Share count
562Mpeak FY2025
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COMP, Compass Inc.
Our technology offerings provide a strong foundation for real estate professionals and empower them to deliver exceptional service to their clients, grow their businesses, save time, and manage their businesses more effectively.
Model Following the Anywhere Merger, we are a global real estate services company with a presence in every major U.S. city and approximately 120 countries and territories and we operate a portfolio of some of the most recognized and iconic brands.
In 2025, we operated our owned-brokerage business primarily under the Compass brand and our franchise business under the Christie's International Real Estate brand.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$7.0B
+23.7% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.3B 5-yr avg $6.0B
Revenue $2.7B +99.4% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −13.0% yr-ago −4.0%
Net income $22M yr-ago ($51M)
Net margin 0.8% yr-ago −3.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −7.3% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −95%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $2.4B | $3.7B | $6.4B | $6.0B | $4.9B | $5.6B | $7.0B | $8.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| ($388M) | ($270M) | ($494M) | ($602M) | ($321M) | ($154M) | ($59M) | $15M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| ($347M) | ($219M) | ($430M) | ($515M) | ($231M) | ($72M) | $54M | $261M | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| — | $1.4B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $8.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | -455.5× | -205.4× | -163.7× | -29.2× | -24.2× | -7.0× | -8.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($682M) | ($863M) | $844M | $517M | $429M | $409M | $782M | $2.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 320M | 330M | 326M | 428M | 467M | 502M | 562M | 823M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $-1.09 | $-0.66 | $-1.32 | $-1.20 | $-0.50 | $-0.14 | $0.10 | $0.32 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $-2.13 | $-2.62 | $2.59 | $1.21 | $0.92 | $0.82 | $1.39 | $3.42 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2021 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×1.46 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +8.8%/yr | +1.9%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −31.6%/yr | −28.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
−9%low FY2022
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -7.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($63M) ÷ interest expense $9M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $199M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $199M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest $203M = operating cash $217M − maintenance capex $13M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median -1%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $203M of SBC) leaves $600K.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($59M) · cash from operations $217M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.12×HarvestingCapex $13M ÷ depreciation $113M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $7.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.24/share (latest year $-0.08), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −11% → −3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −11% early to −3% lately, median −7% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Worst year 2019 · −16.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The adoption of AI technologies within the real estate industry has introduced, and will likely continue to introduce, increased risk of disintermediation, as future AI technologies might be able to provide direct access to information or capabilities that currently require assistance of real estate professionals.…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$1.1B
- Cash & short-term investments$484M
- Receivables$180M
- Other current assets$399M
Current liabilities$1.3B
- Accounts payable$96M
- Other current liabilities$1.2B
Current ratio0.84×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.84×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.38×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($199M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+99.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.8× → 0.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($2.8B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.9B$767M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $454M (annual-report basis)
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$124Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$533Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$454Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$0
Lease obligations (present value)$454M
Total fixed claims on the business$454M
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $454M, of which the leases are 100%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$673M44% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity61%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$410Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $278M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Robert Reffkin | $89.9M | $29.4M | ($79M) |
| 2022 | Robert Reffkin | $411k | −$86.4M | ($362M) |
| 2023 | Robert Reffkin | $7.7M | $4.6M | ($37M) |
| 2024 | Robert Reffkin | $15.0M | $21.8M | $106M |
| 2025 | Robert Reffkin | $10.7M | $28.6M | $203M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio112:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$203M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Real Estate Development & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CWKCushman & Wakefield Ltd. | $10.3B | — | 2.2% | 4% | 1% |
| COMPCompass Inc. | $7.0B | — | -7.3% | -95% | -1% |
| VACMarriott Vacations Worldwide Corporation | $5.0B | 68% | 10.4% | 6% | 6% |
| AGNTAGNT Inc. | $4.8B | 11% | -0.4% | -14% | 5% |
| OPENOpendoor Technologies Inc | $4.4B | 8% | -6.4% | -20% | -1% |
| NMRKNewmark Group Inc. | $3.3B | — | 10.4% | 14% | -2% |
| INVHInvitation Homes Inc. | $2.7B | — | 11.2% | 1% | 37% |
| MMIMarcus & Millichap Inc. | $755M | 38% | 11.3% | 24% | 6% |
| Group median | — | — | 6.3% | 3% | 3% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Compass Inc. has delivered.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+92%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2024+92%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $16M on 747M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $2.7B. The if-converted diluted count is 823M, 10% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($20M) runs well above depreciation ($247M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $23M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Compass Inc. (COMP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/COMP, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← COLM its page in the Manual CON →
Industry order: ← CIGI the Real Estate Development & Services chapter CRESY →