Owner Scorecard


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GPN, Global Payments Inc.

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive Serial acquirer

Payments technology industry provides financial institutions, businesses and consumers with payment processing services, merchant acceptance solutions and related business management software and value-added services.

We are a leading payments technology company delivering innovative software and services to our customers globally, with worldwide reach spanning North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and Latin America.

Our technologies, services and team member expertise allow us to provide a broad range of solutions that enable our customers to operate their businesses more efficiently across a variety of channels around the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
GPN · Global Payments Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$7.7B
−0.4% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.9B 5-yr avg $8.1B
Gross margin 67% 5-yr avg 66%
Operating margin 15.4% 5-yr avg 17.8%
Owner-earnings margin 12% 5-yr avg 26%
Free cash flow margin 12% 5-yr avg 26%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 40% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 8 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 58% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from 7.1% to 26% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 25% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.9B$4.0B$3.4B$4.9B$7.4B$8.5B$9.0B$7.4B$7.7B$7.7B$8.9BRevenueRevenue
60%51%67%58%51%56%58%72%74%73%67%Gross marginGross mgn
46%37%46%42%39%40%39%52%52%53%55%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$425M$559M$737M$791M$894M$1.4B$640M$1.3B$2.0B$1.8B$1.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
14.7%14.1%21.9%16.1%12.0%15.9%7.1%17.8%25.5%22.8%15.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$272M$468M$452M$431M$585M$965M$111M$986M$1.6B$1.4B($706M)Net incomeNet inc.
21%15%13%12%15%60%16%13%15%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$593M$512M$1.1B$1.4B$2.3B$2.8B$2.2B$2.5B$3.1B$2.7B$1.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$188M$451M$523M$878M$1.6B$1.7B$1.7B$1.1B$1.2B$1.2B$1.8BDepreciationDeprec.
$103M($446M)$73M($7M)($34M)($57M)$307M$213M$106M($126M)$581MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$92M$182M$213M$308M$436M$493M$616M$658M$675M$618M$752MCapexCapex
3.2%4.6%6.3%6.3%5.9%5.8%6.9%8.9%8.7%8.0%8.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$501M$330M$893M$1.1B$1.9B$2.3B$1.6B$1.9B$2.4B$2.0B$1.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
17.3%8.3%26.5%22.1%25.3%26.8%18.1%25.6%30.8%26.5%12.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$501M$330M$893M$1.1B$1.9B$2.3B$1.6B$1.9B$2.4B$2.0B$1.1BFree cash flowFCF
17.3%8.3%26.5%22.1%25.3%26.8%18.1%25.6%30.8%26.5%12.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$563M$1.3B$645M$161M$1.8B$66M$4.2B$487M$352M$1.7BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$5M$7M$6M$63M$233M$260M$274M$260M$253M$239M$246MDividends paidDiv. paid
$35M$208M$311M$631M$2.5B$2.9B$418M$1.6B$1.2BBuybacksBuybacks
6%8%8%2%2%3%1%3%5%4%ROICROIC
10%12%11%2%2%4%0%4%7%6%-3%Return on equityROE
10%12%11%1%1%3%−1%3%6%5%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.0B$1.3B$1.2B$1.7B$1.9B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.4B$8.3B$5.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$275M$302M$348M$895M$794M$946M$998M$1.1B$788M$784M$1.4BReceivablesReceiv.
$28M$47M$76M$148M$129M$262M$229M$290M$254M$278M$3.7BAccounts payablePayables
$247M$254M$272M$747M$665M$684M$769M$830M$533M$506M($2.3B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.1B$4.3B$3.4B$4.4B$4.6B$4.7B$6.3B$8.1B$6.0B$12.6B$11.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.9B$3.8B$3.3B$3.6B$4.5B$4.5B$6.9B$8.1B$6.3B$7.5B$14.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.1×1.0×1.2×1.0×1.1×0.9×1.0×1.0×1.7×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.8B$5.7B$6.3B$23.8B$23.9B$24.8B$23.3B$26.7B$17.0B$17.1B$27.1BGoodwillGoodwill
$10.7B$13.0B$13.2B$44.5B$44.2B$45.3B$44.8B$50.6B$46.9B$53.3B$64.3BTotal assetsAssets
$4.5B$4.7B$5.2B$9.1B$9.3B$11.5B$13.5B$16.4B$16.3B$21.6B$23.5BTotal debtDebt
$3.4B$3.4B$4.0B$7.4B$7.3B$9.5B$11.5B$14.3B$14.0B$13.2B$17.7BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$2.6B$3.8B$4.0B$27.9B$27.3B$25.6B$22.3B$23.0B$22.3B$22.9B$23.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.1%1.0%1.7%1.8%2.0%2.1%1.8%2.8%2.1%2.0%1.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$833M$33M$33MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
133M156M159M199M301M294M276M262M255M242M273MShares out (diluted)Shares
$21.76$25.56$21.14$24.67$24.70$29.03$32.57$28.20$30.36$31.84$32.41Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.04$3.01$2.84$2.16$1.95$3.29$0.40$3.77$6.16$5.79$-2.58EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.76$2.12$5.61$5.44$6.25$7.79$5.91$7.23$9.35$8.42$3.88Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.76$2.12$5.61$5.44$6.25$7.79$5.91$7.23$9.35$8.42$3.88Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.04$0.04$0.04$0.32$0.78$0.88$0.99$1.00$0.99$0.99$0.90Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.69$1.17$1.34$1.55$1.45$1.68$2.23$2.51$2.65$2.55$2.75Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.76$24.40$25.06$139.88$90.95$87.27$80.93$87.88$87.43$94.58$87.08Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.51 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.3%/yr+5.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+9.4%/yr+6.2%/yr
EPS+12.3%/yr+24.4%/yr
Dividends / share+42.4%/yr+4.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.7%/yr+12.0%/yr
Book value / share+19.0%/yr+0.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
242Mpeak FY2020
ROIC
4%low FY2022
Gross margin
73%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.5×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.0Bowner earningsvs.$1.4Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.4B of profit into $2.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.4B
Owner earnings$2.0B · 26% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$1.4B$1.6B$986M$111M$965M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$1.2B+$1.2B+$1.1B+$1.7B+$1.7B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$154M+$164M+$209M+$163M+$181M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$126M+$106M+$213M+$307M−$57M
Cash from operations$2.7B$3.1B$2.5B$2.2B$2.8B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$618M−$675M−$658M−$616M−$493M
Owner earnings$2.0B$2.4B$1.9B$1.6B$2.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue26%31%26%18%27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $154M), owner earnings is nearer $1.9B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $1.8B ÷ interest expense $17M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $13.2B · 7.6× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $8.3B − debt $21.6B
    What this means

    Netting $8.3B of cash and short-term investments against $21.6B of debt leaves $13.2B owed, about 7.6× a year's operating profit (12.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 37 + DIO 1 − DPO 48 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 1%–8%; 4% latest = NOPAT $1.5B ÷ invested capital $36.1B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–31%; latest $2.0B = operating cash $2.7B − maintenance capex $618M
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 25% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $154M of SBC) leaves $1.9B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.7B ÷ net income $1.4B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $1.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.0B
    What this means

    Of $2.0B Owner Earnings, $1.4B (70%) went back to shareholders, $239M dividends, $1.2B buybacks. Net of $154M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.0B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.50×
    Harvesting
    Capex $618M ÷ depreciation $1.2B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $7.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.69×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $21.6B vs $5.1B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +232%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.82/share (latest year $5.12), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $83.68/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 17% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 17% early to 22% lately, median 16% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +20%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 20% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 7.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$11.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$5.9B
  • Receivables$1.4B
  • Inventory$5M
  • Other current assets$4.4B
Current liabilities$14.7B
  • Debt due within a year$832M
  • Accounts payable$3.7B
  • Other current liabilities$10.2B
Current ratio0.79×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.79×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($3.1B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$832M due · $5.9B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+63.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 0.8×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($23.5B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($27.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$23.9B$364M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$204Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $19.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$4.3B · 22%
  • Dividends$1.6B · 8%
  • Buybacks$9.8B · 51%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$3.5B · 18%
  • Returned to owners$11.4B

    76% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.6B as dividends and $9.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $19.0B and cash and short-term investments rose $4.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$128.40

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 76M shares were bought for $9.8B, about $128.40 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $90.43 (2025) to $191.03 (2020); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $125.56 ($2.9B).

  • Net change in share count105.2%

    The diluted count rose from 133M to 273M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.99/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 42% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$21.3B40% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity75%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$9.6Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $4.3B of capital spent building

$866M written down across 2 years (2022, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Cameron Beady$23.3M−$5.9M$2.3B
2022Cameron Beady$22.3M$14.2M$1.6B
2023Cameron Beady$22.0M$28.6M$1.9B
2023Cameron Beady$16.0M$24.4M$1.9B
2024Cameron Beady$17.2M$10.0M$2.4B
2025Cameron Beady$20.3M$6.5M$2.0B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$154M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 9% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Global Payments Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?105.2%

    Diluted shares grew 105.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $9.8B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$4.5B → $23.5B

    Debt rose from $4.5B to $23.5B while owner earnings went from about $575M to $2.1B — about 7.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?9% → 16% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $275M to $1.4B while revenue grew 206%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (9% of revenue then, 16% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $940M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FIFiserv Inc$21.2B87%26.3%8%21%
URIUnited Rentals$16.1B40%24.4%11%31%
GPNGlobal Payments Inc.$7.7B59%16.0%4%25%
EQPTEquipmentShare.com Inc$4.4B28%6.8%6%-1%
AKAMAkamai$4.2B64%17.7%9%26%
ALLEAllegion$4.1B44%19.4%23%15%
CSGPCoStar Group Inc.$3.2B79%17.7%9%21%
CTEVClaritev Corporation$965M9.9%-1%22%
Group median59%17.7%9%22%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Global Payments Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Global Payments Inc. earns about $2.0B on its 25.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+20%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $1.1B on 274M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $17.7B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($752M) runs well above depreciation ($1.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.2B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Global Payments Inc. (GPN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GPN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GPK its page in the Manual GPOR →

Industry order: ← GETY the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter GRAB →