Owner Scorecard


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DAC, Danaos Corporation

Marine Shipping capital-intensive Cyclical

We operate our drybulk carriers in the spot market, on short-term time charters and voyage charters.

As of February 25, 2026, these customers included CMA CGM, MSC, Hapag Lloyd, COSCO, PIL, Maersk, ONE, Sealead, OOCL, Samudera, Interasia Lines, Yang Ming and ZIM.

Our containerships fleet ranges in size from 1,800 13,100 TEU, providing us flexibility to serve the diverse needs of our customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
DAC · Danaos Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.0B
+2.8% YoY · 18% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.0B 5-yr avg $943M
Operating margin 47.8% 5-yr avg 55.7%
ROIC 13% 5-yr avg 16%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Container Vessel (92%) and Drybulk Vessels (8%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 45% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −43% and 66% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Container Vessel is 92% of revenue, with Drybulk Vessels the other meaningful segment at 8%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Container Vessel92%$955M
  • Drybulk Vessels8%$87M
By geographyEurope52%Asia Pacific48%Americas0%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$498M$452M$459M$447M$462M$690M$993M$974M$1.0B$1.0B$1.0BRevenueRevenue
($213M)$187M($12M)$201M$199M$358M$653M$581M$541M$499M$499MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−42.7%41.5%−2.6%45.0%43.2%52.0%65.8%59.6%53.3%47.8%47.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($366M)$84M($33M)$131M$154M$1.1B$559M$576M$505M$495M$495MNet incomeNet inc.
1%3%0%0%0%0%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$262M$181M$165M$220M$266M$428M$935M$576M$622M$645M$645MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$129M$115M$108M$97M$102M$114M$131M$129M$148M$163M$163MDepreciationDeprec.
$499M($18M)$90M($8M)$11M($739M)$244M($129M)($32M)($13M)($13M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$31M$61M$61M$63M$64M$64MDividends paidDiv. paid
$31M$29M$71M$53M$76MBuybacksBuybacks
-3%3%-0%7%7%12%23%18%15%13%13%ROICROIC
-75%15%-5%15%15%50%22%19%15%13%13%Return on equityROE
49%19%17%13%11%11%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$74M$67M$77M$139M$66M$129M$268M$358M$514M$1.2B$1.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$8M$7M$9M$7M$8M$7M$6M$10M$26M$39M$39MReceivablesReceiv.
$11M$9M$9M$8M$10M$13M$16M$25M$24M$23M$23MInventoryInvent.
$11M$11M$10M$11M$11M$19M$25M$23M$29M$17M$17MAccounts payablePayables
$8M$4M$8M$4M$7M$772K($3M)$12M$20M$45M$45MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$136M$126M$120M$190M$118M$632M$373M$502M$671M$1.3B$1.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$2.6B$2.4B$223M$223M$240M$319M$228M$168M$169M$402M$402MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.1×0.1×0.5×0.9×0.5×2.0×1.6×3.0×4.0×3.3×3.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.1B$3.0B$2.7B$2.7B$2.7B$3.6B$3.4B$3.7B$4.3B$5.1B$5.1BTotal assetsAssets
$4.9B$4.7B$1.6B$1.4B$1.3B$1.1B$430M$404M$735M$1.2B$1.2BTotal debtDebt
$4.8B$4.7B$1.5B$1.3B$1.3B$984M$162M$46M$221M($2M)($2M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.6×2.2×-0.1×2.8×3.7×5.2×10.5×28.4×20.7×24.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$488M$549M$691M$882M$1.0B$2.1B$2.6B$3.0B$3.4B$3.8B$3.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
165M11.8M15.9M16.2M23.8M20.6M20.5M19.9M19.4M18.5M18.3MShares out (diluted)Shares
$3.03$38.39$28.79$27.57$19.39$33.50$48.45$48.91$52.31$56.41$57.08Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.22$7.13$-2.07$8.09$6.45$51.15$27.28$28.95$26.05$26.76$27.08EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.50$3.00$3.05$3.24$3.44$3.48Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.96$46.63$43.36$54.36$43.50$101.44$124.89$151.55$176.67$205.39$207.81Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/14 into 2017 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+38.4%/yr+23.8%/yr
EPS+32.9%/yr
Dividends / share+23.0%/yr (4-yr)+23.0%/yr (4-yr)
Book value / share+60.2%/yr+36.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
18Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
13%low FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $499M ÷ interest expense $20M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $1.0B + ST investments $120M − debt $1.2B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -3%–23%; 13% latest = NOPAT $499M ÷ invested capital $3.9B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Not enough data
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $645M ÷ net income $495M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.28×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Near
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.2B vs $918M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $28.76/share (latest year $27.08), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $207.81/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1% → 54% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −1% early to 54% lately, median 45% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2016 · −42.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.2B
  • Receivables$39M
  • Inventory$23M
  • Other current assets$100M
Current liabilities$402M
  • Debt due within a year$283M
  • Accounts payable$17M
  • Other current liabilities$101M
Current ratio3.28×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.23×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.88×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$918Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$283M due · $1.2B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$3.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$1MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2Bno operating-lease liability tagged this quarter, so debt alone
Deferred revenue$37Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Danaos Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?4% → 6% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $19M to $62M while revenue grew 109%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (4% of revenue then, 6% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Marine Shipping

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
KEXKirby$3.4B7.7%4%10%
MATXMatson$3.3B96%11.4%11%12%
TDWTidewater Inc.$1.4B-12.5%-6%3%
DACDanaos Corporation$1.0B46.4%10%
INSWInternational Seaways Inc. Common Stock$843M12.3%3%33%
PANLPangaea Logistics Solutions Ltd.$632M7.7%10%10%
LPGDorian LPG Ltd.$482M35.2%7%38%
GNKGenco Shipping & Trading Limited$342M-1.1%-0%31%
Group median9.6%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Danaos Corporation reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

Danaos Corporation is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Revenue, delivered16%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Danaos Corporation (DAC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/DAC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CYD its page in the Manual DAO →

Industry order: ← CMRE the Marine Shipping chapter DHT →