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CVEO, Civeo Corporation (Canada)
We do so for the convenience of our shareholders and in an effort to provide information available in the market that will assist our investors in having a better understanding of the market environment in which we operate.
We provide hospitality services to remote workforces in Australia and Canada, including catering and food service, lodging, housekeeping and maintenance at accommodation facilities that we or our customers own.
We provide services that support the day-to-day operations of these facilities, such as laundry, facility management and maintenance, water and wastewater treatment, power generation, communication systems, security and logistics.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Australia (72%) and Canada (28%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −9.3% through the cycle on a 24% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Australia is 72% of revenue, with Canada the other meaningful segment at 28%.
- Australia72%$460M
- Canada28%$179M
- Other0%$0
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $397M | $382M | $467M | $528M | $530M | $594M | $697M | $701M | $682M | $639M | $667M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 26% | 24% | 22% | 24% | 24% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 14% | 17% | 14% | 11% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 11% | 12% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($96M) | ($98M) | ($88M) | ($49M) | ($147M) | $6M | $17M | $39M | $1M | $4M | $13M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −24.1% | −25.6% | −18.9% | −9.3% | −27.8% | 1.0% | 2.4% | 5.6% | 0.2% | 0.6% | 1.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($96M) | ($106M) | ($82M) | ($58M) | ($134M) | $1M | $4M | $30M | ($17M) | ($20M) | ($14M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $62M | $57M | $54M | $74M | $117M | $89M | $92M | $97M | $84M | $22M | $21M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $131M | $126M | $126M | $124M | $97M | $83M | $87M | $75M | $68M | $73M | $74M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $27M | $36M | $11M | $9M | $155M | $4M | $562K | ($9M) | $33M | ($30M) | ($39M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $20M | $11M | $17M | $30M | $10M | $16M | $25M | $32M | $26M | $20M | $19M | CapexCapex |
| 5.0% | 2.9% | 3.7% | 5.7% | 1.9% | 2.6% | 3.6% | 4.5% | 3.8% | 3.2% | 2.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $42M | $46M | $37M | $45M | $107M | $73M | $66M | $65M | $57M | $2M | $2M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 10.7% | 11.9% | 8.0% | 8.5% | 20.3% | 12.3% | 9.5% | 9.3% | 8.4% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $42M | $46M | $37M | $45M | $107M | $73M | $66M | $65M | $57M | $2M | $2M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 10.7% | 11.9% | 8.0% | 8.5% | 20.3% | 12.3% | 9.5% | 9.3% | 8.4% | 0.3% | 0.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $171M | $16M | $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $72M | $72M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $7M | $14M | $3M | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $5M | $14M | $12M | $30M | $54M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -9% | -10% | -8% | -5% | -19% | 1% | 2% | 8% | — | — | 2% | ROICROIC |
| -20% | -22% | -15% | -12% | -36% | 0% | 1% | 9% | -7% | -12% | -9% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | — | — | 0% | 1% | 7% | −13% | −13% | −9% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $2M | $33M | $12M | $3M | $6M | $6M | $8M | $3M | $5M | $14M | $17M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $56M | $67M | $70M | $99M | $90M | $115M | $120M | $143M | $89M | $90M | $107M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3M | $7M | $4M | $6M | $6M | $6M | $7M | $7M | $8M | $6M | $6M | InventoryInvent. |
| $21M | $28M | $28M | $37M | $42M | $49M | $51M | $59M | $40M | $44M | $45M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $39M | $46M | $46M | $68M | $54M | $72M | $76M | $92M | $57M | $52M | $69M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $83M | $132M | $108M | $131M | $119M | $157M | $154M | $175M | $110M | $131M | $153M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $60M | $76M | $87M | $110M | $117M | $137M | $128M | $114M | $93M | $85M | $81M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.4× | 1.7× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.5× | 1.2× | 1.5× | 1.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $0 | $114M | $110M | $9M | $8M | $8M | $8M | $7M | $8M | $8M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $910M | $854M | $1.0B | $970M | $741M | $673M | $566M | $548M | $405M | $477M | $492M | Total assetsAssets |
| $357M | $295M | $376M | $357M | $249M | $173M | $131M | $66M | $43M | $183M | $328M | Total debtDebt |
| $355M | $262M | $364M | $354M | $242M | $167M | $123M | $62M | $38M | $168M | $311M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -4.2× | -4.6× | -3.4× | -1.8× | -8.8× | 0.5× | 1.5× | 3.0× | 0.2× | 0.4× | 0.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $475M | $476M | $535M | $490M | $375M | $361M | $300M | $320M | $236M | $174M | $161M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | $20M | $94M | — | — | — | — | — | $94M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 10.7M | 12.8M | 13.1M | 13.9M | 14.1M | 14.2M | 14.0M | 15.0M | 14.3M | 12.6M | 11.1M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $37.12 | $29.78 | $35.62 | $37.90 | $37.49 | $41.77 | $49.78 | $46.68 | $47.74 | $50.52 | $60.01 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-9.01 | $-8.24 | $-6.28 | $-4.20 | $-9.50 | $0.09 | $0.29 | $2.01 | $-1.19 | $-1.59 | $-1.26 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.96 | $3.55 | $2.85 | $3.21 | $7.59 | $5.13 | $4.74 | $4.33 | $4.02 | $0.17 | $0.18 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.96 | $3.55 | $2.85 | $3.21 | $7.59 | $5.13 | $4.74 | $4.33 | $4.02 | $0.17 | $0.18 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.49 | $1.01 | $0.27 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $1.85 | $0.87 | $1.31 | $2.14 | $0.71 | $1.09 | $1.82 | $2.11 | $1.83 | $1.60 | $1.71 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $44.43 | $37.10 | $40.86 | $35.21 | $26.52 | $25.40 | $21.44 | $21.33 | $16.54 | $13.79 | $14.45 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +3.5%/yr | +6.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −29.5%/yr | −53.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −1.6%/yr | +17.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | −12.2%/yr | −12.3%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Operating income+208.9%
“Operating income increased $2.8 million, or 209%, in 2025 compared to 2024 primarily due to higher activity levels in Australia in 2025 compared to 2024 and impairment expenses recorded in 2024.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $20M loss into $2M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($20M) | ($17M) | $30M | $4M | $1M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$73M | +$68M | +$75M | +$87M | +$83M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$30M | +$33M | −$9M | +$562K | +$4M |
| Cash from operations | $22M | $84M | $97M | $92M | $89M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$20M | −$26M | −$32M | −$25M | −$16M |
| Owner earnings | $2M | $57M | $65M | $66M | $73M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 8% | 9% | 10% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $4M ÷ interest expense $11M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $343M · 83.3× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $14M − debt $357M
What this means
Netting $14M of cash and short-term investments against $357M of debt leaves $343M owed, about 83.3× a year's operating profit (86.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 52 + DIO 5 − DPO 33 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -19%–8%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–20%; latest $2M = operating cash $22M − maintenance capex $20MIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($20M) · cash from operations $22M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $57M ÷ Owner Earnings $2M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $2M of Owner Earnings, $57M (2657%) went back to shareholders, $3M dividends, $54M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.28×HarvestingCapex $20M ÷ depreciation $73M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $639M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.54×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $357M vs $46M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.21/share (latest year $-1.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −23% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −23% early to 2% lately, median −9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −27.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“If these AI features do not function as intended, are improperly trained, or generate inaccurate, biased, or misleading outputs, we could experience system implementation failures, operational disruptions, or decision making based on erroneous information.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$17M
- Receivables$107M
- Inventory$6M
- Other current assets$23M
- Accounts payable$45M
- Other current liabilities$36M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $748M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$207M · 28%
- Dividends$25M · 3%
- Buybacks$114M · 15%
- Retained (debt / cash)$402M · 54%
- Returned to owners$139M
26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $25M as dividends and $114M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $114M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count3.9%
The diluted count rose from 11M to 11M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.27/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$114M written down across 2 years (2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 44% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Bradley J. Dodson | $5.1M | $5.8M | $73M |
| 2022 | Bradley J. Dodson | $4.7M | $7.6M | $66M |
| 2023 | Bradley J. Dodson | $6.3M | $2.1M | $65M |
| 2024 | Bradley J. Dodson | $3.9M | $3.3M | $57M |
| 2025 | Bradley J. Dodson | $3.8M | $3.6M | $2M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership6.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Civeo Corporation (Canada) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.0% vs 10.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.2% early in the record and 6.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.9%
Diluted shares grew 3.9% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $114M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 10 years, $417M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Hotels & Resorts
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BYDBoyd Gaming | $4.1B | — | 16.3% | 14% | 13% |
| PKPark Hotels & Resorts | $2.5B | — | 13.0% | 4% | 8% |
| RRRRed Rock Resorts | $2.0B | — | 24.8% | — | 13% |
| XHRXenia Hotels & Resorts Inc. | $1.1B | 32% | 9.8% | 4% | 10% |
| SHOSunstone Hotel Investors, Inc. | $960M | — | 13.6% | 5% | 9% |
| CVEOCiveo Corporation (Canada) | $639M | 24% | -4.6% | -6% | 9% |
| MCRIMonarch Casino & Resort Inc. | $545M | — | 17.8% | 13% | 19% |
| THTarget Hospitality Corp. | $275M | — | 21.9% | 7% | 42% |
| Group median | — | — | 14.9% | 5% | 11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Civeo Corporation (Canada) has delivered.
Through the cycle, Civeo Corporation (Canada) earns about $60M on its 9.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $2M on 11M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $311M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← CVCO its page in the Manual CVI →
Industry order: ← CHH the Hotels & Resorts chapter CZR →