Share count
51Mpeak FY2025
← All companies ← CRESY Manual CRNT → ← CHRW Trucking & Logistics CVLG →
CRGO, Freightos Limited
Our SaaS solutions focus on providing a comprehensive suite of freight rate management, freight quoting and freight booking solutions for freight forwarders, as well as freight procurement and market intelligence solutions used by both enterprise shippers as well as freight forwarders.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (" UNCTAD "), the value of goods exported internationally reached $24.4 trillion in 2024, representing approximately 22% of global gross domestic product (" GDP ").
International trade is facilitated by the third-party logistics market, which, according to logistics research firm Armstrong & Associates, generated $1.22 trillion dollars in revenue in 2024. 1 Despite its size and importance, global freight has not yet undergone a comprehensive digital transformation.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$29M
+23.9% YoY · 28% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $29M 5-yr avg $21M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Subscriptions (61%), Transactional Platforms Fees (34%) and SaaS Related Professional Services (5%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −147% through the cycle on a 59% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −85%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Subscriptions is 61% of revenue, with Transactional Platforms Fees the other meaningful line at 34%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Subscriptions61%$18M
- Transactional Platforms Fees34%$10M
- SaaS Related Professional Services5%$2M
By geographyUnited States37%Europe30%Hong Kong SAR China17%Other15%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $9M | $11M | $19M | $20M | $24M | $29M | $29M | RevenueRevenue |
| 50% | 59% | 59% | 58% | 65% | 67% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($14M) | ($16M) | ($24M) | ($78M) | ($23M) | ($19M) | ($19M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −163.8% | −147.1% | −127.2% | −383.6% | −96.5% | −65.0% | −65.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($14M) | ($16M) | ($25M) | ($65M) | ($22M) | ($18M) | ($18M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($8M) | ($17M) | ($15M) | ($27M) | ($12M) | ($9M) | ($9M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1M | $1M | $2M | $3M | $3M | $3M | $3M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $5M | ($2M) | $7M | $36M | $7M | $5M | $5M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $56K | $181K | $251K | $80K | $48K | $135K | $135K | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($8M) | ($18M) | ($15M) | ($27M) | ($12M) | ($9M) | ($9M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −97.9% | −157.5% | −79.4% | −134.0% | −51.1% | −30.6% | −30.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($8M) | ($18M) | ($15M) | ($27M) | ($12M) | ($9M) | ($9M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −97.9% | −157.5% | −79.4% | −134.0% | −51.1% | −30.6% | −30.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | -131% | — | -118% | -40% | -51% | -51% | ROICROIC |
| -77% | -47% | -1488% | -91% | -41% | -41% | -41% | Return on equityROE |
| −77% | −47% | n/m | −91% | −41% | −41% | −41% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $22M | $25M | $7M | $32M | $10M | $13M | $25M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $2M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $4M | $4M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $2M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $4M | $4M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $37M | $13M | $60M | $46M | $36M | $36M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $16M | $17M | $14M | $17M | $17M | $17M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.3× | 0.8× | 4.4× | 2.7× | 2.2× | 2.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $8M | $16M | $16M | $15M | $15M | $15M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $54M | $42M | $88M | $74M | $63M | $63M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($22M) | ($25M) | ($7M) | ($32M) | ($10M) | ($13M) | ($25M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -81.0× | -104.8× | -53.5× | -201.0× | -128.9× | -71.5× | -71.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $18M | $35M | $2M | $72M | $55M | $43M | $43M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 5.9M | 6.2M | 7.9M | 44.9M | 48.6M | 50.6M | 51.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.43 | $1.78 | $2.41 | $0.45 | $0.49 | $0.58 | $0.57 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-2.38 | $-2.62 | $-3.11 | $-1.46 | $-0.46 | $-0.35 | $-0.34 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.40 | $-2.80 | $-1.91 | $-0.61 | $-0.25 | $-0.18 | $-0.18 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.40 | $-2.80 | $-1.91 | $-0.61 | $-0.25 | $-0.18 | $-0.18 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.03 | $0.03 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $3.11 | $5.59 | $0.21 | $1.60 | $1.13 | $0.85 | $0.84 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×5.66 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −16.5%/yr | −16.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −22.3%/yr | −22.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | −22.9%/yr | −22.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−51%low FY2021
Gross margin
67%low FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($9M)owner earningsvs.($18M)net incomelow FY2023
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $18M loss into ($9M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($18M) | ($22M) | ($65M) | ($25M) | ($16M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$3M | +$3M | +$3M | +$2M | +$1M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$5M | +$7M | +$36M | +$7M | −$2M |
| Cash from operations | ($9M) | ($12M) | ($27M) | ($15M) | ($17M) |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$135K | −$48K | −$80K | −$251K | −$181K |
| Owner earnings | ($9M) | ($12M) | ($27M) | ($15M) | ($18M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -31% | -51% | -134% | -79% | -157% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -71.5×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($19M) ÷ interest expense $268K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $13M + ST investments $12M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $25M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 19%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -157%–-31%; latest ($9M) = operating cash ($9M) − maintenance capex $135KIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -31% of revenue this year, a -98% median across 6 years.
- Loss, and burning cashNet income ($18M) · cash from operations ($9M)
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.04×HarvestingCapex $135K ÷ depreciation $3M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $29M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.16×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.68/share (latest year $-0.34), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −146% → −182% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
The recent-years average (−182%) sits below the early years (−146%), but the latest year (−65%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −147% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Worst year 2023 · −383.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our competitors, including new "AI-native" entrants and established tech giants, may be able to respond more quickly and effectively than we can to new or changing opportunities, technologies, standards, or customer requirements, particularly in their deployment and integration of AI technologies by developing systems …”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$36M
- Cash & short-term investments$25M
- Receivables$4M
- Other current assets$7M
Current liabilities$17M
- Other current liabilities$17M
Current ratio2.16×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.16×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.48×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$19Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway2.8 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$21Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Deferred revenue$3Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$22M34% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity35%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 6 years buying other businesses, against $751K of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Peers, Trucking & Logistics
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BKNGBooking Holdings Inc. | $26.9B | 99% | 30.8% | 30% | 33% |
| CHRWC.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. | $16.2B | 92% | 5.0% | 23% | 4% |
| EXPEExpedia Group Inc. | $14.7B | 82% | 6.9% | 11% | 15% |
| FWRDForward Air Corporation | $2.5B | 52% | 7.8% | 15% | 7% |
| CRGOFreightos Limited | $29M | 59% | -137.1% | -85% | -89% |
| Group median | — | 82% | 6.9% | 15% | 7% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Freightos Limited reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
Freightos Limited is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
$
The assumptions
Revenue, delivered28%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−31%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Freightos Limited (CRGO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CRGO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← CRESY its page in the Manual CRNT →
Industry order: ← CHRW the Trucking & Logistics chapter CVLG →