Owner Scorecard


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CTEV, Claritev Corporation

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-outCyclical

Claritev Corporation is a technology, data and insights company focused on improving transparency, affordability and quality across the healthcare system.

Claritev brings objective, market-based insights to some of the healthcare system's most complex decisions - grounded in decades of claims experience.

Claritev helps address these challenges by providing solutions and services that deliver objective, data-driven insights that support greater alignment between payers and providers, which improves affordability and fairness and helps patients and members avoid getting caught in the middle of disconnected decisions or unexpected costs.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CTEV · Claritev Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$965M
+3.7% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $979M 5-yr avg $1.0B
Operating margin 2.6% 5-yr avg −25.7%
Owner-earnings margin −4% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin −4% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Claims Intelligence Solutions (66%), Network Solutions (21%) and Payment and Revenue Integrity Solutions (12%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 13% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 3.0% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −149% and 41% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 22% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Claims Intelligence Solutions is 66% of revenue, with Network Solutions the other meaningful line at 21%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Claims Intelligence Solutions66%$640M
  • Network Solutions21%$207M
  • Payment and Revenue Integrity Solutions12%$119M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.0B$983M$938M$1.1B$1.1B$962M$931M$965M$979MRevenueRevenue
7%8%38%14%15%15%16%23%24%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$428M$368M($132M)$386M($363M)$162M($1.4B)$29M$26MOperating incomeOp. inc.
41.1%37.5%−14.1%34.5%−33.6%16.8%−149.4%3.0%2.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$36M$10M($521M)$102M($573M)($92M)($1.6B)($284M)($287M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$292M$284M$377M$405M$372M$172M$108M$117M$102MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$52M$56M$61M$65M$69M$77M$88M$102M$102MDepreciationDeprec.
$199M$234M$431M$220M$860M$168M$1.6B$272M$257MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$64M$66M$71M$85M$90M$109M$118M$130M$138MCapexCapex
6.1%6.8%7.6%7.6%8.3%11.3%12.7%13.4%14.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$229M$218M$307M$320M$283M$63M($11M)($12M)($36M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
22.0%22.2%32.7%28.6%26.2%6.5%−1.1%−1.3%−3.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$229M$218M$307M$320M$283M$63M($11M)($12M)($36M)Free cash flowFCF
22.0%22.2%32.7%28.6%26.2%6.5%−1.1%−1.3%−3.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$140M$0$0$0$0$5M$5MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$101M$100M$0$15M$10M$0BuybacksBuybacks
-1%4%-5%2%-24%ROICROIC
2%0%-20%4%-32%-5%-1959%Return on equityROE
2%0%−20%4%−32%−5%n/mRetained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$5M$22M$127M$185M$334M$72M$17M$17M$21MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$77M$63M$100M$79M$77M$90M$128M$141MReceivablesReceiv.
$10M$15M$13M$13M$20M$86M$60M$59MAccounts payablePayables
$68M$48M$87M$66M$57M$3M$67M$82MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$116M$209M$319M$447M$194M$176M$224M$242MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$86M$112M$142M$176M$167M$214M$261M$190MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.9×2.2×2.5×1.2×0.8×0.9×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.1B$4.1B$4.3B$4.4B$3.7B$3.8B$2.4B$2.4B$2.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$8.4B$8.3B$8.2B$7.4B$7.0B$5.2B$4.9B$4.8BTotal assetsAssets
$5.4B$4.6B$5.0B$4.8B$4.6B$4.6B$4.6B$4.6BTotal debtDebt
$5.4B$4.5B$4.8B$4.5B$4.5B$4.6B$4.6B$4.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.1×1.0×-0.4×1.4×-1.2×0.5×-4.3×0.1×0.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.0B$2.0B$2.6B$2.3B$1.8B$1.7B$84M($174M)($241M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%−1.5%43.3%1.6%1.6%1.9%2.9%2.9%2.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
10.4M10.4M11.8M16.3M16.0M16.1M16.1M16.4M16.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$100.16$94.58$79.68$68.61$67.60$59.62$57.63$58.74$58.64Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.49$0.93$-44.23$6.27$-35.87$-5.69$-101.92$-17.30$-17.16EPS (diluted)EPS
$22.01$20.97$26.05$19.65$17.69$3.90$-0.65$-0.75$-2.15Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$22.01$20.97$26.05$19.65$17.69$3.90$-0.65$-0.75$-2.15Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$6.12$6.39$6.02$5.19$5.62$6.75$7.32$7.89$8.24Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$191.52$191.02$217.33$143.95$112.10$105.97$5.20$-10.58$-14.45Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/40 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−7.3%/yr−5.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.7%/yr+5.6%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Payment and Revenue Integrity Solutions+7.5%
    “Payment and revenue integrity solutions revenues increased $8.3 million, or 7.5%, for the year ended December 31, 2025, as compared to the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase was primarily due to an increase in our Clinical Review and Payment Accuracy solution, partially offset by a decrease in our Revenue Integrity solution.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
16Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−24%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
72.2×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($12M)owner earningsvs.($284M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $284M loss into ($12M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($284M)($1.6B)($92M)($573M)$102M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$102M+$88M+$77M+$69M+$65M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$28M+$27M+$18M+$17M+$18M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$272M+$1.6B+$168M+$860M+$220M
Cash from operations$117M$108M$172M$372M$405M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$130M−$118M−$109M−$90M−$85M
Owner earnings($12M)($11M)$63M$283M$320M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-1%-1%7%26%29%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $28M), owner earnings is nearer ($40M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $29M ÷ interest expense $392M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.6B · 160.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $17M − debt $4.6B
    What this means

    Netting $17M of cash and short-term investments against $4.6B of debt leaves $4.6B owed, about 160.3× a year's operating profit (160.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -24%–4%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -1%–33%; latest ($12M) = operating cash $117M − maintenance capex $130M
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -1% of revenue this year, a 22% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves ($40M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($284M) · cash from operations $117M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.27×
    Expanding
    Capex $130M ÷ depreciation $102M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $965M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.6B vs ($37M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (8-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-39.53/share (latest year $-16.68), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-10.20/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 21% → −43% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 21% early to −43% lately, median 3% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2024 · −149.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Evolving industry standards and rapid technological changes, including the adoption and further development of artificial intelligence, could result in reduced demand for our products and solutions.”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$242M
  • Cash & short-term investments$21M
  • Receivables$141M
  • Other current assets$80M
Current liabilities$190M
  • Debt due within a year$15M
  • Accounts payable$59M
  • Other current liabilities$116M
Current ratio1.28×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.28×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$53Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$15M due · $21M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($4.4B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.8B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.7B$20M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$732M · 34%
  • Buybacks$227M · 11%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.2B · 55%
  • Returned to owners$227M

    16% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $227M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $227M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count60.6%

    The diluted count rose from 10M to 17M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.3B88% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equitygoodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$145Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $732M of capital spent building

$2.1B written down across 2 years (2022, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$9.0M$6.5M$320M
2022$10.7M$2.1M$283M
2022$2.6M$2.4M$283M
2023$7.6M$11.6M$63M
2024$11.7M$4.8M($11M)
2024$1.5M−$6.3M($11M)
2025$10.2M$25.8M($12M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio140:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$28M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 97% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Claritev Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

2 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.4% vs 25.6%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 25.6% early in the record and 1.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?60.6%

    Diluted shares grew 60.6% over 2018–2025, even as the company spent $227M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GPNGlobal Payments Inc.$7.7B59%16.0%4%25%
AKAMAkamai$4.2B64%17.7%9%26%
ALLEAllegion$4.1B44%19.4%23%15%
CSGPCoStar Group Inc.$3.2B79%17.7%9%21%
CTOSCustom Truck One Source Inc.$1.9B24%7.0%4%11%
CCOClear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc.$1.6B12.3%11%-3%
CTEVClaritev Corporation$965M9.9%-1%22%
HRIHerc Holdings Inc. Common Stock$862M95%11.2%6%31%
Group median14.1%8%22%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Claritev Corporation has delivered.

Claritev Corporation’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, a cyclical trough. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Claritev Corporation earns about $213M on its 22.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −1.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ($36M) on 17M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $4.6B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Claritev Corporation (CTEV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CTEV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CTBI its page in the Manual CTKB →

Industry order: ← CTAS the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter CURR →