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LVS, Las Vegas Sands Corp.

Hotels & Resorts capital-intensive Cyclical

Sands ECO360, we develop and implement environmental practices to advance energy efficiency and transition to renewables, reduce waste, conserve water and source products and materials responsibly.

The scale of our properties enables us to offer a range of amenities to serve the widest array of customer segments in each market.

Within the mass market, the upscale position of our gaming and non-gaming amenities and service levels enables us to appeal to higher spending customers, which we refer to as premium mass.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

LVS · Las Vegas Sands Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$13.0B

+15.2% YoY · 35% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $13.7B 5-yr avg $8.6B

Operating margin 22.7% 5-yr avg 5.9%

ROIC 19% 5-yr avg 8%

Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg −3%

Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg −3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Casino (75%) and Rooms (11%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 22% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −47% and 28% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 10% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on occupancy and revenue per available room, and the model. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Casino is 75% of revenue, with Rooms the other meaningful line at 11%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Casino75%$9.8B
Rooms11%$1.4B
Mall6%$801M
Food and Beverage5%$644M
Other3%$361M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$11.3B	$12.7B	$13.7B	$12.1B	$2.9B	$4.2B	$4.1B	$10.4B	$11.3B	$13.0B	$13.7B	RevenueRevenue
11%	11%	11%	9%	27%	20%	23%	11%	10%	9%	9%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$2.5B	$3.5B	$3.8B	$3.4B	($1.4B)	($689M)	($792M)	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.8B	$3.1B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
22.2%	27.2%	27.3%	27.7%	−47.4%	−16.3%	−19.3%	22.3%	21.3%	21.6%	22.7%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.7B	$2.8B	$2.4B	$2.7B	($1.7B)	($961M)	$1.8B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.8B	Net incomeNet inc.
12%	-8%	13%	14%	—	—	8%	22%	13%	18%	18%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$4.0B	$4.5B	$4.7B	$3.0B	($1.3B)	($243M)	($944M)	$3.2B	$3.2B	$3.0B	$3.2B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$997M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	DepreciationDeprec.
$1.2B	$530M	$1.1B	($715M)	($646M)	($345M)	($3.9B)	$754M	$395M	($122M)	($140M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.4B	$837M	$949M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$828M	$651M	$1.0B	$1.6B	$1.2B	$983M	CapexCapex
12.4%	6.6%	6.9%	8.4%	41.7%	19.6%	15.8%	9.8%	13.9%	9.0%	7.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.6B	$3.7B	$3.8B	$2.0B	($2.5B)	($1.1B)	($1.6B)	$2.2B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.2B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
23.5%	29.1%	27.3%	16.7%	−86.4%	−25.3%	−38.8%	21.3%	14.5%	14.3%	16.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$2.6B	$3.7B	$3.8B	$2.0B	($2.5B)	($1.1B)	($1.6B)	$2.2B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.2B	Free cash flowFCF
23.5%	29.1%	27.3%	16.7%	−86.4%	−25.3%	−38.8%	21.3%	14.5%	14.3%	16.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$2.9B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$3.0B	$911M	$0	$0	$305M	$590M	$833M	$856M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$375M	$905M	$754M	$0	$0	$0	$505M	$1.8B	$2.2B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
16%	25%	25%	21%	-7%	-4%	-5%	14%	16%	17%	19%	ROICROIC
27%	43%	42%	52%	-57%	-48%	47%	30%	50%	102%	154%	Return on equityROE
−20%	−2%	−10%	−6%	−87%	−48%	47%	22%	30%	50%	82%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2.1B	$2.4B	$4.6B	$4.2B	$2.1B	$1.9B	$6.3B	$5.1B	$3.6B	$3.8B	$3.3B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$776M	$615M	$726M	$844M	$252M	$202M	$267M	$484M	$417M	$742M	$677M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$46M	$37M	$35M	$37M	$22M	$22M	$28M	$38M	$41M	$46M	$46M	InventoryInvent.
$128M	$171M	$178M	$149M	$89M	$77M	$89M	$167M	$164M	$190M	$159M	Accounts payablePayables
$694M	$481M	$583M	$732M	$185M	$147M	$206M	$355M	$294M	$598M	$564M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.1B	$3.2B	$5.6B	$5.3B	$5.7B	$5.5B	$6.7B	$5.8B	$4.3B	$4.8B	$4.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.8B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$3.2B	$2.8B	$2.6B	$3.9B	$4.4B	$5.8B	$4.2B	$4.6B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×	1.1×	1.8×	1.6×	2.0×	2.1×	1.7×	1.3×	0.7×	1.1×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	—	—	—	—	$10M	$103M	$102M	$103M	$103M	GoodwillGoodwill
$20.5B	$20.7B	$22.5B	$23.2B	$20.8B	$20.1B	$22.0B	$21.8B	$20.7B	$21.9B	$21.2B	Total assetsAssets
$9.6B	$9.6B	$12.1B	$12.6B	$14.1B	$14.9B	$16.1B	$14.1B	$13.8B	$15.8B	$15.8B	Total debtDebt
$7.5B	$7.2B	$7.4B	$8.4B	$12.0B	$13.1B	$9.7B	$9.0B	$10.1B	$11.9B	$12.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
9.1×	10.6×	8.4×	7.5×	-2.7×	-1.1×	-1.1×	2.8×	3.3×	3.8×	4.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$6.2B	$6.5B	$5.7B	$5.2B	$3.0B	$2.0B	$3.9B	$4.1B	$2.9B	$1.6B	$1.2B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.7%	0.5%	0.9%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%	0.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
795M	792M	786M	771M	764M	764M	764M	765M	737M	693M	671M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$14.18	$16.07	$17.47	$15.73	$3.85	$5.54	$5.38	$13.56	$15.33	$18.78	$20.48	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.11	$3.55	$3.07	$3.50	$-2.21	$-1.26	$2.40	$1.60	$1.96	$2.35	$2.75	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.33	$4.68	$4.77	$2.62	$-3.32	$-1.40	$-2.09	$2.89	$2.22	$2.68	$3.35	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.33	$4.68	$4.77	$2.62	$-3.32	$-1.40	$-2.09	$2.89	$2.22	$2.68	$3.35	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.68	$3.72	$3.79	$3.89	$1.19	$0.00	$0.00	$0.40	$0.80	$1.20	$1.28	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.76	$1.06	$1.21	$1.32	$1.61	$1.08	$0.85	$1.33	$2.13	$1.69	$1.46	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.77	$8.19	$7.23	$6.73	$3.89	$2.61	$5.08	$5.38	$3.91	$2.29	$1.79	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.2%/yr	+37.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−2.4%/yr	—
EPS	+1.2%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−11.7%/yr	+0.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	−0.5%/yr	+1.0%/yr
Book value / share	−12.7%/yr	−10.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Casino+17.9%
“Casino revenues at Marina Bay Sands increased due to overall increases in win and hold percentages, as well as an increase in table games volumes.”
✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

693Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

17%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.4×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.9Bowner earningsvs.$1.6Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.6B of profit into $1.9B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.6B

Owner earnings$1.9B · 14% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.8B	($961M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.5B	+$1.3B	+$1.2B	+$1.0B	+$1.0B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$54M	+$55M	+$44M	+$39M	+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$122M	+$395M	+$754M	−$3.9B	−$345M
Cash from operations	$3.0B	$3.2B	$3.2B	($944M)	($243M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$1.2B	−$1.6B	−$1.0B	−$651M	−$828M
Owner earnings	$1.9B	$1.6B	$2.2B	($1.6B)	($1.1B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	14%	14%	21%	-39%	-25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $54M), owner earnings is nearer $1.8B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.8×

Adequate

Operating income $2.8B ÷ interest expense $746M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $11.9B · 4.2× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $3.8B − debt $15.8B

What this means
Netting $3.8B of cash and short-term investments against $15.8B of debt leaves $11.9B owed, about 4.2× a year's operating profit (5.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 16%

High through the cycle

10-yr median, range -7%–25%; 17% latest = NOPAT $2.3B ÷ invested capital $13.5B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 17% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 14%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -86%–29%; latest $1.9B = operating cash $3.0B − maintenance capex $1.2B

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $54M of SBC) leaves $1.8B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.86×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $3.0B ÷ net income $1.6B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 164%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $3.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.9B

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $1.9B of Owner Earnings, $3.0B (164%) went back to shareholders, $833M dividends, $2.2B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $54M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.2B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.80×

Harvesting

Capex $1.2B ÷ depreciation $1.5B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $13.0B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.14×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $15.8B vs $610M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −38%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.16/share (latest year $2.46), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $2.40/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 26% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 26% early to 22% lately, median 22% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −6%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 6% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · −47.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −1.5%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.
How management talks about it Promotional

What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.3B

Cash & short-term investments$3.3B
Receivables$677M
Inventory$46M
Other current assets$213M

Current liabilities$4.6B

Accounts payable$159M
Other current liabilities$4.5B

Current ratio0.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.91×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.72×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($367M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+25.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.6× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$625Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($15.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$9.7B$187M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $23.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$10.7B · 46%
Dividends$14.5B · 62%
Buybacks$6.5B · 28%

Returned to owners$21.0B
166% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $14.5B as dividends and $6.5B as buybacks.
Source of funding−$8.4B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $8.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $9.6B to $15.8B.
Average price paid for buybacks$46.44
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 96M shares were bought for $4.5B, about $46.44 each.
Net change in share count−15.6%
The diluted count fell from 795M to 671M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$1.20/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 12% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Adelson	$5.8M	$5.4M	($1.1B)
2021	Mr. Goldstein	$31.2M	$8.4M	($1.1B)
2022	Mr. Goldstein	$11.4M	$40.3M	($1.6B)
2023	Mr. Goldstein	$21.9M	$12.5M	$2.2B
2024	Mr. Goldstein	$21.9M	$23.2M	$1.6B
2025	Mr. Goldstein	$31.1M	$27.6M	$1.9B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio774:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$54M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Las Vegas Sands Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?16.7% vs 26.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 26.6% early in the record and 16.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$9.6B → $15.8B
Debt rose from $9.6B to $15.8B while owner earnings went from about $3.4B to $1.9B — about 2.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MGMMGM Resorts International	$17.5B	—	12.1%	13%	8%
LVSLas Vegas Sands Corp.	$13.0B	—	21.9%	16%	16%
CZRCaesars Entertainment Inc.	$11.5B	—	15.7%	5%	5%
WYNNWynn Resorts Limited	$7.1B	—	12.4%	6%	8%
PENNPENN Entertainment Inc.	$7.0B	—	12.1%	12%	8%
BYDBoyd Gaming	$4.1B	—	16.3%	14%	13%
PKPark Hotels & Resorts	$2.5B	—	13.0%	4%	8%
RRRRed Rock Resorts	$2.0B	—	24.8%	—	13%
Group median	—	—	14.3%	12%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Las Vegas Sands Corp. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Las Vegas Sands Corp. earns about $2.0B on its 15.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($2.0B) Net of stock comp (−$67M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−6%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.2B on 663M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-22; net debt $12.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh LVS against another business →

The owners of LVS: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Las Vegas Sands Corp. (LVS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/LVS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← LUV its page in the Manual LW →

Industry order: ← LTH the Hotels & Resorts chapter MAR →