%13%14%14%14%13%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$949M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$11M$13M$16M$17M$19M$21M$23M$23M$24M$25M$25MDepreciationDeprec.
$214M$294M$306M$262M$296M$368M$279M$175M$183M$118M$334MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$24M$29M$17M$26M$19M$16M$22M$19M$24M$27M$27MCapexCapex
1.4%1.6%0.9%1.3%0.9%0.7%0.9%0.8%0.9%1.0%1.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$938M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$1.2BOwner earningsOwner earn.
53.9%59.1%58.8%54.5%55.3%54.8%46.2%42.2%40.1%43.0%43.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$925M$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$1.2BFree cash flowFCF
53.1%58.3%58.8%54.1%55.3%54.8%46.2%42.2%40.1%43.0%43.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$988M$995M$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4BBuybacksBuybacks
21%23%22%23%25%26%28%34%33%77%77%ROICROIC
21%22%22%23%24%25%27%30%30%37%29%Return on equityROE
21%22%22%23%24%25%27%30%30%37%29%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$187M$245M$304M$279M$256M$272M$196M$538M$506M$1.8B$2.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$479M$472M$495M$496M$541M$598M$644M$658M$729M$769M$769MReceivablesReceiv.
$20M$12M$21M$16M$18M$10M$30M$48M$55M$28M$28MAccounts payablePayables
$458M$460M$475M$480M$523M$588M$615M$609M$674M$742M$742MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.9B$2.0B$2.3B$2.1B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$2.3B$2.2B$4.0B$4.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.6×1.7×1.5×1.5×1.4×1.3×1.2×1.1×2.0×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$812M$812M$951M$982M$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.6B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9BGoodwillGoodwill
$5.2B$5.5B$5.8B$5.8B$5.8B$5.9B$5.7B$5.7B$5.8B$7.8B$7.8BTotal assetsAssets
($187M)($245M)($304M)($279M)($256M)($272M)($196M)($538M)($506M)($1.8B)($2.5B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$3.5B$3.6B$3.8B$3.6B$3.5B$3.3B$2.9B$2.8B$2.8B$2.9B$2.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
173M167M159M152M142M134M126M118M113M110M106MShares out (diluted)Shares
$10.05$11.13$12.02$13.12$14.54$16.16$18.44$20.40$22.62$24.80$25.81Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.18$4.82$5.15$5.43$5.96$6.08$6.31$7.10$7.46$9.62$7.96EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.41$6.58$7.07$7.15$8.04$8.86$8.52$8.61$9.07$10.67$11.11Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.34$6.49$7.07$7.09$8.04$8.86$8.52$8.61$9.07$10.67$11.11Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.14$0.17$0.11$0.17$0.14$0.12$0.17$0.16$0.21$0.24$0.25Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$20.15$21.61$23.67$23.46$24.41$24.29$23.19$23.84$24.60$26.22$27.29Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.6%/yr+11.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.8%/yr+5.8%/yr
EPS+9.7%/yr+10.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.4%/yr+12.2%/yr
Book value / share+3.0%/yr+1.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
110Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
77%low FY2016
Gross margin
87%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.2Bowner earningsvs.$1.1Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.1B of profit into $1.2B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.1B
Owner earnings$1.2B · 43% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.1B$846M$840M$797M$816M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$25M+$24M+$23M+$23M+$21M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$118M+$183M+$175M+$279M+$368M
Cash from operations$1.2B$1.1B$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$27M−$24M−$19M−$22M−$16M
Owner earnings$1.2B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue43%40%42%46%55%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash, debt-free
    Cash $1.8B + ST investments $695M − debt $0
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.5B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 103 + DIO 0 − DPO 28 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median -6%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 40%–59%; latest $1.2B = operating cash $1.2B − maintenance capex $27M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 43% of revenue this year, a 54% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.2B ÷ net income $840M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $1.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $1.2B of Owner Earnings, $1.4B (119%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1.4B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.07×
    Maintaining
    Capex $27M ÷ depreciation $25M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.05×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +17%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.66/share (latest year $7.96), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $27.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Operating margin 49% → 34% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 49% early to 34% lately, median 42% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 30.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −4.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Industry developments and evolving technology, such as AI, may also impact our competitive landscape and the factors required to compete effectively in current or prospective markets.”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.5B
  • Receivables$769M
  • Other current assets$699M
Current liabilities$1.9B
  • Accounts payable$28M
  • Other current liabilities$1.9B
Current ratio2.05×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.05×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.29×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$959Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($960M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$12M$12M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1.5Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $11.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$223M · 2%
  • Buybacks$12.2B · 111%
  • Returned to owners$12.2B

    113% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $12.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$1.4B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $12.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−39.1%

    The diluted count fell from 173M to 106M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.9B25% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity66%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $223M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?41.8% vs 57.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 57.3% early in the record and 41.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
HUBSHubSpot Inc.$3.1B81%-6.5%-6%13%
OKTAOkta Inc.$2.9B72%-30.8%-8%7%
PTCPTC Inc.$2.7B79%21.1%10%19%
CHKPCheck Point Software Technologies Ltd.$2.7B88%42.8%25%54%
ANSSAnsys Inc.$2.5B87%31.7%13%30%
NTNXNutanix$2.5B79%-26.6%-190%-1%
DBXDropbox$2.5B79%1.5%-1%29%
MDBMongoDB Inc.$2.5B73%-34.1%-19%-5%
Group median79%-2.5%-4%16%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. earns about $1.5B on its 54.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 43.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.2B on 106M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $2.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. (CHKP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CHKP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CHA its page in the Manual CHT →

Industry order: ← CGNT the Software chapter CLBT →