Share count
33Mpeak FY2025
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WD, Walker & Dunlop
We are a leading commercial real estate services, finance, and technology company in the United States.
Through investments in people, brand, and technology, we have built a diversified suite of commercial real estate services to meet the needs of our customers.
Our services include (i) multifamily lending, property sales, appraisal, valuation, and research, (ii) commercial real estate debt brokerage and advisory services, (iii) investment management, and (iv) affordable housing lending, property sales, tax credit syndication, development, and investment.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$320M
+20.6% YoY · 21% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $334M 5-yr avg $327M
Revenue $301M +26.9% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $18M yr-ago $3M
Net margin 5.9% yr-ago 1.1%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 106% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from 24% to 360% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Stock-based pay runs about 11% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 3 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 149% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $52M | $82M | $96M | $127M | $126M | $364M | $430M | $258M | $265M | $320M | $334M | RevenueRevenue |
| $185M | $233M | $213M | $230M | $330M | $385M | $319M | $193M | $139M | $78M | $57M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 359.6% | 282.8% | 222.9% | 180.8% | 263.1% | 105.9% | 74.2% | 74.6% | 52.3% | 24.5% | 17.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $114M | $211M | $161M | $173M | $246M | $266M | $214M | $107M | $108M | $56M | $69M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 39% | 9% | 24% | 25% | 26% | 25% | 21% | 25% | 22% | 28% | 28% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $759M | $1.1B | $64M | $428M | ($1.4B) | $870M | $1.6B | ($518K) | $129M | ($664M) | ($1.5B) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $111M | $131M | $142M | $152M | $169M | $210M | $235M | $227M | $238M | $239M | $244M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $516M | $704M | ($263M) | $78M | ($1.9B) | $358M | $1.1B | ($362M) | ($244M) | ($986M) | ($1.9B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $3M | $9M | $22M | $16M | $13M | $16M | $14M | CapexCapex |
| 4.8% | 6.3% | 4.9% | 3.7% | 2.4% | 2.5% | 5.1% | 6.3% | 4.9% | 4.9% | 4.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $757M | $1.1B | $59M | $423M | ($1.4B) | $861M | $1.6B | ($17M) | $116M | ($680M) | ($1.5B) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| n/m | n/m | 62.0% | 331.7% | n/m | 236.9% | 363.0% | −6.5% | 43.9% | −212.5% | −462.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $757M | $1.1B | $59M | $423M | ($1.4B) | $861M | $1.6B | ($17M) | $116M | ($680M) | ($1.5B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| n/m | n/m | 62.0% | 331.7% | n/m | 236.9% | 363.0% | −6.5% | 43.9% | −212.5% | −462.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $31M | $37M | $45M | $64M | $80M | $85M | $89M | $92M | $92M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $13M | $35M | $69M | $31M | $46M | $19M | $42M | $21M | $12M | $10M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 17% | 27% | 15% | 14% | 21% | 15% | 12% | 7% | 5% | 2% | 1% | ROICROIC |
| 19% | 26% | 18% | 17% | 21% | 17% | 13% | 6% | 6% | 3% | 4% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 14% | 13% | 17% | 13% | 8% | 1% | 1% | −2% | −1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $119M | $191M | $90M | $121M | $321M | $306M | $226M | $329M | $279M | $299M | $193M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $29M | $42M | $50M | $52M | $66M | $212M | $202M | $234M | $336M | $419M | $424M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $29M | $42M | $50M | $52M | $66M | $212M | $202M | $234M | $336M | $419M | $424M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $96M | $124M | $174M | $180M | $249M | $699M | $960M | $902M | $869M | $869M | $869M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.1B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $2.7B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $4.0B | $4.1B | $4.4B | $5.1B | $6.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $164M | $164M | $296M | $294M | $292M | $740M | $704M | $773M | $768M | $829M | $1.4B | Total debtDebt |
| $45M | ($27M) | $206M | $173M | ($30M) | $435M | $478M | $445M | $489M | $530M | $1.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | — | 11.7× | 6.5× | 3.8× | — | — | 1.2× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $610M | $809M | $902M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 35.8% | 25.7% | 25.0% | 18.9% | 22.5% | 10.1% | 7.9% | 10.8% | 10.3% | 8.4% | 8.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 30.5M | 31.4M | 31.4M | 30.8M | 31.1M | 31.5M | 32.7M | 32.9M | 33.2M | 33.4M | 33.4M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.69 | $2.62 | $3.05 | $4.14 | $4.04 | $11.53 | $13.15 | $7.85 | $8.00 | $9.59 | $9.98 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.73 | $6.73 | $5.14 | $5.63 | $7.92 | $8.43 | $6.54 | $3.27 | $3.26 | $1.69 | $2.08 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $24.79 | $33.85 | $1.89 | $13.72 | $-45.50 | $27.31 | $47.75 | $-0.51 | $3.51 | $-20.38 | $-46.13 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $24.79 | $33.85 | $1.89 | $13.72 | $-45.50 | $27.31 | $47.75 | $-0.51 | $3.51 | $-20.38 | $-46.13 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | $1.00 | $1.21 | $1.46 | $2.04 | $2.45 | $2.58 | $2.67 | $2.75 | $2.77 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.08 | $0.17 | $0.15 | $0.15 | $0.10 | $0.29 | $0.67 | $0.49 | $0.39 | $0.47 | $0.42 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $19.98 | $25.79 | $28.74 | $33.61 | $38.48 | $49.16 | $51.68 | $52.43 | $52.71 | $52.00 | $51.49 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +21.3%/yr | +18.9%/yr |
| EPS | −8.4%/yr | −26.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +15.5%/yr (7-yr) | +13.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +21.6%/yr | +37.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +11.2%/yr | +6.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
2%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.2×peak FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($680M)owner earningsvs.$56Mnet incomelow FY2020
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $56M of profit but ($680M) of owner earnings: $736M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $56M | $108M | $107M | $214M | $266M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$239M | +$238M | +$227M | +$235M | +$210M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$27M | +$27M | +$28M | +$34M | +$37M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$986M | −$244M | −$362M | +$1.1B | +$358M |
| Cash from operations | ($664M) | $129M | ($518K) | $1.6B | $870M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$16M | −$13M | −$16M | −$22M | −$9M |
| Owner earnings | ($680M) | $116M | ($17M) | $1.6B | $861M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -213% | 44% | -6% | 363% | 237% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $27M), owner earnings is nearer ($707M).
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $57M ÷ interest expense $50M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.1B · 19.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $299M − debt $1.4B
What this means
Netting $299M of cash and short-term investments against $1.4B of debt leaves $1.1B owed, about 19.2× a year's operating profit (24.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–27%; 1% latest = NOPAT $41M ÷ invested capital $2.8BIndustry peers: median -8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -1126%–1469%; latest ($680M) = operating cash ($664M) − maintenance capex $16MIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -213% of revenue this year, a 62% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $27M of SBC) leaves ($707M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? -11.81×Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ($664M) ÷ net income $56M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.07×HarvestingCapex $16M ÷ depreciation $239M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $320M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity —Current ratio ≥ 2× · —
What this means
Current assets / liabilities not in the data yet.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −44%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.64/share (latest year $1.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $50.54/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 288% → 50% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 288% early to 50% lately, median 106% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2025 · 24.5% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +1.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$96M · 3%
- Dividends$524M · 19%
- Buybacks$298M · 11%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 68%
- Returned to owners$822M
30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $524M as dividends and $298M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.2B and cash and short-term investments rose $74M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $298M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count9.4%
The diluted count rose from 31M to 33M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$2.75/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−98%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($836M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $820M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.98 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$1.0B20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity50%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $96M of capital spent building
$95M written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | William M. Walker | $7.6M | $20.0M | $861M |
| 2022 | William M. Walker | $4.8M | −$7.7M | $1.6B |
| 2023 | William M. Walker | $4.8M | $4.7M | ($17M) |
| 2024 | William M. Walker | $7.6M | $8.6M | $116M |
| 2025 | William M. Walker | $15.5M | $4.3M | ($680M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio92:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$27M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 47% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Walker & Dunlop is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?9.4%
Diluted shares grew 9.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $298M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$164M → $1.4B
Debt rose from $164M to $1.4B while owner earnings went from about $626M to ($193M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?57% → 127% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $29M to $424M while revenue grew 547%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (57% of revenue then, 127% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
And these came back clean
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGYPagaya Technologies Ltd. | $1.3B | 41% | -1.3% | 4% | 3% |
| PWPPerella Weinberg Partners | $751M | — | -7.6% | — | 15% |
| WRLDWorld Acceptance Corporation | $585M | — | 16.9% | 8% | 44% |
| DAVEDave Inc. | $554M | — | -4.2% | -12% | 13% |
| WDWalker & Dunlop | $320M | — | 143.4% | 14% | 149% |
| GEMIGemini Space Station Inc. | $180M | — | -192.5% | -95% | -123% |
| GPGIGPGI Inc. | $60M | 53% | 30.4% | -3% | 27% |
| GREELGreenidge Generation Holdings Inc. | $59M | — | -16.2% | -193% | — |
| Group median | — | — | -2.7% | -3% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFWalker & Dunlop is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered10%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−462%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Walker & Dunlop (WD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/WD, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← WCN its page in the Manual WDAY →
Industry order: ← VRTS the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter WLTH →