Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← CVCO Manual CVI → ← CHH Hotels & Resorts CZR →

CVEO, Civeo Corporation (Canada)

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

We do so for the convenience of our shareholders and in an effort to provide information available in the market that will assist our investors in having a better understanding of the market environment in which we operate.

We provide hospitality services to remote workforces in Australia and Canada, including catering and food service, lodging, housekeeping and maintenance at accommodation facilities that we or our customers own.

We provide services that support the day-to-day operations of these facilities, such as laundry, facility management and maintenance, water and wastewater treatment, power generation, communication systems, security and logistics.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
CVEO · Civeo Corporation (Canada)
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$639M
−6.3% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $667M 5-yr avg $663M
Gross margin 24% 5-yr avg 24%
Operating margin 1.9% 5-yr avg 2.0%
ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 0% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Australia (72%) and Canada (28%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −9.3% through the cycle on a 24% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Australia is 72% of revenue, with Canada the other meaningful segment at 28%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Australia72%$460M
  • Canada28%$179M
  • Other0%$0

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$397M$382M$467M$528M$530M$594M$697M$701M$682M$639M$667MRevenueRevenue
26%24%22%24%24%Gross marginGross mgn
14%17%14%11%10%10%10%10%11%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($96M)($98M)($88M)($49M)($147M)$6M$17M$39M$1M$4M$13MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−24.1%−25.6%−18.9%−9.3%−27.8%1.0%2.4%5.6%0.2%0.6%1.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($96M)($106M)($82M)($58M)($134M)$1M$4M$30M($17M)($20M)($14M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$62M$57M$54M$74M$117M$89M$92M$97M$84M$22M$21MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$131M$126M$126M$124M$97M$83M$87M$75M$68M$73M$74MDepreciationDeprec.
$27M$36M$11M$9M$155M$4M$562K($9M)$33M($30M)($39M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$20M$11M$17M$30M$10M$16M$25M$32M$26M$20M$19MCapexCapex
5.0%2.9%3.7%5.7%1.9%2.6%3.6%4.5%3.8%3.2%2.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$42M$46M$37M$45M$107M$73M$66M$65M$57M$2M$2MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.7%11.9%8.0%8.5%20.3%12.3%9.5%9.3%8.4%0.3%0.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$42M$46M$37M$45M$107M$73M$66M$65M$57M$2M$2MFree cash flowFCF
10.7%11.9%8.0%8.5%20.3%12.3%9.5%9.3%8.4%0.3%0.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$171M$16M$0$0$0$0$72M$72MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$7M$14M$3M$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$5M$14M$12M$30M$54MBuybacksBuybacks
-9%-10%-8%-5%-19%1%2%8%2%ROICROIC
-20%-22%-15%-12%-36%0%1%9%-7%-12%-9%Return on equityROE
0%1%7%−13%−13%−9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$2M$33M$12M$3M$6M$6M$8M$3M$5M$14M$17MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$56M$67M$70M$99M$90M$115M$120M$143M$89M$90M$107MReceivablesReceiv.
$3M$7M$4M$6M$6M$6M$7M$7M$8M$6M$6MInventoryInvent.
$21M$28M$28M$37M$42M$49M$51M$59M$40M$44M$45MAccounts payablePayables
$39M$46M$46M$68M$54M$72M$76M$92M$57M$52M$69MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$83M$132M$108M$131M$119M$157M$154M$175M$110M$131M$153MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$60M$76M$87M$110M$117M$137M$128M$114M$93M$85M$81MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.7×1.2×1.2×1.0×1.1×1.2×1.5×1.2×1.5×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$114M$110M$9M$8M$8M$8M$7M$8M$8MGoodwillGoodwill
$910M$854M$1.0B$970M$741M$673M$566M$548M$405M$477M$492MTotal assetsAssets
$357M$295M$376M$357M$249M$173M$131M$66M$43M$183M$328MTotal debtDebt
$355M$262M$364M$354M$242M$167M$123M$62M$38M$168M$311MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-4.2×-4.6×-3.4×-1.8×-8.8×0.5×1.5×3.0×0.2×0.4×0.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$475M$476M$535M$490M$375M$361M$300M$320M$236M$174M$161MShareholders’ equityEquity
$20M$94M$94MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
10.7M12.8M13.1M13.9M14.1M14.2M14.0M15.0M14.3M12.6M11.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$37.12$29.78$35.62$37.90$37.49$41.77$49.78$46.68$47.74$50.52$60.01Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-9.01$-8.24$-6.28$-4.20$-9.50$0.09$0.29$2.01$-1.19$-1.59$-1.26EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.96$3.55$2.85$3.21$7.59$5.13$4.74$4.33$4.02$0.17$0.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.96$3.55$2.85$3.21$7.59$5.13$4.74$4.33$4.02$0.17$0.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.49$1.01$0.27$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.85$0.87$1.31$2.14$0.71$1.09$1.82$2.11$1.83$1.60$1.71Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$44.43$37.10$40.86$35.21$26.52$25.40$21.44$21.33$16.54$13.79$14.45Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.5%/yr+6.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−29.5%/yr−53.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−1.6%/yr+17.5%/yr
Book value / share−12.2%/yr−12.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income+208.9%
    “Operating income increased $2.8 million, or 209%, in 2025 compared to 2024 primarily due to higher activity levels in Australia in 2025 compared to 2024 and impairment expenses recorded in 2024.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
13Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
8%low FY2020
Gross margin
24%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
78.4×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2Mowner earningsvs.($20M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $20M loss into $2M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($20M)($17M)$30M$4M$1M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$73M+$68M+$75M+$87M+$83M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$30M+$33M−$9M+$562K+$4M
Cash from operations$22M$84M$97M$92M$89M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$20M−$26M−$32M−$25M−$16M
Owner earnings$2M$57M$65M$66M$73M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue0%8%9%10%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $4M ÷ interest expense $11M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $343M · 83.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $14M − debt $357M
    What this means

    Netting $14M of cash and short-term investments against $357M of debt leaves $343M owed, about 83.3× a year's operating profit (86.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 52 + DIO 5 − DPO 33 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -19%–8%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–20%; latest $2M = operating cash $22M − maintenance capex $20M
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($20M) · cash from operations $22M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $57M ÷ Owner Earnings $2M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $2M of Owner Earnings, $57M (2657%) went back to shareholders, $3M dividends, $54M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.28×
    Harvesting
    Capex $20M ÷ depreciation $73M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $639M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.54×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $357M vs $46M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.21/share (latest year $-1.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −23% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −23% early to 2% lately, median −9% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −27.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“If these AI features do not function as intended, are improperly trained, or generate inaccurate, biased, or misleading outputs, we could experience system implementation failures, operational disruptions, or decision making based on erroneous information.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$153M
  • Cash & short-term investments$17M
  • Receivables$107M
  • Inventory$6M
  • Other current assets$23M
Current liabilities$81M
  • Accounts payable$45M
  • Other current liabilities$36M
Current ratio1.88×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.81×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$72Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+19.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$85Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($178M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$230M$18M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$5Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $748M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$207M · 28%
  • Dividends$25M · 3%
  • Buybacks$114M · 15%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$402M · 54%
  • Returned to owners$139M

    26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $25M as dividends and $114M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $114M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count3.9%

    The diluted count rose from 11M to 11M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.27/sh

    Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$78M16% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity4%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$260Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $207M of capital spent building

$114M written down across 2 years (2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 44% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Bradley J. Dodson$5.1M$5.8M$73M
2022Bradley J. Dodson$4.7M$7.6M$66M
2023Bradley J. Dodson$6.3M$2.1M$65M
2024Bradley J. Dodson$3.9M$3.3M$57M
2025Bradley J. Dodson$3.8M$3.6M$2M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership6.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Civeo Corporation (Canada) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.0% vs 10.2%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.2% early in the record and 6.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.9%

    Diluted shares grew 3.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $114M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $417M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BYDBoyd Gaming$4.1B16.3%14%13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts$2.5B13.0%4%8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts$2.0B24.8%13%
XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc.$1.1B32%9.8%4%10%
SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc.$960M13.6%5%9%
CVEOCiveo Corporation (Canada)$639M24%-4.6%-6%9%
MCRIMonarch Casino & Resort Inc.$545M17.8%13%19%
THTarget Hospitality Corp.$275M21.9%7%42%
Group median14.9%5%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Civeo Corporation (Canada) has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Civeo Corporation (Canada) earns about $60M on its 9.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−19%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2M on 11M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $311M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Civeo Corporation (Canada) (CVEO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CVEO, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CVCO its page in the Manual CVI →

Industry order: ← CHH the Hotels & Resorts chapter CZR →