Owner Scorecard


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ET, Energy Transfer LP Common

Pipelines & Midstream capital-intensive

Energy Transfer is a midstream energy partnership. It owns a sprawling network of pipelines, treating and processing plants, and storage that gathers, treats, moves, and stores natural gas, natural gas liquids, crude oil, and refined products across much of the United States, and it markets those commodities. Part of the take is a fee for carrying and holding other companies' hydrocarbons — a toll on volume — and part rides on the price of the commodities the partnership itself buys and sells.

Energy Transfer's primary cash requirements are for distributions to its partners, capital expenditures, general and administrative expenses and debt service requirements.

Financial Statements and Supplementary Data" for additional financial information about our segments.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ET · Energy Transfer LP Common
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$85.5B
+3.5% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $92.3B 5-yr avg $80.8B
Gross margin 25% 5-yr avg 24%
Operating margin 10.3% 5-yr avg 10.8%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Refined product sales (28%) and Crude sales (27%), with 4 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
The question is how much of this is a toll road and how much is a commodity trade. The pipe sitting between the drilling basins and the end markets is the would-be moat, and the test is whether that footprint is dense enough to be the cheapest path a shipper can find — the filing itself calls the gathering, treating, and transport business highly competitive, and interstate rates answer to FERC, where a shipper can claw back charges. Fee contracts steady the cash, but the volume that rides through depends on drilling the partnership does not control, and a debt load takes its cut before the owners see a dollar. Watch the share of cash that is fee-based, the cost edge of the network, and what the leverage and returns leave behind — the figures are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 6 lines, the largest Refined product sales at 28%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Refined product sales28%$24.2B
  • Crude sales27%$23.5B
  • NGL sales22%$19.0B
  • Natural Gas, Midstream15%$12.4B
  • Natural gas sales5%$4.7B
  • Other2%$1.7B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$31.8B$40.5B$54.1B$54.2B$39.0B$67.4B$89.9B$78.6B$82.7B$85.5B$92.3BRevenueRevenue
25%24%23%27%35%25%20%23%25%26%25%Gross marginGross mgn
2%1%1%1%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.9B$2.7B$5.4B$7.2B$3.0B$8.8B$7.7B$8.3B$9.1B$9.0B$9.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
5.8%6.7%10.0%13.3%7.7%13.0%8.6%10.6%11.1%10.6%10.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$995M$954M$1.7B$3.5B($648M)$5.5B$4.8B$3.9B$4.8B$4.4B$4.4BNet incomeNet inc.
0%5%3%4%7%10%7%9%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$3.3B$4.4B$7.5B$8.1B$7.4B$11.2B$9.1B$9.6B$11.5B$10.1B$10.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.2B$2.6B$2.9B$3.1B$3.7B$3.8B$4.2B$4.4B$5.2B$5.7B$5.9BDepreciationDeprec.
$41M$822M$2.8B$1.3B$4.2B$1.8B$16M$1.1B$1.4B($114M)$195MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$7.8B$8.4B$7.4B$6.0B$5.1B$2.8B$3.4B$3.1B$4.2B$6.3B$7.0BCapexCapex
24.4%20.8%13.7%11.0%13.2%4.2%3.8%4.0%5.0%7.4%7.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.1B$1.9B$4.6B$4.9B$3.7B$8.3B$5.7B$6.4B$7.3B$3.8B$3.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.5%4.6%8.6%9.1%9.5%12.4%6.3%8.2%8.9%4.5%3.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($4.4B)($4.0B)$99M$2.1B$2.2B$8.3B$5.7B$6.4B$7.3B$3.8B$3.6BFree cash flowFCF
−14.0%−9.9%0.2%3.9%5.7%12.4%6.3%8.2%8.9%4.5%3.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$330M$303M$429M$7M$0$205M$1.1B$111M$250M$250MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$0$25M$0$31M$0$0BuybacksBuybacks
3%8%10%8%8%8%7%7%ROICROIC
4%3%6%10%-2%14%12%9%10%9%9%Return on equityROE
4%3%6%10%−2%14%12%9%10%9%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$467M$336M$419M$291M$367M$336M$257M$161M$312M$1.3B$951MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.6B$4.5B$4.0B$5.0B$3.9B$7.7B$8.5B$9.0B$15.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$2.1B$2.0B$1.7B$1.5B$1.7B$2.0B$2.5B$2.5B$3.1B$4.8B$4.6BInventoryInvent.
$3.5B$4.7B$3.5B$4.1B$2.8B$6.8B$7.0B$6.7B$7.3BAccounts payablePayables
$2.1B$1.8B$2.2B$2.5B$2.8B$2.8B$4.0B$4.9B$3.1B$4.8B$13.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$6.9B$10.7B$6.8B$7.5B$6.3B$10.5B$12.1B$12.4B$14.2B$18.2B$22.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$7.3B$7.9B$9.3B$7.7B$5.9B$10.8B$10.4B$11.3B$12.7B$15.0B$19.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×1.4×0.7×1.0×1.1×1.0×1.2×1.1×1.1×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$5.7B$4.8B$4.9B$5.2B$2.4B$2.5B$2.6B$4.0B$3.9B$5.5B$5.6BGoodwillGoodwill
$78.9B$86.2B$88.4B$99.0B$95.1B$106.0B$105.6B$113.7B$125.4B$141.3B$147.5BTotal assetsAssets
$43.8B$44.1B$46.0B$51.1B$51.4B$49.7B$48.3B$52.4B$59.8B$68.3B$69.3BTotal debtDebt
$43.3B$43.7B$45.6B$50.8B$51.1B$49.4B$48.0B$52.2B$59.4B$67.1B$68.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.0×1.4×2.6×3.1×1.3×3.9×3.4×3.2×2.9×2.6×2.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$22.4B$30.1B$31.0B$33.9B$31.4B$39.3B$40.7B$43.9B$46.0B$49.0B$49.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.3%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$897M$895M$378M$21M$2.8B$2.8BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
2.16B2.30B2.92B2.64B2.70B2.74B3.10B3.18B3.42B3.45B3.46BShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.74$17.61$18.51$20.55$14.45$24.61$29.02$24.73$24.17$24.80$26.69Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.46$0.41$0.60$1.33$-0.24$2.00$1.54$1.24$1.41$1.29$1.26EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.51$0.81$1.59$1.86$1.37$3.04$1.83$2.02$2.15$1.11$1.05Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.06$-1.74$0.03$0.79$0.83$3.04$1.83$2.02$2.15$1.11$1.05Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.60$3.67$2.53$2.26$1.90$1.03$1.09$0.99$1.22$1.83$2.02Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.40$13.07$10.61$12.87$11.64$14.36$13.13$13.83$13.45$14.21$14.39Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.0%/yr+11.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+9.0%/yr−4.0%/yr
EPS+12.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−7.3%/yr−0.8%/yr
Book value / share+3.5%/yr+4.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count
3.4Bpeak FY2025
ROIC
7%low FY2016
Gross margin
26%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
17.4×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.8Bowner earningsvs.$4.4Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $4.4B of profit but $3.8B of owner earnings: $587M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$4.4B
Owner earnings$3.8B · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$4.4B$4.8B$3.9B$4.8B$5.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$5.7B+$5.2B+$4.4B+$4.2B+$3.8B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$148M+$151M+$130M+$115M+$111M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$114M+$1.4B+$1.1B+$16M+$1.8B
Cash from operations$10.1B$11.5B$9.6B$9.1B$11.2B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$6.3B−$4.2B−$3.1B−$3.4B−$2.8B
Owner earnings$3.8B$7.3B$6.4B$5.7B$8.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%9%8%6%12%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $148M), owner earnings is nearer $3.7B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $9.0B ÷ interest expense $3.5B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $67.1B · 7.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $1.3B + ST investments $1M − debt $68.3B
    What this means

    Netting $1.3B of cash and short-term investments against $68.3B of debt leaves $67.1B owed, about 7.4× a year's operating profit (7.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 39 + DIO 27 − DPO 38 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    7-yr median, range 3%–10%; 7% latest = NOPAT $8.4B ÷ invested capital $116.1B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–12%; latest $3.8B = operating cash $10.1B − maintenance capex $6.3B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $148M of SBC) leaves $3.7B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $10.1B ÷ net income $4.4B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $3.8B
    What this means

    Of $3.8B Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.11×
    Maintaining
    Capex $6.3B ÷ depreciation $5.7B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $85.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.22×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $68.3B vs $3.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +256%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.28/share (latest year $1.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $14.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 8% early to 11% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 5.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$22.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$951M
  • Receivables$15.7B
  • Inventory$4.6B
  • Other current assets$981M
Current liabilities$19.0B
  • Debt due within a year$19M
  • Accounts payable$7.3B
  • Other current liabilities$11.7B
Current ratio1.17×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.93×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$19M due · $951M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+32.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$36.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$71.1B$1.8B of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$343Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$3.5B
'27$5.3B
'28$4.5B
'29$11.6B
'30$6.2B
later$37.6B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$3.5Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$8.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$11.6Bin 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$68.7Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$951M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.8B
Together, against $3.5B due next year1.4×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $4.8B against the $3.5B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.4 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $82.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$54.5B · 66%
  • Buybacks$56M · 0%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$27.5B · 34%
  • Returned to owners$56M

    0% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $56M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $25.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $484M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $56M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count60.3%

    The diluted count rose from 2157M to 3457M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained11%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($29.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $3.3B, so each retained $1 added about 0.11 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$12.9B9% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity11%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $54.5B of capital spent building

$5.0B written down across 5 years (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Stock-based compensation$148M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Energy Transfer LP Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?60.3%

    Diluted shares grew 60.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $56M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $11.2B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Insurance reserves, Contingencies as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Pipelines & Midstream

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ETEnergy Transfer LP Common$85.5B25%10.3%8%8%
EPDEnterprise Products Partners L.P.$52.6B27%14.4%12%
OKEONEOK Inc.$33.6B29%15.8%8%13%
NRGNRG Energy$30.3B24%7.6%13%9%
LNGCheniere Energy Inc.$19.5B45%25.7%19%18%
TRGPTarga Resources Inc.$17.0B19%4.0%5%8%
KMIKinder Morgan Inc.$15.2B68%27.8%5%20%
WMBWilliams Companies Inc. (The)$14.9B77%22.1%6%20%
Group median28%15.1%8%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Energy Transfer LP Common has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Energy Transfer LP Common earns about $7.2B on its 8.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2018+69%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3.6B on 3441M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $68.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Energy Transfer LP Common (ET), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ET, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ESTC its page in the Manual ETD →

Industry order: ← EPD the Pipelines & Midstream chapter GEL →