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ET, Energy Transfer LP Common
Energy Transfer is a midstream energy partnership. It owns a sprawling network of pipelines, treating and processing plants, and storage that gathers, treats, moves, and stores natural gas, natural gas liquids, crude oil, and refined products across much of the United States, and it markets those commodities. Part of the take is a fee for carrying and holding other companies' hydrocarbons — a toll on volume — and part rides on the price of the commodities the partnership itself buys and sells.
Energy Transfer's primary cash requirements are for distributions to its partners, capital expenditures, general and administrative expenses and debt service requirements.
Financial Statements and Supplementary Data" for additional financial information about our segments.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Refined product sales (28%) and Crude sales (27%), with 4 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- The question is how much of this is a toll road and how much is a commodity trade. The pipe sitting between the drilling basins and the end markets is the would-be moat, and the test is whether that footprint is dense enough to be the cheapest path a shipper can find — the filing itself calls the gathering, treating, and transport business highly competitive, and interstate rates answer to FERC, where a shipper can claw back charges. Fee contracts steady the cash, but the volume that rides through depends on drilling the partnership does not control, and a debt load takes its cut before the owners see a dollar. Watch the share of cash that is fee-based, the cost edge of the network, and what the leverage and returns leave behind — the figures are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Refined product sales at 28%.
- Refined product sales28%$24.2B
- Crude sales27%$23.5B
- NGL sales22%$19.0B
- Natural Gas, Midstream15%$12.4B
- Natural gas sales5%$4.7B
- Other2%$1.7B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $31.8B | $40.5B | $54.1B | $54.2B | $39.0B | $67.4B | $89.9B | $78.6B | $82.7B | $85.5B | $92.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 25% | 24% | 23% | 27% | 35% | 25% | 20% | 23% | 25% | 26% | 25% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $1.9B | $2.7B | $5.4B | $7.2B | $3.0B | $8.8B | $7.7B | $8.3B | $9.1B | $9.0B | $9.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.8% | 6.7% | 10.0% | 13.3% | 7.7% | 13.0% | 8.6% | 10.6% | 11.1% | 10.6% | 10.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $995M | $954M | $1.7B | $3.5B | ($648M) | $5.5B | $4.8B | $3.9B | $4.8B | $4.4B | $4.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | 0% | 5% | — | 3% | 4% | 7% | 10% | 7% | 9% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $3.3B | $4.4B | $7.5B | $8.1B | $7.4B | $11.2B | $9.1B | $9.6B | $11.5B | $10.1B | $10.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2.2B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $5.2B | $5.7B | $5.9B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $41M | $822M | $2.8B | $1.3B | $4.2B | $1.8B | $16M | $1.1B | $1.4B | ($114M) | $195M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $7.8B | $8.4B | $7.4B | $6.0B | $5.1B | $2.8B | $3.4B | $3.1B | $4.2B | $6.3B | $7.0B | CapexCapex |
| 24.4% | 20.8% | 13.7% | 11.0% | 13.2% | 4.2% | 3.8% | 4.0% | 5.0% | 7.4% | 7.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1.1B | $1.9B | $4.6B | $4.9B | $3.7B | $8.3B | $5.7B | $6.4B | $7.3B | $3.8B | $3.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 3.5% | 4.6% | 8.6% | 9.1% | 9.5% | 12.4% | 6.3% | 8.2% | 8.9% | 4.5% | 3.9% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($4.4B) | ($4.0B) | $99M | $2.1B | $2.2B | $8.3B | $5.7B | $6.4B | $7.3B | $3.8B | $3.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| −14.0% | −9.9% | 0.2% | 3.9% | 5.7% | 12.4% | 6.3% | 8.2% | 8.9% | 4.5% | 3.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $330M | $303M | $429M | $7M | $0 | $205M | $1.1B | $111M | $250M | — | $250M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $0 | $0 | $25M | $0 | $31M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 3% | — | — | 8% | — | 10% | 8% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 4% | 3% | 6% | 10% | -2% | 14% | 12% | 9% | 10% | 9% | 9% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | 3% | 6% | 10% | −2% | 14% | 12% | 9% | 10% | 9% | 9% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $467M | $336M | $419M | $291M | $367M | $336M | $257M | $161M | $312M | $1.3B | $951M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $3.6B | $4.5B | $4.0B | $5.0B | $3.9B | $7.7B | $8.5B | $9.0B | — | — | $15.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $2.1B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $3.1B | $4.8B | $4.6B | InventoryInvent. |
| $3.5B | $4.7B | $3.5B | $4.1B | $2.8B | $6.8B | $7.0B | $6.7B | — | — | $7.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $2.1B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $4.0B | $4.9B | $3.1B | $4.8B | $13.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $6.9B | $10.7B | $6.8B | $7.5B | $6.3B | $10.5B | $12.1B | $12.4B | $14.2B | $18.2B | $22.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $7.3B | $7.9B | $9.3B | $7.7B | $5.9B | $10.8B | $10.4B | $11.3B | $12.7B | $15.0B | $19.0B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.9× | 1.4× | 0.7× | 1.0× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $5.7B | $4.8B | $4.9B | $5.2B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $4.0B | $3.9B | $5.5B | $5.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $78.9B | $86.2B | $88.4B | $99.0B | $95.1B | $106.0B | $105.6B | $113.7B | $125.4B | $141.3B | $147.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $43.8B | $44.1B | $46.0B | $51.1B | $51.4B | $49.7B | $48.3B | $52.4B | $59.8B | $68.3B | $69.3B | Total debtDebt |
| $43.3B | $43.7B | $45.6B | $50.8B | $51.1B | $49.4B | $48.0B | $52.2B | $59.4B | $67.1B | $68.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 1.0× | 1.4× | 2.6× | 3.1× | 1.3× | 3.9× | 3.4× | 3.2× | 2.9× | 2.6× | 2.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $22.4B | $30.1B | $31.0B | $33.9B | $31.4B | $39.3B | $40.7B | $43.9B | $46.0B | $49.0B | $49.7B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| $897M | $895M | $378M | $21M | $2.8B | — | — | — | — | — | $2.8B | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 2.16B | 2.30B | 2.92B | 2.64B | 2.70B | 2.74B | 3.10B | 3.18B | 3.42B | 3.45B | 3.46B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $14.74 | $17.61 | $18.51 | $20.55 | $14.45 | $24.61 | $29.02 | $24.73 | $24.17 | $24.80 | $26.69 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.46 | $0.41 | $0.60 | $1.33 | $-0.24 | $2.00 | $1.54 | $1.24 | $1.41 | $1.29 | $1.26 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.51 | $0.81 | $1.59 | $1.86 | $1.37 | $3.04 | $1.83 | $2.02 | $2.15 | $1.11 | $1.05 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.06 | $-1.74 | $0.03 | $0.79 | $0.83 | $3.04 | $1.83 | $2.02 | $2.15 | $1.11 | $1.05 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $3.60 | $3.67 | $2.53 | $2.26 | $1.90 | $1.03 | $1.09 | $0.99 | $1.22 | $1.83 | $2.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $10.40 | $13.07 | $10.61 | $12.87 | $11.64 | $14.36 | $13.13 | $13.83 | $13.45 | $14.21 | $14.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2019 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.0%/yr | +11.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +9.0%/yr | −4.0%/yr |
| EPS | +12.1%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −7.3%/yr | −0.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +3.5%/yr | +4.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $4.4B of profit but $3.8B of owner earnings: $587M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $4.4B | $4.8B | $3.9B | $4.8B | $5.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$5.7B | +$5.2B | +$4.4B | +$4.2B | +$3.8B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$148M | +$151M | +$130M | +$115M | +$111M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$114M | +$1.4B | +$1.1B | +$16M | +$1.8B |
| Cash from operations | $10.1B | $11.5B | $9.6B | $9.1B | $11.2B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$6.3B | −$4.2B | −$3.1B | −$3.4B | −$2.8B |
| Owner earnings | $3.8B | $7.3B | $6.4B | $5.7B | $8.3B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 9% | 8% | 6% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $148M), owner earnings is nearer $3.7B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $9.0B ÷ interest expense $3.5B
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $67.1B · 7.4× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $1.3B + ST investments $1M − debt $68.3B
What this means
Netting $1.3B of cash and short-term investments against $68.3B of debt leaves $67.1B owed, about 7.4× a year's operating profit (7.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 39 + DIO 27 − DPO 38 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median, range 3%–10%; 7% latest = NOPAT $8.4B ÷ invested capital $116.1BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 3%–12%; latest $3.8B = operating cash $10.1B − maintenance capex $6.3BIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $148M of SBC) leaves $3.7B.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $10.1B ÷ net income $4.4B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $3.8B
What this means
Of $3.8B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.11×MaintainingCapex $6.3B ÷ depreciation $5.7B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $85.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.22×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $68.3B vs $3.3B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +256%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.28/share (latest year $1.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 8% early to 11% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 5.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$951M
- Receivables$15.7B
- Inventory$4.6B
- Other current assets$981M
- Debt due within a year$19M
- Accounts payable$7.3B
- Other current liabilities$11.7B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $4.8B against the $3.5B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.4 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $82.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$54.5B · 66%
- Buybacks$56M · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)$27.5B · 34%
- Returned to owners$56M
0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $56M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $25.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $484M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $56M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count60.3%
The diluted count rose from 2157M to 3457M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained11%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($29.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $3.3B, so each retained $1 added about 0.11 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$5.0B written down across 5 years (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Stock-based compensation$148M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Energy Transfer LP Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?60.3%
Diluted shares grew 60.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $56M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $11.2B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Pipelines & Midstream
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ETEnergy Transfer LP Common | $85.5B | 25% | 10.3% | 8% | 8% |
| EPDEnterprise Products Partners L.P. | $52.6B | 27% | 14.4% | — | 12% |
| OKEONEOK Inc. | $33.6B | 29% | 15.8% | 8% | 13% |
| NRGNRG Energy | $30.3B | 24% | 7.6% | 13% | 9% |
| LNGCheniere Energy Inc. | $19.5B | 45% | 25.7% | 19% | 18% |
| TRGPTarga Resources Inc. | $17.0B | 19% | 4.0% | 5% | 8% |
| KMIKinder Morgan Inc. | $15.2B | 68% | 27.8% | 5% | 20% |
| WMBWilliams Companies Inc. (The) | $14.9B | 77% | 22.1% | 6% | 20% |
| Group median | — | 28% | 15.1% | 8% | 12% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Energy Transfer LP Common has delivered.
Through the cycle, Energy Transfer LP Common earns about $7.2B on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $3.6B on 3441M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $68.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ESTC its page in the Manual ETD →
Industry order: ← EPD the Pipelines & Midstream chapter GEL →