Owner Scorecard


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CVLG, Covenant Logistics Group Inc.

Trucking & Logistics capital-intensive Cyclical

A logistics business, moving goods across a network of assets and partners.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CVLG · Covenant Logistics Group Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.2B
+2.9% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.2B 5-yr avg $1.1B
Operating margin 0.1% 5-yr avg 5.2%
ROIC 0% 5-yr avg 9%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 4%
Free cash flow margin −1% 5-yr avg −2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 4.0% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −1.7% and 10% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 13% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on volume, density and yield. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$671M$705M$880M$885M$839M$1.0B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2BRevenueRevenue
$32M$28M$55M$9M($14M)$67M$121M$59M$45M$3M$2MOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.8%4.0%6.3%1.0%−1.7%6.4%9.9%5.3%4.0%0.3%0.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
$17M$55M$43M$8M($43M)$61M$109M$55M$36M$7M$5MNet incomeNet inc.
38%26%22%26%24%24%23%14%14%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$102M$83M$125M$64M$63M$73M$159M$85M$123M$114M$118MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$72M$72M$76M$81M$65M$54M$58M$70M$87M$93M$95MDepreciationDeprec.
$13M($45M)$6M($25M)$40M($50M)($14M)($47M)($3M)$10M$14MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$113M$111M$75M$138M$94M$35M$100M$218M$153M$148M$126MCapexCapex
16.8%15.7%8.5%15.6%11.2%3.4%8.3%19.7%13.5%12.7%10.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$31M$10M$50M($16M)($2M)$38M$102M$15M$36M$21M$23MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.6%1.5%5.6%−1.9%−0.3%3.6%8.4%1.3%3.2%1.8%1.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($10M)($28M)$50M($74M)($31M)$38M$59M($133M)($30M)($34M)($8M)Free cash flowFCF
−1.5%−4.0%5.6%−8.4%−3.7%3.6%4.8%−12.0%−2.7%−2.9%−0.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$106M$0$0$0$39M$108M$5M$27M$27MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$4M$6M$6M$7M$7MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$17M$10M$85M$25M$0$37MBuybacksBuybacks
5%6%8%1%-3%13%21%7%5%0%0%ROICROIC
7%19%12%2%-15%17%29%14%8%2%1%Return on equityROE
17%28%12%7%0%−0%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$8M$15M$23M$44M$8M$8M$69M$2M$36M$5M$11MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$97M$104M$151M$81M$91M$142M$120M$143M$142M$152M$156MReceivablesReceiv.
$13M$12M$22M$20M$32M$30M$34M$33M$32M$45M$50MAccounts payablePayables
$84M$92M$129M$62M$60M$112M$86M$109M$110M$106M$105MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$135M$162M$212M$254M$148M$189M$223M$186M$214M$233M$211MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$88M$81M$127M$161M$133M$143M$156M$170M$181M$210M$202MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×2.0×1.7×1.6×1.1×1.3×1.4×1.1×1.2×1.1×1.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$0$42M$43M$43M$43M$58M$76M$79M$80M$80MGoodwillGoodwill
$621M$650M$774M$882M$677M$652M$797M$954M$998M$1.0B$1.0BTotal assetsAssets
$194M$189M$202M$267M$80M$46M$137M$245M$251M$298M$254MTotal debtDebt
$186M$174M$179M$223M$72M$37M$69M$242M$216M$293M$242MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$236M$295M$343M$350M$291M$350M$377M$403M$438M$404M$408MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.9%0.5%0.6%0.3%0.3%0.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
18.3M18.4M18.5M18.6M17.4M17.0M31.0M27.7M27.7M26.9M26.4MShares out (diluted)Shares
$36.72$38.37$47.67$47.51$48.31$61.46$39.19$39.89$40.83$43.27$45.48Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.92$3.02$2.30$0.45$-2.46$3.57$3.50$2.00$1.30$0.27$0.19EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.69$0.57$2.69$-0.88$-0.14$2.23$3.28$0.54$1.31$0.78$0.87Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.57$-1.52$2.69$-3.98$-1.79$2.23$1.89$-4.80$-1.08$-1.26$-0.29Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.14$0.21$0.21$0.27$0.27Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6.18$6.03$4.07$7.42$5.42$2.07$3.24$7.86$5.52$5.48$4.75Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.94$16.07$18.58$18.79$16.74$20.55$12.15$14.58$15.82$15.01$15.42Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.82 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+1.8%/yr−2.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−8.2%/yr
EPS−12.8%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.3%/yr+0.2%/yr
Book value / share+1.7%/yr−2.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
27Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
0%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
14.0×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$21Mowner earningsvs.$7Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $21M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $93M it takes just to hold its position. It put $55M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($34M).

Reported net income$7M
Owner earnings$21M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$7M$36M$55M$109M$61M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$93M+$87M+$70M+$58M+$54M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$4M+$4M+$7M+$7M+$9M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$10M−$3M−$47M−$14M−$50M
Cash from operations$114M$123M$85M$159M$73M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$93M−$87M−$70M−$58M−$35M
Owner earnings$21M$36M$15M$102M$38M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$55M−$66M−$148M−$43M
Free cash flow($34M)($30M)($133M)$59M$38M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%3%1%8%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $93M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $55M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $4M), owner earnings is nearer $17M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $293M · 99.8× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $5M − debt $298M
    What this means

    Netting $5M of cash and short-term investments against $298M of debt leaves $293M owed, about 99.8× a year's operating profit (101.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -3%–21%; 0% latest = NOPAT $3M ÷ invested capital $697M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $21M = operating cash $114M − maintenance capex $93M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. It chose to put $55M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($34M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves $17M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $114M ÷ net income $7M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $44M ÷ Owner Earnings $21M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $21M of Owner Earnings, $44M (209%) went back to shareholders, $7M dividends, $37M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $4M stock comp, the real buyback was about $33M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.59×
    Expanding
    Capex $148M ÷ depreciation $93M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.11×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $298M vs $23M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −14%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.31/share (latest year $0.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.11/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 5% early to 3% lately, median 4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −1.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$211M
  • Cash & short-term investments$11M
  • Receivables$156M
  • Other current assets$44M
Current liabilities$202M
  • Debt due within a year$52M
  • Accounts payable$50M
  • Other current liabilities$100M
Current ratio1.04×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.04×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$9Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$52M due · $11M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$225Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($398M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$289M$35M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $991M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.2B · 120%
  • Dividends$23M · 2%
  • Buybacks$175M · 18%
  • Returned to owners$198M

    70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $23M as dividends and $175M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$392M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $392M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $194M to $254M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $175M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count44.7%

    The diluted count rose from 18M to 26M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.27/sh

    Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−4%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($151M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $6M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.04 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$186M18% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity20%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$284Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$11M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$5.8M$9.0M$38M
2022$2.1M$4.9M$102M
2023$1.4M$6.2M$15M
2024$2.0M$3.0M$36M
2025$1.8M$1.8M$21M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership22.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$4M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 122% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Covenant Logistics Group Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.1% vs 3.9%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.9% early in the record and 2.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?44.7%

    Diluted shares grew 44.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $175M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$194M → $254M

    Debt rose from $194M to $254M while owner earnings went from about $30M to $24M — about 6.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$529M · 44% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “Our top ten customers accounted for approximately 44% and 45% of our total revenue in 2025 and 2024, respectively.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Trucking & Logistics

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LSTRLandstar$4.7B6.9%48%5%
ARCBArcBest$4.0B3.4%10%4%
SAIASaia, Inc.$3.2B10.4%14%10%
WERNWerner Enterprises$2.9B8.0%12%5%
ULHUniversal Logistics Holdings Inc.$1.6B5.8%10%3%
CVLGCovenant Logistics Group Inc.$1.2B4.4%6%3%
MRTNMarten Transport$884M8.8%11%
HTLDHeartland Express Inc.$806M14.2%12%3%
Group median7.4%11%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Covenant Logistics Group Inc. has delivered.

Covenant Logistics Group Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Covenant Logistics Group Inc. earns about $29M on its 2.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−20%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($8M) on 25M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $242M. The if-converted diluted count is 26M, 5% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($126M) runs well above depreciation ($95M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $25M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Covenant Logistics Group Inc. (CVLG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CVLG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CVI its page in the Manual CVLT →

Industry order: ← CRGO the Trucking & Logistics chapter EXPD →