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CZR, Caesars Entertainment Inc.

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

In addition to the Caesars Sportsbook app, we have a partnership with NYRABets LLC, the official online wagering platform of the New York Racing Association, Inc., and operate the Caesars Racebook app in 22 states.

Our consolidated business is composed of complementary businesses that reinforce, cross-promote, and build upon each other: casino, which includes our casino properties, retail and online sports betting and iGaming, food and beverage, hotel, casino management or branding, entertainment, retail and other business operations.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CZR · Caesars Entertainment Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$11.5B

+2.1% YoY · 26% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $11.6B 5-yr avg $10.9B

Operating margin 16.2% 5-yr avg 17.9%

Owner-earnings margin 5% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 5% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Casino (58%) and Hotel (17%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 15% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −11% and 21% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Casino at 58%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Casino58%$6.6B
Hotel17%$1.9B
Food and beverage15%$1.7B
Other11%$1.2B
Real Estate1%$128M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$900M	$1.5B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$3.6B	$9.6B	$10.8B	$11.5B	$11.2B	$11.5B	$11.6B	RevenueRevenue
15%	16%	19%	20%	25%	19%	19%	17%	17%	17%	17%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$89M	$95M	$310M	$410M	($383M)	$1.5B	$1.7B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.9%	6.4%	15.1%	16.2%	−10.6%	15.3%	16.1%	21.4%	20.5%	16.2%	16.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$25M	$73M	$95M	$81M	($1.8B)	($1.0B)	($899M)	$786M	($278M)	($502M)	($485M)	Net incomeNet inc.
35%	—	30%	35%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$95M	$130M	$323M	$313M	($561M)	$1.2B	$993M	$1.8B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$63M	$106M	$157M	$222M	$583M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	DepreciationDeprec.
$7M	($49M)	$71M	$10M	$613M	$1.1B	$687M	($238M)	$29M	$387M	$366M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$43M	$83M	$147M	$171M	$164M	$520M	$952M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$805M	$750M	CapexCapex
4.8%	5.6%	7.1%	6.8%	4.5%	5.4%	8.8%	11.0%	11.5%	7.0%	6.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$52M	$47M	$176M	$142M	($725M)	$679M	$41M	$545M	($221M)	$497M	$538M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
5.8%	3.2%	8.6%	5.6%	−20.0%	7.1%	0.4%	4.7%	−2.0%	4.3%	4.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$52M	$47M	$176M	$142M	($725M)	$679M	$41M	$545M	($221M)	$497M	$538M	Free cash flowFCF
5.8%	3.2%	8.6%	5.6%	−20.0%	7.1%	0.4%	4.7%	−2.0%	4.3%	4.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$1.3B	$0	$0	$6.4B	—	—	—	—	—	$6.4B	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	$9M	$0	$0	—	$0	$0	$191M	$229M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
6%	—	5%	8%	-2%	—	—	—	—	—	—	ROICROIC
8%	8%	9%	7%	-35%	-23%	-24%	17%	-7%	-14%	-14%	Return on equityROE
8%	8%	9%	7%	−35%	−23%	−24%	17%	−7%	−14%	−14%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$61M	$152M	$248M	$241M	$1.8B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$866M	$887M	$903M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$15M	$46M	$60M	$54M	$342M	$472M	$611M	$608M	$470M	$476M	$441M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$11M	$17M	$21M	$18M	$44M	$42M	$59M	$46M	$45M	$43M	$47M	InventoryInvent.
$22M	$35M	$59M	$62M	$167M	$254M	$314M	$408M	$296M	$297M	$258M	Accounts payablePayables
$4M	$28M	$22M	$10M	$219M	$260M	$356M	$246M	$219M	$222M	$230M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$102M	$251M	$573M	$605M	$6.1B	$6.0B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$1.7B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$102M	$224M	$402M	$688M	$2.5B	$5.3B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.1B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	1.1×	1.4×	0.9×	2.4×	1.1×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$67M	$747M	$1.0B	$910M	$9.9B	$11.1B	$11.0B	$11.0B	$10.6B	$10.4B	$10.4B	GoodwillGoodwill
$1.3B	$3.5B	$5.9B	$5.6B	$36.4B	$38.0B	$33.5B	$33.4B	$32.6B	$31.6B	$31.7B	Total assetsAssets
$800M	$2.2B	$3.3B	$2.6B	$14.1B	$13.8B	$12.8B	$12.3B	$12.1B	$11.8B	$11.8B	Total debtDebt
$739M	$2.0B	$3.0B	$2.3B	$12.4B	$12.7B	$11.7B	$11.3B	$11.3B	$10.9B	$10.9B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.7×	1.0×	1.8×	1.4×	-0.3×	0.6×	0.8×	1.0×	0.9×	0.8×	0.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$296M	$942M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$5.0B	$4.5B	$3.7B	$4.6B	$4.2B	$3.5B	$3.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	$35M	$10M	—	$100M	$102M	$78M	$14M	$182M	$160M	$160M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
47.7M	68.1M	78.0M	79.0M	130M	211M	214M	216M	215M	208M	204M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$18.88	$21.74	$26.36	$32.00	$27.91	$45.36	$50.57	$53.37	$52.30	$55.22	$56.68	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.51	$1.08	$1.22	$1.03	$-13.52	$-4.83	$-4.20	$3.64	$-1.29	$-2.41	$-2.38	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.09	$0.69	$2.26	$1.79	$-5.58	$3.22	$0.19	$2.52	$-1.03	$2.39	$2.64	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.09	$0.69	$2.26	$1.79	$-5.58	$3.22	$0.19	$2.52	$-1.03	$2.39	$2.64	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.91	$1.22	$1.88	$2.16	$1.26	$2.46	$4.45	$5.85	$6.03	$3.87	$3.68	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.20	$13.83	$13.19	$14.14	$38.58	$21.23	$17.35	$21.07	$19.33	$16.85	$16.75	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1.43 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.65 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.62 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+12.7%/yr	+14.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+9.1%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	+17.5%/yr	+25.1%/yr
Book value / share	+11.7%/yr	−15.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

208Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

−2%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

21.9×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$497Mowner earningsvs.($502M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $502M loss into $497M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($502M)	($278M)	$786M	($899M)	($1.0B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.4B	+$1.3B	+$1.3B	+$1.2B	+$1.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$387M	+$29M	−$238M	+$687M	+$1.1B
Cash from operations	$1.3B	$1.1B	$1.8B	$993M	$1.2B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$805M	−$1.3B	−$1.3B	−$952M	−$520M
Owner earnings	$497M	($221M)	$545M	$41M	$679M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	-2%	5%	0%	7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.8×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $1.9B ÷ interest expense $2.3B

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $10.9B · 5.8× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $887M + ST investments $35M − debt $11.8B

What this means
Netting $922M of cash and short-term investments against $11.8B of debt leaves $10.9B owed, about 5.8× a year's operating profit (6.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

4-yr median, range -2%–8%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -20%–9%; latest $497M = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $805M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? $1.3B

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($502M) · cash from operations $1.3B

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 46%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $229M ÷ Owner Earnings $497M

What this means
Of $497M Owner Earnings, $229M (46%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $229M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.57×

Harvesting

Capex $805M ÷ depreciation $1.4B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $11.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $11.8B vs ($450M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −97%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.01/share (latest year $-2.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.20/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 10% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 10% early to 19% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +12%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −10.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.8B

Cash & short-term investments$903M
Receivables$441M
Inventory$47M
Other current assets$409M

Current liabilities$2.1B

Debt due within a year$114M
Accounts payable$258M
Other current liabilities$1.7B

Current ratio0.85×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.83×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.43×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($318M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$114M due · $903M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($11.0B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($26.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$12.5B$742M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$546Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$114M

'27$114M

'28$805M

'29$1.6B

'30$4.0B

later$5.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$114Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$228Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$4.0Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$11.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$903M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$497M

Together, against $114M due next year12.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.4B against the $114M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 12 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$5.4B · 82%
Buybacks$429M · 6%
Retained (debt / cash)$804M · 12%

Returned to owners$429M
35% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $429M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $11.0B and cash and short-term investments rose $842M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $429M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count327.7%
The diluted count rose from 48M to 204M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$14.4B46% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$7.7Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.4B of capital spent building

$681M written down across 8 years (2017, 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Reeg	$22.6M	$35.5M	$679M
2022	Mr. Reeg	$31.3M	−$15.8M	$41M
2023	Mr. Reeg	$18.6M	$15.4M	$545M
2024	Mr. Reeg	$18.4M	$8.1M	($221M)
2025	Mr. Reeg	$17.2M	$6.7M	$497M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Caesars Entertainment Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

All 5 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.4% vs 5.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.8% early in the record and 2.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?327.7%
Diluted shares grew 327.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $429M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$800M → $11.8B
Debt rose from $800M to $11.8B while owner earnings went from about $92M to $274M — about 8.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 43 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?3% → 4% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $26M to $488M while revenue grew 1184%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (3% of revenue then, 4% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $1.7B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MGMMGM Resorts International	$17.5B	—	12.1%	13%	8%
LVSLas Vegas Sands Corp.	$13.0B	—	21.9%	16%	16%
CZRCaesars Entertainment Inc.	$11.5B	—	15.7%	5%	5%
WYNNWynn Resorts Limited	$7.1B	—	12.4%	6%	8%
PENNPENN Entertainment Inc.	$7.0B	—	12.1%	12%	8%
BYDBoyd Gaming	$4.1B	—	16.3%	14%	13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts	$2.5B	—	13.0%	4%	8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts	$2.0B	—	24.8%	—	13%
Group median	—	—	14.3%	12%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Caesars Entertainment Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Caesars Entertainment Inc. earns about $520M on its 4.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($520M) Net of stock comp

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−21%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $538M on 204M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $10.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CZR against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Caesars Entertainment Inc. (CZR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CZR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CZNC its page in the Manual D →

Industry order: ← CVEO the Hotels & Resorts chapter EXPE →