Owner Scorecard


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EDN, EDENOR

Electric Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityDistress / turnaroundCyclical

A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.

Latest annual: FY2024 20-F · figures as filed, in ARS · 1 ADS = 20 ordinary shares
EDN · EDENOR
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
ARS 2.04T
+33.8% YoY · 62% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue ARS 2.04T 5-yr avg ARS 1.18T
Operating margin 2.1% 5-yr avg −11.2%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin −6% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 59% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −3.9%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 15% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2015–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2015’152016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMDec 2024
Income statement
ARS 3.8BARS 25.8BARS 60.9BARS 117.1BARS 184.7BARS 268.4BARS 688.5BARS 1.40TARS 1.53TARS 2.04TARS 2.04TRevenueRevenue
ARS 2.2B(ARS 2.8B)ARS 3.6BARS 9.5BARS 9.8B(ARS 58.5B)(ARS 26.7B)(ARS 211.9B)(ARS 260.9B)ARS 42.1BARS 42.1BOperating incomeOp. inc.
59.0%−10.8%6.0%8.1%5.3%−21.8%−3.9%−15.2%−17.1%2.1%2.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
ARS 1.1BARS 250MARS 7.8BARS 9.0BARS 24.9B(ARS 51.8B)(ARS 128.7B)(ARS 46.9B)ARS 189.3BARS 274.4BARS 274.4BNet incomeNet inc.
14%37%9%30%47%52%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
ARS 3.0BARS 5.0BARS 11.2BARS 20.1BARS 20.9BARS 50.9BARS 129.5BARS 240.2BARS 155.6BARS 245.9BARS 245.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
ARS 5.4BARS 9.5BARS 19.1BARS 55.2BARS 123.4BARS 180.2BARS 154.6BARS 154.6BDepreciationDeprec.
ARS 1.9BARS 4.7BARS 3.3BARS 5.8B(ARS 13.5B)ARS 83.6BARS 203.0BARS 163.8B(ARS 213.9B)(ARS 183.0B)(ARS 183.0B)Working capital & otherWC & other
ARS 2.1BARS 4.2BARS 12.1BARS 17.3BARS 19.2BARS 28.9BARS 89.3BARS 215.1BARS 260.8BARS 360.0BARS 360.0BCapexCapex
55.1%16.4%19.9%14.8%10.4%10.8%13.0%15.4%17.1%17.6%17.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
ARS 2.7BARS 3.0BARS 6.6BARS 14.8BARS 11.4BARS 31.8BARS 74.3BARS 116.9B(ARS 24.6B)ARS 91.4BARS 91.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
71.4%11.7%10.8%12.6%6.2%11.9%10.8%8.4%−1.6%4.5%4.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
ARS 907MARS 743M(ARS 970M)ARS 2.8BARS 1.6BARS 22.0BARS 40.2BARS 25.1B(ARS 105.2B)(ARS 114.0B)(ARS 114.0B)Free cash flowFCF
23.8%2.9%−1.6%2.4%0.9%8.2%5.8%1.8%−6.9%−5.6%−5.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
5%1%13%9%11%-9%-12%-4%15%18%18%Return on equityROE
5%1%13%9%11%−9%−12%−4%15%18%18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
ARS 129MARS 259M(ARS 375M)ARS 42MARS 558MARS 6.6BARS 6.2BARS 11.1BARS 19.9BARS 23.9BARS 23.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
ARS 3.9BARS 8.4BARS 11.7BARS 17.0BARS 21.4BARS 34.2BARS 189.8BARS 145.0BARS 362.4BARS 362.4BReceivablesReceiv.
ARS 288MARS 650MARS 1.9BARS 2.6BARS 2.8BARS 6.7BARS 43.7BARS 86.7BARS 149.8BARS 149.8BInventoryInvent.
ARS 6.8BARS 13.6BARS 22.5BARS 17.3BARS 33.0BARS 148.4BARS 1.22TARS 524.7BARS 758.8BARS 758.8BAccounts payablePayables
(ARS 2.6B)(ARS 4.5B)(ARS 8.9B)ARS 2.3B(ARS 8.8B)(ARS 107.5B)(ARS 985.9B)(ARS 293.0B)(ARS 246.6B)(ARS 246.6B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
ARS 6.6BARS 13.7BARS 21.1BARS 24.3BARS 35.2BARS 81.8BARS 566.0BARS 505.7BARS 966.3BARS 966.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
ARS 9.6BARS 18.5BARS 32.3BARS 33.5BARS 63.6BARS 190.0BARS 1.35TARS 774.6BARS 1.09TARS 1.09TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.7×0.7×0.7×0.6×0.4×0.4×0.7×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
ARS 18.9BARS 70.9BARS 118.4BARS 162.6BARS 224.5BARS 463.3BARS 3.26TARS 3.29TARS 3.98TARS 3.98TTotal assetsAssets
-1.1×0.9×0.9×-2.1×-0.2×-0.4×-0.4×0.1×0.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
ARS 22.4BARS 34.9BARS 58.2BARS 97.8BARS 236.7BARS 575.7BARS 1.09TARS 1.04TARS 1.23TARS 1.51TARS 1.51TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
897M898M890M875M875M875M875M875M875M875MShares out (diluted)Shares
ARS 28.79ARS 67.79ARS 131.60ARS 211.13ARS 306.73ARS 786.86ARS 1595.26ARS 1744.84ARS 2335.00ARS 2335.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
ARS 0.28ARS 8.72ARS 10.10ARS 28.47ARS -59.19ARS -147.07ARS -53.60ARS 216.39ARS 313.60ARS 313.60EPS (diluted)EPS
ARS 3.37ARS 7.31ARS 16.60ARS 12.99ARS 36.37ARS 84.91ARS 133.56ARS -28.08ARS 104.41ARS 104.41Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
ARS 0.83ARS -1.08ARS 3.18ARS 1.85ARS 25.14ARS 45.91ARS 28.68ARS -120.22ARS -130.34ARS -130.34Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
ARS 4.72ARS 13.52ARS 19.45ARS 21.99ARS 33.08ARS 102.09ARS 245.88ARS 298.10ARS 411.39ARS 411.39Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
ARS 38.89ARS 64.77ARS 109.90ARS 270.46ARS 657.92ARS 1245.73ARS 1192.20ARS 1408.69ARS 1722.36ARS 1722.36Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+73.2%/yr (8-yr)+61.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+53.6%/yr (8-yr)+51.7%/yr
EPS+140.6%/yr (8-yr)+61.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+74.8%/yr (8-yr)+79.6%/yr
Book value / share+60.6%/yr (8-yr)+44.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2015–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
875Mpeak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

ARS 91.4Bowner earningsvs.ARS 274.4Bnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2015FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business earned ARS 91.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ARS 154.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ARS 205.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (ARS 114.0B).

Reported net incomeARS 274.4B
Owner earningsARS 91.4B · 4% of revenue
FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net incomeARS 274.4BARS 189.3B(ARS 46.9B)(ARS 128.7B)(ARS 51.8B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+ARS 154.6B+ARS 180.2B+ARS 123.4B+ARS 55.2B+ARS 19.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−ARS 183.0B−ARS 213.9B+ARS 163.8B+ARS 203.0B+ARS 83.6B
Cash from operationsARS 245.9BARS 155.6BARS 240.2BARS 129.5BARS 50.9B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−ARS 154.6B−ARS 180.2B−ARS 123.4B−ARS 55.2B−ARS 19.1B
Owner earningsARS 91.4B(ARS 24.6B)ARS 116.9BARS 74.3BARS 31.8B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−ARS 205.4B−ARS 80.6B−ARS 91.8B−ARS 34.1B−ARS 9.8B
Free cash flow(ARS 114.0B)(ARS 105.2B)ARS 25.1BARS 40.2BARS 22.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%-2%8%11%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ARS 154.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ARS 205.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Much of fiscal 2024's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Restated past financials
“IAS 29 requires all the items of the Statement of Cash Flows to be restated in terms of the measuring unit current as of the date of financial statements.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ARS 42.1B ÷ interest expense ARS 340.4B
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
    What this means

    This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Debt under-captured
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -2%–71%; latest ARS 91.4B = operating cash ARS 245.9B − maintenance capex ARS 154.6B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. It chose to put ARS 205.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (ARS 114.0B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ARS 245.9B ÷ net income ARS 274.4B

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a restatement of previously reported figures — some numbers in the record have moved since they were first filed; read what changed, and why, before trusting the trend.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.33×
    Expanding
    Capex ARS 360.0B ÷ depreciation ARS 154.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · ARS 2.04T
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.89×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt
    Debt ≤ working capital ·
    What this means

    The filings tag only a fraction of the debt this company's interest bill implies (much of it sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so this test can't be run honestly.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +4418%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are ARS 158.80/share (latest year ARS 313.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is ARS 1722.36/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2015–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 7 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 18% → −10% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to −10% lately, median −4% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Owner earnings growth +31%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 31% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −21.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.3%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2024

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assetsARS 966.3B
  • Cash & short-term investmentsARS 23.9B
  • ReceivablesARS 362.4B
  • InventoryARS 149.8B
  • Other current assetsARS 430.2B
Current liabilitiesARS 1.09T
  • Debt due within a yearARS 112.5B
  • Accounts payableARS 758.8B
  • Other current liabilitiesARS 218.5B
Current ratio0.89×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.75×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(ARS 123.5B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cashARS 112.5B due · ARS 23.9B cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Dec 31, 2024 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueARS 1.51Tequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(ARS 1.51T)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesARS 476.4BARS 8.9B of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2015–2024

Over the record, the business generated ARS 882.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • ReinvestedARS 1.01T · 114%
  • Source of funding−ARS 126.9B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ARS 126.9B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Net change in share count−2.5%

    The diluted count fell from 897M to 875M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained20%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (ARS 279.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ARS 57.1B, so each retained ARS 1 added about 0.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why EDENOR is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.

1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?3.7% vs 31.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 31.3% early in the record and 3.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electric Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
EDNEDENORARS 2.04T-0.9%11%
ETEnergy Transfer LP Common$85.5B25%10.3%8%8%
NRGNRG Energy$30.3B24%7.6%13%9%
SOSouthern Company (The)$29.6B22.8%6%12%
NEENextEra Energy Inc.$27.4B28.2%6%
CEGConstellation Energy$22.7B5.0%8%-17%
AEPAmerican Electric Power Company Inc.$21.7B19.2%6%26%
VSTVistra$17.6B10.8%7%17%
Group median10.6%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, or ADSs, evidenced by American Depositary Receipts, each representing 20 Class”; EDENOR reports in ARS, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at ARS 1 = $0.001 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in ARS.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what EDENOR has delivered.

EDENOR’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, EDENOR earns about $149M on its 10.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24−11%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’15→’24+31%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($77M) on 44M shares outstanding (a weighted average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $301M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($244M) runs well above depreciation ($105M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $62M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "EDENOR (EDN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EDN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ECX its page in the Manual EDU →

Industry order: ← DTW the Electric Utilities chapter EIX →